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## **Soviet Union**

***Political Affairs***

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# Soviet Union

## Political Affairs

JPRS-UPA-89-056

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**ERRATUM:** This report is republished to provide pages 23-54. Please discard JPRS-UPA-89-056 of 27 September and substitute this corrected copy.

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### **Federative Principles Deemed Unsuitable for CPSU**

18001547 Kiev PRAVDA UKRAINY in Russian  
2 Aug 89 p 2

[Article by F. Rudich, doctor of philosophical sciences: "In Order To Be in the Vanguard, Is It Necessary to Rebuild the Party on Federative Principles"]

[Text] Perestroyka, which developed at the direction of the party, has subjected all aspects of our life to critical scrutiny. Needless to say, the party itself could not avoid criticism and must not remain apart from it. Today this situation is influenced by the fact that perestroyka actually lags behind the processes of change currently taking place in our society. And to the extent that change in the situation is the aim of criticism, it is useful and necessary.

It must be recognized, however, that this stream of criticism includes attacks on key organizational principles of the party of Lenin which are destructive in nature. Forces have manifested themselves which are making a concerted effort to discredit party elective bodies, party machinery, and CPSU members, and which are trying to sow discord among local and central organs of the party and to stand in opposition to the soviets. In a number of regions efforts are being undertaken to create alternative political structures in opposition to the party committees, and appeals are being made for a multi-party system.

To evaluate these trends properly and resolve the problems that have arisen, it is particularly important to heed the ideas of Lenin on the building of our party, which are undoubtedly sound and enduring. By analyzing the Leninist stage of party development, and intra-party activities as they actually took place, it is possible to obtain substantive answers.

Using this approach, I should like to examine a debate that is now taking place about extending the principles of federalism in party development and the granting of so-called "independence" to the communist parties of the Union republics in drawing up their own programs and party rules.

### **The Testimony of History**

Consistently, from the very beginning, communists have represented themselves as a party of the international proletariat. The Communist Manifesto took note of the fact that communists "uphold the universal interests, apart from the national interests, of the entire proletariat" and that "they shall always serve the interests of the movement as a whole."

At the inception of the social democratic movement, as we know, two approaches to party construction appeared. One consisted of creating a single international Marxist party on the basis of democratic centralism. The other would attempt to form the Russian Social Democratic Labor Party (RSDLP) as a federation

of disparate national proletarian organizations. This position was backed particularly by the leaders of the Universal Jewish Workers Union in Russia and Poland (the Bund). In advancing its proposals the Bund was motivated by the contention of the Jewish proletariat that it was the most oppressed as well as by the special interests of Jewish workers as distinct from those of others.

The second approach, however, tended to split the unified international party into separate, isolated national parties as well as to bring about a loss of unity within the international working class. In view of this fact the Second RSDLP Congress rejected an ultimatum by the Bund demanding that it be recognized as "the sole representative of the Jewish proletariat" and as a "federative element of the RSDLP."

An effort to apply this principle of "federative" development to the party was undertaken in early 1901 by the governing board of the Social Democrats in Poland and Lithuania. In November 1902 a draft of the formation of the RSDLP along federative lines was even approved by the Third Congress of the Social Democrats of Poland and Latvia. The Fourth Congress of this party, however, advocated merger with the RSDLP and withdrew its demand for federation. At the Fourth (Joint) Congress of the RSDLP and the Bund, after renouncing their demands for reorganization in accordance with federative principles, the Social Democrats of Poland and Lithuania were admitted into the RSDLP.

The Leninist international unity of the party became one of the decisive factors in the victory of the proletariat over autocracy and the bourgeoisie and the establishment of the socialist order.

The question of forming communist parties in the Soviet national republics under the party of Lenin arose in the post-October period. It is well known that the Ukrainian communists were the initiators of a radically new system of party unification, and that it drew the close attention of V. I. Lenin and the party Central Committee. The principles and the form of unifying the Ukrainian Bolshevik organizations (the issue of maintaining international unity and the principle of democratic socialism) were taken up repeatedly at sessions of the Central Committee of the RSDLP(b) and the RCP(b) and were discussed regularly with representatives of the local party organizations. The Ukrainian communists had to overcome separatist, and often nationalist, tendencies, which manifested themselves in efforts by some party officials to create a party separate from the RCP(b).

The cohesion of the Ukrainian party organizations around the RCP(b) Central Committee of Lenin, backed by a willingness and desire on their part to consolidate the party and strengthen its unity, won the day. The First Conference of Ukrainian Communist Party of Bolsheviks, which took place during the period 5-12 July 1918,

adopted the following resolution: "To unite the Ukrainian Communist Party organizations into the Communist Party of the Ukraine, which shall be autonomous with respect to local issues, with its own Central Committee and congresses, but function as an integral and subordinate element of the Communist Party in matters of general policy before RCP congresses and the RCP Central Committee."

By successfully completing the process of consolidating local Bolshevik organizations and of forming the Communist Party of the Ukraine, as one of the organizational components of a single Leninist party, the Ukrainian communists made a substantial contribution to strengthening the cohesive unity of the entire RCP(b). During the period from October through December of that year the communist parties of Lithuania, Belorussia, Latvia, and Estonia were formed along the same lines.

Special consideration was given to the issue of the communist parties in the Soviet national republics at the Eighth Congress of the RCP(b), which took place in March 1919. Decisively rejecting the federative principle of party development, the congress declared: "It is essential to have a single centralized communist party with a single central committee guiding the entire operation of the party in all elements of the RSDLP. All decisions of the RCP and its executive bodies are unconditionally binding upon all party elements regardless of national affiliation. The central committees of the Ukrainian, Latvian, and Lithuanian communists possess the rights of regional committees and are entirely subordinate to the RCP Central Committee." This decision signaled the completion of the process of searching for a party organizational principle under the new conditions.

#### New Proposals Summarized and Our View

Contentions are currently being advanced that the "renewal" of our party can come about only through "national regeneration" and that the party itself must not serve as "the mouthpiece of some dubious metaphysics but express the substance of national life and the aspirations of the people." Hence the proposals to change the status of republic party organizations from that of a single party, founded upon the principle of democratic centralism and consisting of local, regional organizations in terms of rights, into a "union of parties" in accordance with federative principles. (See "Hearing One Another," *KOMMUNIST*, No. 6, 1989. pp 77-78.)

Actually, experience confirms the necessity of further refining and perfecting interaction between the center, communist parties of the Union republics, and local party organizations. It has now become necessary to endow republic communist parties with regulatory powers distinct in status from those of oblast or regional party organizations. The Communist Party of the Ukraine, for example, numbering in its ranks 3.3 million CPSU members, deals with tasks that differ in complexity as well as scope from those of the regional party

organizations. It is incumbent upon republic party organizations as well as the organizations of such national territorial units as autonomous republics, okrugs, and oblasts to delegate the authority to resolve many organizational, structural, staff, and other kinds of problems. But can the resolution of all these problems be provided for by building the party along the lines of federalism?

It is well known that V. I. Lenin considered the principle of federalism for the party of the new type to be absolutely unacceptable. "We reject federalism in principle from the outset," he said, "and we reject every kind of obligatory dividing line between peoples." Ilich emphasized in particular: "In order to eradicate entirely the notion of national character, the party designated itself not simply "Russian" [Russkiy] but "belonging to Russia" [Rossiyskiy].

If the communists wish to attain their ultimate objective, as well as the goals of today's process of perestroika (and undoubtedly they do), then mindful of national differences, potentialities, and rights, but not emphasizing them unduly, they should continue as before to bolster the overall international unity of their ranks as the only way to ensure success.

Advocates of party building in accordance with the principle of federalism tend, in fact, to weaken—whether they wish to or not—the party's position as the political vanguard of society. If it should become, let us suppose, "a union of national parties," then in the face of the recent regional and national egoism, which is now perceptibly making itself felt in the sphere of economics, it may assume a political shape of its own and turn into a potent destabilizing factor. Today we are, in fact, coming into contact with a self-effacing "pluralism," reflecting a political potpourri of a hundred different hues, in which the red star could become entirely invisible.

#### A Key Factor

To fulfill its role today as the political and intellectual vanguard of Soviet multinational society, the party is called upon:

First, to uphold the fundamental communist tradition of international unity in its ranks. The warning of V. I. Lenin that at critical times in the life of a society "the slightest vacillation within the party is capable of ruining everything" resounds today with special force.

Second, to consolidate all party forces in national regions under conditions in which there is increasing danger of aggravating international relations with concomitant consequences for socialist society.

Third, to systematically improve the principles of party building, so that with the extension of the sovereignty of the Soviet republics they may be successful, insofar as possible, in achieving communist policy objectives, while sufficiently taking into consideration the demands for national and state development of all persons residing in the country.

Are the communist parties of the Union republics capable of becoming more forceful and independent in resolving regional and all-Union problems without "federalism" and without endowing them with a particular "national" coloration?

In our judgment, the answer is yes. The limits placed on the jurisdiction of the USSR and the Union republics, decentralization, the transfer of administrative functions to local authorities, the strengthening of independence and local responsibility in the spheres of economic, social, and cultural development, as well as in the area of environmental protection, etc.—all of this together, in and of itself, is creating favorable circumstances for the emergence of independence and business initiative on the part of republic party organizations.

Faced with the necessity of improving the entire mechanism of the party apparatus, it is important to constantly bear in mind V. I. Lenin's legacy of international party unity. A key factor, we submit, in the ability of the CPSU to fulfill its role of coordinating and integrating society is rooted in this precept. As M. S. Gorbachev stated in an address to the CPSU Central Committee: "At this point I wish to emphasize once again the predominant idea of the party's predestined role as the political vanguard; as the bearer of program objectives; as the principal agency for expressing the international interests of the workers; and as an exceptionally important and irreplaceable element in the social consolidation of society in rallying around the goals and tasks of perestroika."

The Communist Party has proved itself the instigator of perestroika, resolute—without fear or compromise—in exposing the deficiencies of socialism and in assuming responsibility for its failings. The party has worked out and offered our society a scheme for the radical reform of the economic and political system, and it is today the sole force capable of bringing the renewal of socialism in our country to a successful conclusion.

The renewal of society must activate the renewal of the Communist Party. It is no simple task being the political vanguard of the country. It means above everything else living for the interests of the working people, sharing their concerns, and organizing and consolidating their forces in the effort to carry out perestroika.

The times require that the party address social and economic problems by use of political means. We refer in this regard to policy line development, cadre selection and training, and the monitoring of adopted decisions and plans as they are being implemented.

With regard to the party's authority, we have in mind authority throughout its elements. As far as the organs of leadership are concerned, we must strive to attain an all-around increase in their competence and an extension of the democratic basis of their activities. The theory and strategy of social development must be worked out more thoroughly. Especially critical is the matter of arming communists with a scientifically sound conception of

socialism. A broad spectrum of issues must be considered in this context: the party's changing place and function in society and in the area of economics; especially, its ideological activities under current conditions; ways of developing intra-party democracy; and interaction with social organizations and movements.

Communists are called upon not only to recognize what is new in unfolding events but to analyze and actively study the critical problems that are being discussed in society, such as the character of socialism in the future, social guarantees and political guarantees, national relations, and changing property relations.

The primary party organizations are called upon to make increased demands upon all members of the party. Today as never before there is a need for real fighters, who, in actions as well as words, are prepared to stand up for the party's policies and ideals; people who will not put up with lies and deceit, and who live for the interests and hopes of the people. An understanding of ethics, of honor, and of the dignity of being a communist, steadfastly holding to the communist ideology and world view, is becoming increasingly critical under these new conditions. Party members should know how to gain the sympathy of the workers and to repulse anti-socialist and anti-party forces. The party has no need of people who lack these qualities or who tolerate double-dealing.

The party as a whole confronts the task of overcoming an idyllic internal sense of self-complacency, creating instead conditions for the creative, strenuous, and honorable effort of each communist, and increasing a sense of responsibility for the state of affairs that comes from personal participation in all decisions that are made.

Our party is a party of the new type, a party of revolutionary action, and as such it is constructed as an organic unity, combining three kinds of principles—organizational, ideological, and political. The replacement of these by essentially different principles, resulting in the destruction of their interrelations, threatens to alter the very existence of the party as the political vanguard of developing socialist society.

#### **Legislators to Receive Expanded Research Support**

*18001565 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 30 Aug 89  
Morning Edition p 2*

[Interview with Deputy Director of the Lenin State Library A. Volik by TASS correspondent O. Svistunova, special to IZVESTIYA: "Information Center for the Parliament"]

[Text] Of course, many of us would like to respond to the question about which library is the largest in the world by saying: the USSR Lenin State Library. Our patriotism suffers greatly when we find out that, apparently, there are much larger storage facilities for books on our planet. For example, the area of just one out of three buildings of the U.S. Library of Congress exceeds that of the main

library of our country by a factor of 1.5. It is difficult to even compare them in terms of completeness and technical equipment.

Still, such a comparison needs to be made, no matter how disadvantageous for us it is, right now, when our Lenin Library has indeed gained readers genuinely interested in improving its condition. They are the USSR people's deputies, who came to feel the need for this richest treasury of knowledge, the library named after the leader of revolutionary proletariat, during the work of their congress and later during the session of the Supreme Soviet of our country.

Deputy Director of the Lenin State Library A. Volik said: "In all honesty, thus far the parliamentarians have used our potential only to a very small degree. Apart from those who had been our readers before, only 13 deputies and one official deputy aide signed up permanently. However, I am convinced that in the future parliamentarians will need our services more."

[Svistunova] Anatoliy Petrovich, tell us whether a draft for turning the Lenin Library into a library of the Soviet parliament exists?

[Volik] First of all, I will be more specific. The library of parliament is primarily the national library of a country, open to the general reader and performing information services to the members of parliament as one of its functions. As early as several months before the proceedings of the USSR Congress of People's Deputies began, we sent our proposals for providing information support for the deputies to the Secretariat of the Presidium of the USSR Supreme Soviet. We outlined in detail the scope of our opportunities in the long run, beginning with the provision of bibliographic and reference information through sophisticated analytical research and the organization of independent searches for information by deputies in the national and foreign data banks.

The success in performing the functions enumerated is associated with the reconstruction and technical retrofitting of the Lenin State Library which are carried out pursuant to two resolutions of the government. This is a long-range process; however, even at the first stage it is necessary to increase the staff of the library by 25 persons, according to the most conservative calculations, with a view to information services for deputies. It is also necessary to provide technical equipment for a station receiving requests and delivering information material to the location of permanent work of deputies and to furnish the necessary amount of copying equipment for the library. This is just the beginning; ultimately, we intend to provide a personal terminal for ordering and receiving information for every deputy of the Supreme Soviet.

[Svistunova] Understandably, considerable funds denominated not only in rubles but also in hard currency will have to be expended in order to fulfill these plans. Could it be feasible, having studied the experience of the U.S. Library of Congress, to install only the most needed

equipment in your library for now and enhance the technical potential as the information needs of the deputies and staff of the apparatus of the Supreme Soviet grow?

[Volik] Quite recently, I went to the United States on a business trip. My objective was to familiarize myself with the experience in using the equipment of the Hewlett-Packard Company, with which we have signed a contract for the delivery of computers. I definitely wanted to visit the U.S. Library of Congress as well. At present, it is headed by James Billington. He is primarily a politician, and only then the director of a library. Incidentally, over there this position is called the librarian of Congress; this emphasizes the importance of this state position appointments to which are made by the supreme legislative organ of the country.

A special research service operates at the library for giving the Congress, its committees, and members the information they need. The staff of this service numbers 860 persons—broadly educated and highly skilled employees. Precision, objectivity, compliance with the deadlines for completing assignments, diligence, and absolute confidentiality are the main features of their work. The research service reports to the Library of Congress and directly to the Congress itself.

Here is one more serious issue which, as I see it, needs to be emphasized: the subordination of the Lenin State Library to the USSR Supreme Soviet along with its subordination to the USSR Ministry of Culture. The experience of the U.S. Library of Congress indicates that this solution is most rational.

### **Social Democracy Viewed as Political Alternative**

*18001491 Tallinn SOVETSKAYA ESTONIYA in Russian 14 Jul 89 p 3*

[Interview with L. Volkov, senior scientific associate at the USSR Academy of Sciences Institute of Information on the Social Sciences, member of the council of the Moscow Democratic Perestroika Club, by A. Chalygin: "School for Politicians"]

[Text] The era of political clubs, where dozens of intellectuals more or less heatedly discuss the shortcomings of our political and economic system, is coming to an end. The meetings of many thousands of people in the Luzhniki, which the Moscow "informals" call with pride "the first steps on a Baltic scale," the activities of the Moscow Tribune, which has turned into an impromptu headquarters for an interregional deputies' group, the participation of many political clubs in the drafting of bills—all this graphically demonstrates not only the unity of the values of the many independent political organizations, but also the opportunity for their amalgamation. One attempt to join together to develop a common program was the creation of the Association of Social-Democratic Movements, which was comprised of unofficial political organizations from Moscow, Leningrad, and other cities of our country. At the same time as

the congress of the clubs, a "Social-Democratic School" is being conducted 10-15 July in Tallinn.

[Volkov] Interest in social democracy, in both its Russian and its international experience, is evidently growing. Against the background of the changes which have already occurred, we are beginning gradually to review the dogmatic, propagandistic attitude that we have had until now toward the political experience of all non-Marxist parties and movements. It has become clear that our official ideology, which has been reduced to primitive propaganda, no longer works. It is clear both "above" and to much of the broad masses. Against this background arises the question, who is most familiar with the problems of reorganizing socialism on fitting, democratic foundations? And from this comes the desire to find out just what social democracy is. Our school strives to help those who are interested to add to their knowledge, to give them the opportunity to hear professional lectures on the problems of the socialist model and on the history, theory and practice of social democracy, and to conduct seminars and "round tables" where the participants themselves can express their opinions.

[Chalygin] Who are the scholars participating in the work of your school?

[Volkov] Victor Kiselev, head of department at the USSR Academy of Sciences' Institute of Economics of the World Socialist System, a prominent specialist on models of socialism and Marxology, and author of one of the articles from the famous collection "No Other Is Given." Boris Orlov, professor and head of the department of social democracy at the USSR Academy of Sciences' Institute of Information on Social Sciences—he consented to read four lectures. Valeriy Lyubin, also an associate at the Institute of Information on Social Sciences and one of the leading specialists on Italian social democracy. And I would call Professor Sultan Dzarasov the patriarch of our team. He is the head of the department of political economy at the USSR Academy of Sciences and author of textbooks on political economy and several books. He will undertake the leadership of the economics portion of our school. He and I will conduct a seminar to discuss concrete programs and avenues out of our economic and social crisis. All these people are professionals, endowed with great civic spirit, who do not want to see their knowledge confined to academic arguments, who want to help develop our public life.

[Chalygin] And who are the students at your school?

[Volkov] I cannot say that I know all of them, but basically they are members of the so-called independent organizations, the "informals," although it is now becoming clear that many of the "informals" have already outgrown their "informality"—especially as a bill concerning social organizations is already being prepared in the Supreme Soviet, after which many of the organizations, I hope, will be "legalized." Basically, our students are young people who, having participated in

the elections, already have experience with the debate, theory, and practice of political activities—not all of them, but many. And there are professionals—historians, economists, sociologists. In general, the distinction between students and lecturers here is relative.

[Chalygin] Given what I know as a layman about social democracy, mainly from textbooks which are not always objective, I would like to ask what social democracy has to offer our society.

[Volkov] First and foremost, a search for avenues out of the impasse we have reached—a search that is open, democratic, but at the same time rational, based on knowledge and intellect. The avenues which are taking shape today do not satisfy us. The intentions behind them may be excellent, but they are insufficient in terms of methods and theoretical platform.

[Chalygin] On what sort of theory should this search be based?

[Volkov] This is the fundamental distinction between social democracy and, so to say, "orthodox Marxism," which proposes "cramming" real life into previously designated theoretical limits. The social-democratic conception in essence does not aspire to create a dogmatic theory or a rigid theoretical program. In short, our goal is to put into practice a program which, in general, coincides with what the Social Democrats would like to do in the West—but taking into account our specific character. In the realm of economics this means the creation of a market, but one under close democratic control, insofar as a total market is just as dangerous for us as total planning—because we do not have the legal, economic, and cultural prerequisites for it. In the realm of politics, it means an alternative cooperation with the CPSU. In attendance here today are representatives of the Moscow "Party Club," which is working within the bounds of the party to bring about its democratization on the basis of an acknowledgement of the possibility of a multi-party system.

[Chalygin] How are your relations with the deputies?

[Volkov] It would not be entirely honest to speak yet of a serious influence on the deputies in general by an amorphous social-democratic body. There is a common bond between the democratic movement and the progressive bloc of deputies, and there are personal contacts, including those with the deputies from Estonia. And there are attempts to create some consultative body which would serve the body of deputies. Because the deputies have indeed shown an interest.

#### **LiSSR Plenum Discusses CPSU Central Committee Statement on Baltics**

*18001581 Moscow SOVETSKAYA KULTURA in Russian 31 Aug 89 p 1*

[Report by V. Burbulis: "A Principled Discussion"]

[Text] Vilnius—The discussion at the regular plenum of the Lithuanian CP Central Committee was principled, stormy, and not unambiguous. The CPSU Central Committee announcement on the situation in the republics of the Soviet Baltic region was discussed. In a brief introductory statement A. Brazauskas, first secretary of the republic CP Central Committee, spoke in particular about the fact that the time had come for the taking of responsible decisions and for the removal of obstacles hindering the continuing movement along the path of restructuring. He said that the announcement of the CPSU Central Committee was principled, calling to dialogue all forces in society which are interested in supporting the course planned by the Communist Party. In Lithuania, because of the inciting actions of certain groups, a tense situation has been created, the consequences of which cannot be foretold. Even the communists of the republic turned out to be not at the required level, emphasized A. Brazauskas. The communists are losing the initiative, they are not going out among the people, they are not conducting discussions with the informal movements, and they are not repelling, in a timely fashion, the efforts of the activists of various leagues and self-proclaimed parties who are trying to tear Lithuania from the family of fraternal peoples of the Soviet Union, to break up society; who dream of the "good times" of bourgeois rule.

The speakers, and there were 21 of them, noted that the announcement of the CPSU Central Committee on the situation in the republics of the Soviet Baltic region, in particular in Lithuania, appeared in a timely fashion. It is permeated with genuine concern about the fates not only of the peoples of the Baltic region but of the Soviet Union as a whole. Party veterans, members of the Lithuanian CP Central Committee A. Dauksha, Y. Guretskas, and others were, if you will, more categorical in their judgements. They criticized the members of the republic CP Central Committee Buro, the Central Committee secretaries, and the Lithuanian CP Central Committee Ideological Section for inconsistency in directing the mass media, which are more and more often offering the airwaves and the pages of the press to activists of the informal movements for the reworking of public opinion in a nationalistic spirit and for a constitutional confrontation with the USSR. They demanded an unconditional recognition of the correctness of all the propositions in the CPSU Central Committee announcement.

The "young generation" of first secretaries of raykoms of the party, in their turn recognizing that the announcement of the CPSU Central Committee was correct in principle, called on Lithuanian communists to strengthen the unity in the ranks of the party in the name of consolidation of all the forces of society, and to repel nationalistic manifestations.

The plenum participants condemned the acts of outright vandalism, of the desecration of state symbols and sacred places which are inviolable for any orderly person—the memorials to those who fell in the Civil War and in the Great Patriotic War.

For the sake of objectivity it must be emphasized that at the plenum voices were also heard which called for "not falling on our knees" before the announcement of the CPSU Central Committee and the diktat of the center. But they found no support at the plenum. V. Astrauskas, member of the Lithuanian CP Central Committee Buro and chairman of the republic Supreme Soviet Presidium and other speakers proposed postponing the convocation of the next session of the Lithuanian SSR Supreme Soviet, scheduled for the 5th of September of this year. The reason is that the drafts of the very important laws on citizenship in the Lithuanian SSR, on referendums, on elections of deputies of local and Supreme Soviets of the Lithuanian SSR have not been sufficiently well prepared and thought out, evoking stormy, and at times, just criticism from the Russian-speaking population, which further complicates an already complex situation in Lithuania. A. Brazauskas supported this opinion in his concluding statement.

A series of Central Committee members criticized the conclusions of the Lithuanian SSR Supreme Soviet Commission established to study the German-Soviet treaties and their results, justly considering that they were hurried, inconsistent, and not corresponding to the historical realities of the time.

The Plenum, in spite of the wide spectrum of views unanimously—I emphasize, unanimously—adopted the text of the announcement of the Lithuanian CP Central Committee directed to communists and to the entire populace of the republic which was published in all the Lithuanian newspapers. It says, in particular: "We understand the anxiety and concern of the CPSU Central Committee evoked by the not fully thought out announcements and actions carried out in circumstances of a complex political situation by certain people who participate in the social movements. This announcement obliges us to again look at the path which has been taken by perestroyka, an responsibly and soberly to plan further steps so that society can regain its health." It continues: "we must soberly understand that the Lithuanian SSR is integrated in the USSR in the political and economic sense. It is natural that we are evaluated in the above-mentioned announcement of the CPSU Central Committee from such positions. Progressive changes are taking place in the entire Soviet Union. It is undoubtedly true that the federation will improve itself. The CPSU platform on the question of nationalities policy which has been published testifies to this. We consider that it is possible to be a free and sovereign government in a union of republics enjoying equal rights."

#### **New Deputy Chairman of the BSSR Council of Ministers Appointed**

*18001599 Minsk SOVETSKAYA BELORUSSIYA in Russian 22 Aug 89 p 1*

[Ukase of the Belorussian SSR Supreme Soviet Presidium on the Appointment of V.S. Pilyuto as Deputy Chairman of the Belorussian SSR Council of Ministers, issued 21 August 1989]

[Text] The Belorussian SSR Supreme Soviet Presidium resolves:

To appoint Comrade Vladislav Sergeyevich Pilyuto deputy chairman of the Belorussian SSR Council of Ministers.

*Chairman of the Belorussian SSR Supreme Soviet Presidium, N. Dementey Secretary of the Belorussian SSR Supreme Soviet Presidium, L. Syroyegina*

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Comrade V.S. Pilyuto, born in 1934, is Belorussian and has been a member of the CPSU since 1959. He has a higher education, having completed the Belorussian Polytechnical Institute and the CPSU Central Committee Higher Party Correspondence School; he is a mechanical engineer.

In 1956, upon completing the institute, he began his career at the Mogilev Strommashina plant as a design engineer, and during the next five years he held engineering posts there and at the Mogilev regenerator plant. From 1962 on, his party duties included work as an instructor, deputy chief and chief of the Mogilev Obkom Industrial-Transport Department. In 1970 he was elected first secretary of the Mogilev Gorkom, and in 1974 secretary of the Mogilev Belorussian CP Obkom.

In 1982 Comrade V.S. Pilyuto was promoted to the CPSU Central Committee apparatus, where he worked as chief of the machinebuilding sector and deputy chief of the machinebuilding department. Since 1988 he has been serving as a consultant to the CPSU Central Committee Social-Economic Department.

He has been awarded two Orders of the Red Banner of Labor, an Order of the Friendship of Nations, and various medals.

### **BSSR Resolution on Program to Liquidate Chernobyl Consequences**

*18300778a Minsk SOVETSKAYA BELORUSSIYA in Russian 4 Aug 89 p 1*

[Belorussian SSR Supreme Soviet Decree on the State Program for the Years 1990-1995 to Liquidate the Consequences of the Chernobyl Atomic Power Plant Disaster, issued 29 July 1989]

[Text] The Belorussian SSR Supreme Soviet notes that since the disaster at the Chernobyl Atomic Power Plant a number of top-priority measures have been taken in the Belorussian SSR to ensure preservation of the health of the people who were in the radioactive contamination zone. At the first stage, in order to ensure the safety of the populace, 24,700 citizens evacuated from 107 populated places in Braginskiy, Narovlyanskiy and Khoynikskiy Rayons were provided housing and employment at their new place of residence. A certain amount of work was accomplished on decontamination of the populated places, construction of places of residence, roads and

public utilities, and development of the social sphere. A complex of measures has been accomplished to restore the health of the populace and provide them with clinical treatment, to provide them with pure food and water, and to create conditions in which the populace can live and work.

At the same time there are serious shortcomings and neglect in the work on liquidating the consequences of the Chernobyl Atomic Power Plant disaster.

The Belorussian SSR Council of Ministers, the Belorussian CP Buro and Belorussian SSR Council of Ministers Commission on Liquidating the Consequences of the Chernobyl Atomic Power Plant Disaster, the corresponding ministries and agencies, the Belorussian SSR Academy of Sciences, scientific research institutions, and local Soviets of people's deputies, did not take exhaustive measures for the most rapid liquidation of the consequences of the disaster on the republic's territory.

The Belorussian SSR Health Ministry and its local organs and general-health clinics did not achieve the necessary effectiveness in healing and health-care measures. Many of the health-care institutions in the afflicted regions are not fully staffed with qualified cadres, their turnover is very large, and normal living conditions have not been established for the medical personnel.

Major shortcomings were permitted in trade and public catering organizations, especially at schools and in everyday services to the populace.

The Belorussian SSR State Agroindustrial Commission did not ensure strict observance of scientifically-grounded systems of land use in the contaminated territories, nor introduction of effective agro-technical measures which would reduce the radioactive nuclide contamination of agricultural products, nor the creation of safe working and living conditions for the rural workers.

Oblast ispolkoms and construction ministries and agencies are not fully utilizing the capital investments intended for liquidation of the consequences of the disaster, and in a number of instances gross errors were made when choosing sites for building new settlements; building sites are not being completed; and there have been instances of low-quality construction-installation work and instances of aimless expenditure of funds.

Serious shortcomings have been permitted in providing scientific support for a normal life for the people living in the territories contaminated by radionuclides. The Belorussian SSR Academy of Sciences has not yet become a true coordinator of republic science: to this day no scientifically-grounded recommendations have been worked out for the people to live safely.

Significant improvements are required in work on informing the public, especially in the afflicted regions, and on making them more radiation-conscious.

The State Program for the Years 1990-1995 to Liquidate the Consequences of the Chernobyl Atomic Power Plant Disaster takes the medical and social aspects into consideration: its goal is to create safe living conditions for the populace in the regions subjected to radioactive contamination; it embraces life-support problems, and is coordinating the activity of republic ministries and agencies, Soviet and economic organs in solving problems of liquidating the consequences of the disaster.

Nevertheless, the Belorussian SSR Supreme Soviet has noted that the project proposed by the State Program for the Years 1990-1995 to Liquidate the Consequences of the Chernobyl Atomic Power Plant Disaster has not completely worked out problems at the union-level organs—problems associated with social support for the populace in the regions which suffered radioactive contamination; problems of financial and material-technical supply; and organization of construction work to liquidate the consequences of the disaster.

The Belorussian Soviet Socialist Republic Supreme Soviet resolves:

1. To approve, on the whole, the draft 1990-1995 State Program to Liquidate the Consequences of the Chernobyl Atomic Power Plant Disaster in Belorussia. To consider that in those places where scientific, agrotechnical and other measures have determined that it is impossible to produce pure agricultural products, it is also unwise for people to dwell there as well.

The Belorussian SSR Council of Ministers is directed to complete, before 1 October 1989, a draft State Program for the Years 1990-1995 to Liquidate the Consequences of the Chernobyl Atomic Power Plant Disaster in Belorussia, taking into consideration the remarks and proposals expressed in the supplementary reports of the Belorussian SSR Supreme Soviet Commission on Health-Care and Social Security and the Commission on Environmental Protection and Rational Use of Natural Resources, read at the deputies' sessions; and also the proposals and remarks made by citizens and collectives, which were sent to the sessions of the Presidium and the standing commissions of the Belorussian SSR Supreme Soviet. The completed version of the program shall be submitted at the next session of the Belorussian SSR Supreme Soviet.

2. The Belorussian SSR Council of Ministers, Gosagroprom, Gosstroy and Gossnab, republic ministries and departments, local Soviets of People's Deputies, the Belorussian SSR Academy of Sciences, and appropriate scientific-research institutions shall immediately set about carrying out the assignments of the State Program for Liquidating in the Belorussian SSR the Consequences of the Chernobyl Atomic Power Plant Disaster.

3. The Belorussian SSR Council of Ministers; Gosplan, Gosagroprom, Gossnab, Gosstroy; republic ministries and departments; city and rayon Soviets of People's Deputies; and the Belorussian SSR Academy of Sciences shall introduce to the state and territorial plans for

economic and social development of the republic, oblasts, cities and rayons which have suffered from the accident at the Chernobyl Atomic Power Plant, measures stipulated by the state program.

4. Oblast, rayon and city ispolkoms; the Belorussian SSR Ministry of Health and Belorussian SSR Academy of Sciences; Belorussian SSR Gosplan and Gosagroprom, and the Belorussian SSR Ministry of Public Education shall carefully deal with every populated place and every family, and take decisions on the possibility of further life and labor activity in the contaminated zone, and when necessary submit the proper proposals to the Belorussian SSR Council of Ministers.

5. The USSR Council of Ministers shall be asked to examine the State Plan for Liquidation in the Belorussian SSR the Consequences of the Chernobyl Atomic Power Plant Disaster, and allocate the required material-technical and financial resources for its realization and to resolve the following questions:

Beginning 1 January 1990, to relieve Belorussian SSR construction workers of the responsibility for taking part in building projects outside the bounds of the republic;

Beginning next year, to clarify the deliveries of meat and dairy products to the union fund in consideration of optimal supply of the populace which dwells in the rayons which suffered from the Chernobyl Atomic Power Plant disaster; and,

To establish in the current year additional privileges and supplementary payments for the populace which dwells in the contaminated regions.

6. A standing commission shall be established at the Belorussian SSR Supreme Soviet on questions of liquidating the consequences of the Chernobyl Atomic Power Plant disaster, which shall establish strict control over carrying out the State Program on Liquidating in the Belorussian SSR the Consequences of the Chernobyl Atomic Power Plant Disaster.

7. It is deemed necessary to have in the Belorussian SSR Council of Ministers a deputy chairman of the Belorussian SSR Council of Ministers on questions of liquidating the consequences of the Chernobyl Atomic Power Plant disaster.

8. The Belorussian SSR State Committee on TV and Radio Broadcasting, and newspaper and magazine editors shall organize extensive news coverage of the course of implementing the State Program for Eliminating in the Belorussian SSR the Consequences of the Chernobyl Atomic Power Plant Disaster.

9. The Belorussian SSR Council of Ministers shall make an annual report to the deputies at the session of the Belorussian SSR Supreme Soviet on the course of implementing the State Program on Liquidating in the Belorussian SSR the Consequences of the Chernobyl Atomic Power Plant Disaster.

*Chairman of the Belorussian SSR Supreme Soviet Presidium, N. Dementey.*

*Secretary of the Belorussian SSR Supreme Soviet Presidium, L. Syroyegina.*

### **BSSR Supreme Soviet Standing Commission on Chernobyl Formed**

*18300778b Minsk SOVETSKAYA BELORUSSIYA in Russian 4 Aug 89 pp 1, 3*

[Belorussian SSR Supreme Soviet Decree on the Formation of the Belorussian SSR Supreme Soviet Standing Commission on Questions of Liquidating the Consequences of the Chernobyl Atomic Power Plant Disaster, issued 29 July 1989]

[Text] The Belorussian Soviet Socialist Republic Supreme Soviet **resolves:**

1. To form a standing commission of 19 persons at the Belorussian SSR Supreme Soviet, on questions of liquidating the consequences of the Chernobyl Atomic Power Plant disaster.

2. The following deputies shall be selected as members of the Commission on Liquidating the Consequences of the Chernobyl Atomic Power Plant disaster:

Chairman of the commission—**Smolyar, Ivan Nikolaevich**—a deputy from the Mozyrskiy-Yuzhnyy Electoral District, Gomel Oblast.

Deputy commission chairman—**Katushkin, Peter Mikhaylovich**—a deputy from the Khodosovskiy Electoral District, Mogilev Oblast.

Members of the commission: **Avdevich, Valentin Vasilovich**—a deputy from the Yuratishkovskiy Electoral District, Grodno Oblast.

**Adamovich, Pavel Semenovich**—a deputy from the Slobodskiy Electoral District, Gomel Oblast.

**Apolonik, Aleksandr Vladimirovich**—a deputy from the Kurilivichskiy Electoral District, Grodno Oblast.

**Beganskiy, Mikhail Pavlovich**—a deputy from the Slavgorodskiy Electoral District, Mogilev Oblast.

**Vergey, Nina Makarovna**—a deputy from the Mezhi-setskiy Electoral District, Mogilev Oblast.

—a deputy from the Telekhanskiy Electoral District, Brest Oblast.

**Golubov, Emmanuil Falkovich**—a deputy from the Gomelskiy-Leninskiy Electoral District, Gomel Oblast.

**Kupay, Ivan Visilevich**—a deputy from the Braginskiy Electoral District, Gomel Oblast.

**Nadeevich, Svetlana Iosifovna**—a deputy from the Lemeshevskiy Electoral District, Brest Oblast.

**Nikitchenko, Ivan Nikolaevich**—a deputy from the Zhodinskiy Rural Electoral District, Minsk Oblast.

**Platonov, Vladimir Petrovich**—a deputy from the Kalinovskiy Electoral District, the city of Minsk.

**Rudakovskiy, Viktor Aleksandrovich**—a deputy from the Negorelskiy Electoral District, Minsk Oblast.

**Skachko, Aleksandr Vikentevich**—a deputy from the Zhukovskiy electoral District, city of Minsk.

**Ustin, Nikolay Iosifovich**—a deputy from the Begomskiy Electoral District, Vitebsk Oblast.

**Chekhanovich, Feliks Adamovich**—a deputy from the Glubokskiy City Electoral District, Vitebsk Oblast.

**Chaykovskiy, Vasiliy Fedorovich**—a deputy from the Vitebskiy-Vostochnyy Electoral District, Vitebsk Oblast.

**Yurchenko, Tatyana Fedorovna**—a deputy from the Belynkovichskiy Electoral District, Mogilev Oblast.

3. The deputies of the Belorussian SSR Supreme Soviet who have been chosen as members of the Belorussian SSR Supreme Soviet Commission on Questions of Liquidating the Consequences of the Chernobyl Atomic Power Plant Disaster shall be relieved of their responsibilities as members of other standing commissions to which they had been elected.

*Chairman of the BSSR Supreme Soviet Presidium, N. Dementey.*

*Secretary of the BSSR Supreme Soviet Presidium, L. Syroyegina.*

### **UkSSR Draft Amendments to Constitution, Electoral Laws**

#### **Decree**

*18001558 Kiev PRAVDA UKRAINY in Russian 5 Aug 89 p 1*

[Ukrainian SSR Supreme Soviet Presidium Decree on the Drafts of the Ukrainian SSR Law on Changes and Additions to the Constitution (Basic Law) of the Ukrainian SSR, the Ukrainian SSR Law on Elections of Ukrainian SSR People's Deputies, and the Ukrainian SSR Law on Elections of People's Deputies of Ukrainian SSR Local Soviets of People's Deputies, issued 31 July 1989]

[Text] The Presidium of the Ukrainian SSR Supreme Soviet **resolves:**

1. To submit the drafts of the Ukrainian SSR Law on Changes and Additions to the Constitution (Basic Law) of the Ukrainian SSR, the Ukrainian SSR Law on Elections of Ukrainian SSR People's Deputies, and the Ukrainian SSR Law on Elections of People's Deputies of Ukrainian SSR Local Soviets of People's Deputies for public discussion.

To publish the draft of the Ukrainian SSR Law on Changes and Additions to the Ukrainian SSR Constitution in republic and oblast newspapers for 5 August 1989, and the draft Law of the Ukrainian SSR on Elections of Ukrainian SSR People's Deputies and the draft Law of the Ukrainian SSR on the Elections of People's Deputies of Ukrainian SSR Local Soviets of People's Deputies—in oblast and republic newspapers for 6 August.

2. The executive committees of oblast soviets and the Kiev and Sevastopol city soviets of people's deputies are to organize the generalization of the proposals and criticisms concerning the draft laws that are submitted by people's deputies, citizens, labor collectives and public organizations, as well as those presented by the mass media.

3. Republic publications and television and radio stations are to generalize the proposals and criticisms regarding the draft laws that are submitted to them.

4. The Legislative Proposals Commission of the Ukrainian SSR Supreme Soviet is to consider the proposals and criticisms that are received in the course of the public discussion of the aforementioned drafts and to submit appropriate proposals.

5. Materials related to generalization of the proposals and criticisms concerning the drafts of the Ukrainian SSR Law on Changes and Additions to the Constitution (Basic Law) of the Ukrainian SSR, the Ukrainian SSR Law on Elections of Ukrainian SSR People's Deputies, and the Ukrainian SSR Law on Elections of People's Deputies of Ukrainian SSR Local Soviets of People's Deputies are to be presented to the Presidium of the Ukrainian SSR Supreme Soviet once every 10 days until 1 October 1989.

*Chairman of the Ukrainian SSR Supreme Soviet Presidium, V. Shevchenko*

*Secretary of the Ukrainian SSR Supreme Soviet Presidium, N. Khomenko*

### Constitutional Amendments

18001558 Kiev PRAVDA UKRAINY in Russian  
5 Aug 89 pp 1-2

[Draft Law of the Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic on Changes and Additions to the Constitution (Basic Law) of the Ukrainian SSR]

[Text] For the purposes of developing socialist democracy and self-government by the people, and improving the elective system and the structure and activities of the soviets of people's deputies and the justice agencies, and in accordance with the USSR Law on Changes and Additions to the Constitution (Basic Law) of the USSR, the Ukrainian SSR Supreme Soviet resolves:

I. To make the following changes and additions in the Constitution of the Ukrainian SSR:

1. To word Section 9 as follows:

### "Section 9. The System and Principles of the Activities of Soviets of People's Deputies"

"Article 78. The soviets of people's deputies—the Congress of Ukrainian SSR People's Deputies and the Ukrainian SSR Supreme Soviet—and the local soviets of people's deputies—the oblast, rayon, city, urban rayon, settlement and rural soviets—constitute a unified system of representative bodies of state authority of the Ukrainian SSR.

"Article 79. The term of office of the soviets of people's deputies is five years.

"Elections of people's deputies are set for not less than four months before the expiration of the term of the relevant bodies of state authority.

"Article 80. Extremely important questions of republic and local significance are decided in meetings of the Congress of Ukrainian SSR People's Deputies and sessions of the Ukrainian SSR Supreme Soviet and local soviets of people's deputies, or are put to referendums.

"The Congress of Ukrainian SSR People's Deputies elects the Ukrainian SSR Supreme Soviet and the chairman of the Ukrainian SSR Supreme Soviet. Local soviets of people's deputies elect soviet chairmen. The Ukrainian SSR Supreme Soviet and the local soviets, with the exception of city soviets (of cities under rayon jurisdiction) and settlement and rural soviets, have their own presidiums.

"Soviets of people's deputies form standing commissions and create executive and administrative agencies, as well as other agencies accountable to them.

"Officials elected or appointed by soviets of people's deputies cannot hold their offices for more than two consecutive terms.

"Any official may be relieved of his office ahead of time in the event of his unsuitable performance of his official duties.

"Article 81. The soviets of people's deputies form agencies of people's control, which combines state control with public control by the working people at enterprises and in institutions and organizations.

"People's control agencies check up on fulfillment of the requirements of legislation and state programs and assignments; campaign against violations of state discipline, manifestations of a narrowly local or narrowly departmental approach to matters, mismanagement and wastefulness, and red tape and bureaucratism; coordinate the work of other control agencies; and help improve the structure and work of the state apparatus.

"Article 82. Directly and through agencies created by them, soviets of people's deputies guide all branches of state, economic and social and cultural construction,

make decisions, ensure that they are acted on, and monitor their implementation.

**"Article 83.** The activities of the soviets of people's deputies are based on the collective, free and business-like discussion and resolution of questions, glasnost, regular reporting to them and to the public by executive and administrative agencies and other agencies created by them, and the broad enlistment of citizens to participate in their work.

"The soviets of people's deputies and the agencies created by them take public opinion into account, submit extremely important questions of statewide and local significance for discussion by citizens, and regularly inform citizens of their work and the decisions made by them."

2. To word Section 10 as follows:

#### **"Section 10. The Election System**

**"Article 84.** Elections of people's deputies are held according to single-seat election districts on the basis of the universal, equal and direct right to vote, with secret balloting. In order to ensure the representation of public organizations according to the norms established by law of the Ukrainian SSR, one-fourth of the Ukrainian SSR people's deputies are elected from public organizations—the Ukrainian Communist Party, the trade unions, cooperative organizations, the Ukrainian Leninist Young Communist League, associations of women and of war and labor veterans, organizations of scientific personnel, the creative unions, and other organizations created according to procedures established by law and having republic bodies. Elections of people's deputies from public organizations are conducted in those organizations' congresses or conferences, or in the plenums of their republic bodies.

**"Article 85.** Elections of people's deputies from election districts are universal: Ukrainian SSR citizens who have attained the age of 18 have the right to vote. The right to elect people's deputies from public organizations belongs to all delegates to their congresses or conferences, or participants in the plenums of their republic bodies.

"A citizen of the Ukrainian SSR who has reached the age of 18 has the right to be elected a people's deputy.

"A citizen of the Ukrainian SSR cannot simultaneously be a people's deputy in more than two soviets of people's deputies.

"Persons who are members of the Ukrainian SSR Council of Ministers or of the executive committees of local soviets of people's deputies, with the exception of the chairmen of those bodies; the executives of agencies, departments and administrations of the executive committees of local soviets of people's deputies; judges and state arbitrators cannot be deputies in a soviet by which they are appointed or elected.

"Mentally ill persons who are deemed incompetent by a court, persons held in places of deprivation of freedom, and persons who have been sent by the decision of a court to places of mandatory treatment do not take part in elections.

**"Article 86.** Elections of people's deputies from election districts are equal: for each election district, a voter has one vote; voters take part in elections on an equal basis.

"In elections of Ukrainian SSR people's deputies from a public organization, each delegate to the organization's congress or conference, or participant in a plenum has one vote, and they all take part in elections on an equal basis.

**"Article 87.** Elections of people's deputies from election districts are direct: people's deputies are elected by citizens directly.

"Ukrainian SSR people's deputies from public organizations are elected directly by delegates to their congresses or conferences, or participants in the plenums of their republic bodies.

**"Article 88.** Voting in elections of people's deputies is secret: no monitoring of the expression of the voters' will is allowed.

**"Article 89.** The right to nominate candidates for people's deputies from election districts belongs to labor collectives, public organizations, and meetings of voters by places of residence and meetings of military personnel by military units, and the nomination of candidates for Ukrainian SSR people's deputies from public organizations belongs to their republic bodies, which take into account proposals for candidates for deputy received from local bodies, lower-level collectives, and the members of those organizations.

"The number of candidates for people's deputies is not limited. Every participant in a preelection meeting may propose any candidacy, including his own, for discussion.

"Any number of candidates may be included on election ballots.

"Expenses connected with the preparation and conduct of the elections of people's deputies are paid out of the republic's budgetary funds.

**"Article 90.** The preparation for elections of people's deputies is carried out openly and publicly.

"The conduct of elections is carried out by election commissions, which are made up of the representatives of labor collectives, public organizations, and meetings of voters by places of residence and of military personnel by military unit.

"Citizens of the Ukrainian SSR, labor collectives and public organizations are guaranteed the opportunity to

freely and comprehensively discuss the political, business and personal qualities of candidates for people's deputy, as well as the right to campaign for or against a candidate at meetings, in the press, and on television and radio.

"The procedures for conducting elections of people's deputies are defined by laws of the USSR and the Ukrainian SSR.

"**Article 91.** Constituents and public organizations give directives [nakazy] to their deputies.

"The appropriate soviets of people's deputies examine directives, take them into account in drawing up plans for economic and social development and making up the budget, as well as in preparing decisions on other matters, organize the fulfillment of directives, and inform citizens on their fulfillment."

3. To word Section 12 as follows:

**"Section 12. The Congress of Ukrainian SSR People's Deputies and the Ukrainian SSR Supreme Soviet**

"**Article 97.** The Ukrainian SSR's supreme body of state authority is the Congress of Ukrainian SSR People's Deputies

"The Congress of Ukrainian SSR People's Deputies is empowered to take up for its consideration and decide any question within the jurisdiction of the Ukrainian SSR.

"The following belong to the exclusive jurisdiction of the Congress of Ukrainian SSR People's Deputies:

- 1) adoption of the Ukrainian SSR Constitution and the amendment of it;
- 2) the making of decisions on questions of national-state structure that lie within the jurisdiction of the Ukrainian SSR;
- 3) the formation of oblasts and determination of the procedures for resolving questions pertaining to the administrative and territorial structure of the Ukrainian SSR;
- 4) the resolution of questions connected with changes in the Ukrainian SSR's borders with other union republics; the consideration of questions pertaining to determination of the USSR's state border in cases entailing a change in the territory of the Ukrainian SSR;
- 5) participation in determining the guidelines for the USSR's internal and foreign policies;
- 6) the formation of the basic guidelines for the internal and foreign political activities of the Ukrainian SSR;
- 7) the confirmation of long-range state plans and the most important republic programs of economic and social development;
- 8) the election of the Ukrainian SSR Supreme Soviet;

9) the election of chairman of Ukrainian SSR Supreme Soviet;

10) the election of the first deputy chairman of the Ukrainian SSR Supreme Soviet and the deputy chairman of the Ukrainian SSR Supreme Soviet;

11) the confirmation of the chairman of the Ukrainian SSR Council of Ministers;

12) the confirmation of the chairman of the Ukrainian SSR People's Control Committee, the chairman of the Ukrainian SSR Supreme Court, and the Ukrainian SSR Chief State Arbitrator;

13) the election of the Ukrainian SSR Constitutional Oversight Committee;

14) the exercise of legislative initiative in the Congress of USSR People's Deputies and the USSR Supreme Soviet;

15) the revocation of acts adopted by the Ukrainian SSR Supreme Soviet;

16) the adoption of decisions on the holding of general public votes (referendums) in the Ukrainian SSR;

"The Ukrainian SSR Supreme Soviet adopts laws of the Ukrainian SSR and decrees by a majority of votes of the total number of Ukrainian SSR people's deputies.

"**Article 98.** The Congress of Ukrainian SSR People's Deputies consists of 600 deputies, who are elected as follows:

"450 deputies from territorial election districts with equal numbers of voters;

"150 deputies from republic public organizations according to norms established by the Ukrainian SSR Law on Elections of Ukrainian SSR People's Deputies.

"**Article 99.** The Congress of Ukrainian SSR People's Deputies is convened for its first meeting no later than two months after elections.

"Upon representation by the Credentials Commission elected by it, the Congress of Ukrainian SSR People's Deputies adopts a decision to recognize the authority of deputies, and in the event that election legislation has been violated—to deem the elections of individual deputies invalid.

"The Congress of Ukrainian SSR People's Deputies is convened by the Ukrainian SSR Supreme Soviet.

"Regular meetings of the Congress of Ukrainian SSR People's Deputies are conducted once a year. Special meetings are convened at the initiative of the Ukrainian SSR Supreme Soviet, or on the basis of a proposal by the Presidium of the Ukrainian SSR Supreme Soviet, the chairman of the Ukrainian SSR Supreme Soviet, or no less than one-fifth of the Ukrainian SSR people's deputies.

"The first meeting of the Congress of Ukrainian SSR People's Deputies after elections is opened by the chairman of the Central Election Commission for elections of Ukrainian SSR people's deputies. And after that, meetings of the Congress of Ukrainian SSR People's Deputies are conducted by a Presidium elected by the Congress, including the chairman of the Ukrainian SSR Supreme Soviet, his deputies, and representatives of all the republic's oblasts and the city of Kiev.

**"Article 100.** The Ukrainian SSR Supreme Soviet is the permanent legislative, administrative and control body of state authority of the Ukrainian SSR.

"The Ukrainian SSR Supreme Soviet is elected from among the Ukrainian SSR people's deputies by secret ballot by the Congress of Ukrainian SSR People's Deputies and is accountable to it.

"The Ukrainian SSR Supreme Soviet is elected with a membership of 120 Ukrainian SSR people's deputies, who should represent all oblasts and cities under republic jurisdiction.

"The Congress of Ukrainian SSR People's Deputies annually replaces one-fifth of the membership of the Ukrainian SSR Supreme Soviet.

**"Article 101.** The Ukrainian SSR Supreme Soviet is convened annually by the Presidium of the Ukrainian SSR Supreme Soviet for regular—spring and fall—sessions lasting, as a rule, two to three months each.

"Special sessions are convened by the Presidium of the Ukrainian SSR Supreme Soviet at its initiative, or in accordance with a proposal by the chairman of the Ukrainian SSR Supreme Soviet or by no less than one-third of the membership of the Ukrainian SSR Supreme Soviet.

"A session of the Ukrainian SSR Supreme Soviet consists of meetings of the Ukrainian SSR Supreme Soviet, as well as meetings of standing and other commissions of the Ukrainian SSR Supreme Soviet held between meetings of the Ukrainian SSR Supreme Soviet.

"Upon the expiration of the term of authority of the Congress of Ukrainian SSR People's Deputies, the Ukrainian SSR Supreme Soviet maintains its authority up to the formation by a newly elected Congress of Ukrainian SSR People's Deputies of a new membership of the Ukrainian SSR Supreme Soviet.

**"Article 102.** The Ukrainian SSR Supreme Soviet:

1) sets elections of Ukrainian SSR people's deputies and confirms the membership of the Central Election Commission for elections of Ukrainian SSR people's deputies; sets elections to local Ukrainian SSR soviets of people's deputies;

2) names the chairman of the Ukrainian SSR Council of Ministers and, upon his representation, confirms the membership of the Ukrainian SSR Council of Ministers

and makes changes in it; upon the recommendation of the Ukrainian SSR Council of Ministers, forms and abolishes Ukrainian SSR ministries and Ukrainian SSR state committees;

3) elects the Ukrainian SSR People's Control Committee, the Ukrainian SSR Supreme Soviet, and the judges of oblast courts and the Kiev City Court; appoints the Ukrainian SSR Chief State Arbitrator; confirms the Presidium and Collegium for Disciplinary Cases of the Ukrainian SSR Supreme Court and the collegium of the Ukrainian SSR State Arbitration Service;

4) regularly hears reports from the bodies it has formed or elected, as well as from the officials it has appointed or elected;

5) exercises, within the limits of the republic's jurisdiction, the legislative regulation of ownership relations; of the organization of the management of the national economy, social and cultural construction, and scientific and technological progress; of the budget and financial system; of pay, price setting and taxation; of environmental protection and the use and reproduction of natural resources; and of other relations;

6) considers questions connected with ensuring the constitutional rights, liberties and duties of citizens of the Ukrainian SSR;

7) considers questions pertaining to ensuring the equality of all nationalities living within the territory of the Ukrainian SSR, in combination with the general interests and requirements of the multinational state;

8) provides interpretations of laws of the Ukrainian SSR;

9) forms and abolishes rayons and city rayons; assigns communities to the category of cities; establishes and alters the boundaries of oblasts and cities; and names and renames cities, rayons and city rayons;

10) determines the procedures for the organization and activities of republic and local bodies of state authority and administration, the courts and the arbitration service; determines the general legal principles for the formation and activities of public organizations in the Ukrainian SSR;

11) presents for confirmation by the Congress of Ukrainian SSR People's Deputies drafts of long-range state plans and key republic programs of economic and social development; confirms state plans for the economic and social development of the Ukrainian SSR, and the Ukrainian SSR State Budget; monitors the course of fulfillment of the plan and budget; confirms reports on their fulfillment; when necessary, makes changes in the plan and budget;

12) sets, in accordance with USSR legislation, the revenues received for the formation of the Ukrainian SSR State Budget;

13) ratifies and denounces international treaties of the Ukrainian SSR;

14) monitors the granting of state loans and economic and other aid to foreign states, as well as the conclusion of agreements on state loans and credit obtained from foreign sources;

15) institutes state awards and establishes honorary titles of the Ukrainian SSR;

16) promulgates republic acts amnestying citizens convicted by courts of the Ukrainian SSR;

17) raises before the Constitutional Oversight Commission the question of whether acts of the USSR Supreme Soviet and its chambers, as well as draft acts of these bodies, conform to the USSR Constitution and USSR laws adopted by the Congress of USSR People's Deputies, and the question of whether the acts of other state agencies and public organizations conform to the USSR Constitution and USSR laws;

18) has the right to revoke ukases and decrees of the Presidium of the Ukrainian SSR Supreme Soviet, orders of the chairman of the Ukrainian SSR Supreme Soviet, and decrees and orders of the Ukrainian SSR Council of Ministers;

19) revokes decisions of oblast and city (for cities under republic jurisdiction) soviets of people's deputies in the event that they conflict with the Ukrainian SSR Constitution and Ukrainian SSR laws;

20) resolves other questions within the jurisdiction of the Ukrainian SSR, except for those that belong to the exclusive jurisdiction of the Congress of Ukrainian SSR People's Deputies.

"The Ukrainian SSR Supreme Soviet adopts laws of the Ukrainian SSR and decrees.

"Laws and decrees adopted by the Ukrainian SSR Supreme Soviet cannot contradict laws of the USSR, or laws and other acts adopted by the Ukrainian SSR Congress of People's Deputies.

**"Article 103.** The right of legislative initiative in the Congress of Ukrainian SSR People's Deputies and Ukrainian SSR Supreme Soviet belongs to Ukrainian SSR people's deputies, the Presidium of the Ukrainian SSR Supreme Soviet, the chairman of the Ukrainian SSR Supreme Soviet, the Ukrainian SSR Constitutional Oversight Committee, the Ukrainian SSR Council of Ministers, standing commissions of the Ukrainian SSR Supreme Soviet, the Ukrainian SSR People's Control Committee, the Ukrainian SSR Supreme Court, the Ukrainian SSR procurator, and the Ukrainian SSR chief state arbitrator.

"The right of legislative initiative also belongs to public organizations in the person of their republic bodies, and to the Ukrainian SSR Academy of Sciences

**"Article 104.** Drafts laws and other questions submitted for consideration by the Ukrainian SSR Supreme Soviet are discussed in its meetings.

"A law of the Ukrainian SSR and a decree of the Ukrainian SSR Supreme Soviet are considered adopted if the majority of members of the Ukrainian SSR Supreme Soviet have voted for them.

"Draft laws and other of the most important questions of the republic's state life can, by decision of the Ukrainian SSR Supreme Soviet, be submitted for public discussion.

**"Article 105.** The Presidium of the Ukrainian SSR Supreme Soviet is a body, accountable to the Ukrainian SSR Supreme Soviet, that provides for organization of the work of the Congress of Ukrainian SSR People's Deputies and the Ukrainian SSR Supreme Soviet and exercises other powers within limits stipulated in the Ukrainian SSR Constitution and Ukrainian SSR laws.

"The following are ex officio members of the Presidium of the Ukrainian SSR Supreme Soviet: the chairman of the Ukrainian SSR Supreme Soviet, the first deputy chairman of the Ukrainian SSR Supreme Soviet, the deputy chairman of the Ukrainian SSR Supreme Soviet, the chairman of the Ukrainian SSR People's Control Committee, and the chairmen of standing commissions of the Ukrainian SSR Supreme Soviet.

"The Presidium of the Ukrainian SSR Supreme Soviet is headed by the chairman of the Ukrainian SSR Supreme Soviet.

**"Article 106.** The Presidium of the Ukrainian SSR Supreme Soviet:

1) convenes sessions of the Ukrainian SSR Supreme Soviet;

2) organizes the preparation of meetings of the Congress of Ukrainian SSR People's Deputies and sessions of the Ukrainian SSR Supreme Soviet;

3) coordinates the activities of standing commissions of the Ukrainian SSR Supreme Soviet;

4) provides assistance to Ukrainian SSR people's deputies in the exercise of their powers and provides them with necessary information;

5) exercises oversight over observance of the Ukrainian SSR Constitution;

6) organizes the preparation and conduct of general public votes (referendums) and also of public discussions of draft laws of the Ukrainian SSR and other of the most important questions of the republic's state life;

7) names and renames city-type settlements, villages and settlements;

8) awards state awards of the Ukrainian SSR and confers honorary titles of the Ukrainian SSR;

9) admits persons to citizenship of the Ukrainian SSR, resolves questions of granting asylum;

10) carries out the pardoning of citizens convicted by courts of the Ukrainian SSR;

11) appoints and recalls diplomatic representatives of the Ukrainian SSR in foreign states and international organizations;

12) accepts the credentials and letters of recall of the diplomatic representatives of foreign states accredited under it;

13) publishes, in Ukrainian and in authoritative translation into Russian, laws of the Ukrainian SSR and other acts adopted by the Congress of Ukrainian SSR People's Deputies, the Ukrainian SSR Supreme Soviet, the Presidium of the Ukrainian SSR Supreme Soviet, and the chairman of the Ukrainian SSR Supreme Soviet; promotes the publication of the aforementioned acts in translation into other languages that are used by the majority of the population in certain localities in the republic.

"The Presidium of the Ukrainian SSR Supreme Soviet promulgates ukases and adopts decrees.

"**Article 107.** The chairman of the Ukrainian SSR Supreme Soviet is the republic's highest official and represents the Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic in the country and in international relations.

"The chairman of the Ukrainian SSR Supreme Soviet is elected by the Congress of Ukrainian SSR People's Deputies from among the Ukrainian SSR people's deputies by secret ballot for a term of five years and for no more than two consecutive terms. He may at any time be recalled by the Congress of Ukrainian SSR People's Deputies by secret ballot.

"The chairman of the Ukrainian SSR Supreme Soviet is accountable to the Congress of Ukrainian SSR People's Deputies and the Ukrainian SSR Supreme Soviet.

"**Article 108.** The chairman of the Ukrainian SSR Supreme Soviet:

1) carries out general guidance of the preparation of questions subject to consideration by the Congress of Ukrainian SSR People's Deputies and the Ukrainian SSR Supreme Soviet; signs laws of the Ukrainian SSR and other acts adopted by the Congress of Ukrainian SSR People's Deputies, the Ukrainian SSR Supreme Soviet, and the Presidium of the Ukrainian SSR Supreme Soviet;

2) presents to the Congress of Ukrainian SSR People's Deputies and Ukrainian SSR Supreme Soviet reports on the state of the republic and important questions of its internal- and foreign-policy activities;

3) presents to the Congress of Ukrainian SSR People's Deputies candidates for election to the offices of first

deputy chairman and deputy chairman of the Ukrainian SSR Supreme Soviet, as well as proposals on the membership of the Ukrainian SSR Constitutional Oversight Committee;

4) presents to the Ukrainian SSR Supreme Soviet candidates for appointment or election to the offices of chairman of the Ukrainian SSR Council of Ministers, chairman of the Ukrainian SSR People's Control Committee, chairman of the Ukrainian SSR Supreme Court, and the Ukrainian SSR chief state arbitrator, and then presents these officials to the Congress of Ukrainian SSR People's Deputies for confirmation;

5) conducts negotiations and signs international treaties of the Ukrainian SSR.

"The chairman of the Ukrainian SSR Supreme Soviet issues orders.

"The first deputy chairman of the Ukrainian SSR Supreme Soviet and the deputy chairman of the Ukrainian SSR Supreme Soviet perform, with the authorization of the chairman of the Ukrainian SSR Supreme Soviet, certain of his functions and replace the chairman in the event of his absence or the impossibility of his performance of his duties.

"**Article 109.** The Ukrainian SSR Supreme Soviet elects, from among the members of the Ukrainian SSR Supreme Soviet and other Ukrainian SSR people's deputies, standing commissions to draft legislation and carry out the preliminary consideration and preparation of questions within the jurisdiction of the Ukrainian SSR Supreme Soviet, and to foster the implementation of laws of the Ukrainian SSR and other decisions adopted by the Congress of Ukrainian SSR People's Deputies and the Ukrainian SSR Supreme Soviet, and to monitor the activities of state agencies and organizations.

"The Ukrainian SSR Supreme Soviet creates, when it deems it necessary, investigative, auditing and other commissions on any question.

"One-fifth of the membership of the standing commissions of the Ukrainian SSR Supreme Soviet is replaced annually.

**Article 110.** Laws and other decisions of the Congress of Ukrainian SSR People's Deputies and the Ukrainian SSR Supreme Soviet are adopted, as a rule, following the preliminary discussion of drafts by the appropriate standing commissions of the Ukrainian SSR Supreme Soviet.

"The appointment and election of officials to the Ukrainian SSR Council of Ministers, the Ukrainian SSR People's Control Commission, the Ukrainian SSR Supreme Court, and the collegium of the Ukrainian SSR State Arbitration Service are made with reference to conclusions of the appropriate standing commissions of the Ukrainian SSR Supreme Soviet.

"All state and public agencies, organizations and officials are required to fulfill the requirements of commissions of the Ukrainian SSR Supreme Soviet and present them with the necessary materials and documents.

"The recommendations of commissions are subject to mandatory consideration by state and public agencies, institutions and organizations. The results of their consideration and the measures taken should be reported to the commissions within the time period set by them.

"**Article 111.** Ukrainian SSR people's deputies in meetings of the Congress of Ukrainian SSR People's Deputies and sessions of the Ukrainian SSR Supreme Soviet have the right to address inquiries to the chairman of the Ukrainian SSR Supreme Soviet, the Ukrainian SSR Council of Ministers, and the executives of other bodies formed or elected by the Congress of Ukrainian SSR People's Deputies and the Ukrainian SSR Supreme Soviet, as well as to the executives of enterprises located on the territory of the Ukrainian SSR, and of enterprises, institutions and organizations under union subordination on matters within the jurisdiction of the Ukrainian SSR. The agency or official to which an inquiry is addressed is required to provide an oral or written answer at the given session of the Ukrainian SSR Supreme Soviet within no more than three days.

"Ukrainian SSR people's deputies are relieved from the performance of office or production duties for a specific period required for the performance of their work as deputies in the Congress of Ukrainian SSR People's Deputies and its commissions, and also among the public. Ukrainian SSR people's deputies elected to the Ukrainian SSR Supreme Soviet may be relieved from the performance of office or production duties for the entire period of their term in the Ukrainian SSR Supreme Soviet.

"A Ukrainian SSR people's deputy cannot have criminal charges brought against him, be arrested, or be subjected to administrative penalties imposed through judicial proceedings without the consent of the Ukrainian SSR Supreme Soviet or, in the period between its sessions, without the consent of the Presidium of the Ukrainian SSR Supreme Soviet.

"**Article 112.** The Ukrainian SSR Constitutional Oversight Committee is elected by the Congress of Ukrainian SSR People's Deputies for a period of 10 years from among specialists in the area of policy and law and is to consist of a chairman, deputy chairman and seven committee members.

"Persons elected to the Ukrainian SSR Constitutional Oversight Committee cannot simultaneously serve on agencies whose acts are subject to the committee's oversight, or be Ukrainian SSR people's deputies.

"Persons elected to the Ukrainian SSR Constitutional Oversight Committee are independent in the performance of their duties and subordinate only to the USSR Constitution and Ukrainian SSR Constitution.

"The Ukrainian SSR Constitutional Oversight Committee:

1) at its own initiative or on the instructions of the Congress of Ukrainian SSR People's Deputies, presents the Congress with conclusions concerning the conformity to the Ukrainian SSR Constitution of draft laws of the Ukrainian SSR that are subject to consideration by the Congress;

2) at its own initiative, on instructions from the Congress of Ukrainian SSR People's Deputies, or in accordance with a proposal by the Ukrainian SSR Supreme Soviet, presents the Ukrainian SSR Supreme Soviet with conclusions concerning the conformity of acts of the Ukrainian SSR Supreme Soviet and the drafts of such acts to the Ukrainian SSR Constitution and laws of the Ukrainian SSR adopted by the Congress of Ukrainian SSR People's Deputies;

3) monitors the conformity of decrees and orders of the Ukrainian SSR Council of Ministers to the Ukrainian SSR Constitution and laws of the Ukrainian SSR;

4) at its own initiative or on instructions from the Congress of Ukrainian SSR People's Deputies, or in accordance with proposals by the Ukrainian SSR Supreme Soviet, the Presidium of the Ukrainian SSR Supreme Soviet, the chairman of the Ukrainian SSR Supreme Soviet, standing commissions of the Ukrainian SSR Supreme Soviet, or the Ukrainian SSR Council of Ministers, provides conclusions concerning the conformity to the Ukrainian SSR Constitution and laws of the Ukrainian SSR of the acts of local soviets of people's deputies and other republic state agencies and public organizations.

When an instance in which an act or individual provisions of it are contrary to the Ukrainian SSR Constitution or laws of the Ukrainian SSR is identified, the Ukrainian SSR Constitutional Oversight Committee sends the agency that has promulgated the act its conclusion in order that the violation that has been committed can be eliminated. The committee's adoption of such a conclusion suspends the execution of an act or individual provisions of an act that are contrary to the Ukrainian SSR Constitution or a law of the Ukrainian SSR.

The Ukrainian SSR Constitutional Oversight Committee has the right to submit a representation to the Congress of Ukrainian SSR People's Deputies, the Ukrainian SSR Supreme Soviet, or the Ukrainian SSR Council of Ministers concerning the revocation of acts of agencies or officials accountable to them that are contrary to the Ukrainian SSR Constitution or a law of the Ukrainian SSR.

"The organization and operating procedures of the Ukrainian SSR Constitutional Oversight Committee are defined by legislation of the USSR and the Ukrainian SSR concerning constitutional oversight.

**"Article 113.** The Congress of Ukrainian SSR People's Deputies and Ukrainian SSR Supreme Soviet exercise supervision of the activities of all the state agencies accountable to them.

"The Ukrainian SSR Supreme Soviet directs the activities of the Ukrainian SSR People's Control Committee, which heads the system of people's control agencies in the republic.

"The organization and operating procedures of the people's control agencies are defined by the Law on People's Control in the USSR.

**"Article 114.** The operating procedures of the Congress of Ukrainian SSR People's Deputies, Ukrainian SSR Supreme Soviet and their agencies are defined by the Regulations of the Congress of Ukrainian SSR People's Deputies and the Ukrainian SSR Supreme Soviet, and other laws of the Ukrainian SSR promulgated on the basis of the Ukrainian SSR Constitution."

4. To word articles 73 and 74 as follows:

**"Article 73.** The state language of the Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic is Ukrainian.

"The Ukrainian SSR provides for the all-round development and functioning of the Ukrainian language in all spheres of public life.

"The Ukrainian SSR provides for the free use of the Russian language as the language of internationality intercourse among peoples of the USSR.

"In the work of state, party and public agencies, institutions, enterprises and organizations located in places of dense population by persons of other nationalities, their national languages may be used along with the state language.

"The Ukrainian SSR shows state concern for the free development and use of all national languages used by the republic's population. The procedures for the use of the Ukrainian and other languages in the Ukrainian SSR are defined by law.

**"Article 74.** The Ukrainian SSR participates in the resolution of matters belonging to the jurisdiction of the USSR in the Congress of USSR People's Deputies, the USSR Supreme Soviet, the Presidium of the USSR Supreme Soviet, the government of the USSR, and other agencies of the USSR.

"The Ukrainian SSR provides for comprehensive economic and social development within its territory and assists in the exercise of the powers of the USSR within that territory.

"On matters within its jurisdiction, the Ukrainian SSR coordinates and monitors the activities of enterprises, institutions and organizations under union subordination.

"The Ukrainian SSR enters into relations with foreign states, concludes treaties with them and exchanges diplomatic and consular representatives, and participates in the activities of international organizations."

To word articles 150, 151 and 153 in Section 18, "The Court and Arbitration Service," as follows:

**"Article 150.** All courts of the Ukrainian SSR are formed on the principle of elective judges and people's assessors.

"The people's judges of rayon (city) people's courts are elected by the appropriate oblast soviets or Kiev City Soviet.

"Judges of the Ukrainian SSR Supreme Court and of oblast courts and the Kiev City Court are elected by the Ukrainian SSR Supreme Soviet.

"The people's assessors of rayon (city) people's courts are elected in meetings of citizens based on their places of residence or work in open voting, and the people's assessors of higher courts are elected by the appropriate soviets.

"Judges of all courts are elected for a term of 10 years. People's assessors of all courts are elected for a term of five years.

"Judges and people's assessors are accountable to the bodies or voters that have elected them, report to them, and can be recalled by them according to procedures established by law.

**"Article 151.** The Ukrainian SSR Supreme Court is the supreme judicial body of the Ukrainian SSR and exercises oversight over the judicial activities of the republic's courts.

"The Ukrainian SSR Supreme Court consists of a chairman, his deputies, members, and people's assessors."

**"Article 153.** Judges and people's assessors are independent and subordinate only to the law.

"Judges and people's assessors are provided with the conditions for the unimpeded and effective exercise of their rights and duties. Any interference in the activities of judges and people's assessors in the administration of justice is impermissible and entails liability under the law.

"The inviolability of judges and people's assessors and other guarantees of their independence are established by the Law on the Status of Judges in the USSR and other legislative acts of the USSR and Ukrainian SSR."

II. In connection with the new wording of Sections 9, 10 and 12 of the Ukrainian SSR Constitution, to make changes and additions stemming from them in the following articles of the Ukrainian SSR Constitution:

1. To word Article 92, Part 3, as follows;

"In his activities a deputy is guided by general state interests, takes the requirements of the population of his election district and the interests expressed by the public organization that has elected him into account, and attempts to carry out the directives of his constituents and public organization."

2. To word Article 93 as follows:

**"Article 93.** A deputy exercises his authority, as a rule, without leaving his production or office work.

"For the duration of meetings of the Congress of Ukrainian SSR People's Deputies or sessions of the Ukrainian SSR Supreme Soviet or local soviets of people's deputies, as well as for the exercise of his deputy's authority in other cases provided by law, a deputy is relieved of the performance of his production or office duties with the reimbursement of his expenses connected with his deputy's activities out of moneys of the appropriate republic or local budget."

3. To word Article 94, Part 1, as follows:

"A deputy has the right to submit an inquiry to appropriate state agencies and officials, which are required to provide an answer to the inquiry in the Congress of Ukrainian SSR People's Deputies, or session of the Ukrainian SSR Supreme Soviet or local soviet of people's deputies."

4. To word Article 96 as follows:

**"Article 96.** A deputy is required to report on his work and the work of the Congress of Ukrainian SSR People's Deputies, Ukrainian SSR Supreme Soviet, or local soviet of people's deputies to the constituents, collectives and public organizations that have nominated him as a candidate for deputy, or to the public organization that has elected him.

"A deputy who has not justified the trust of his constituents or public organization can be recalled at any time by a decision of the majority of his constituents or of the public organization that has elected him, according to procedures established by law."

5. To word Article 117 as follows:

**"Article 117.** The Ukrainian SSR Council of Ministers is accountable to the Congress of Ukrainian SSR People's Deputies and the Ukrainian SSR Supreme Soviet and reports to them.

"A newly formed Ukrainian SSR Council of Ministers presents a program of anticipated activities for the term of its office for consideration by the Ukrainian SSR Supreme Soviet.

"At least once a year the Ukrainian SSR Council of Ministers reports on its work to the Ukrainian SSR Supreme Soviet."

6. To word Article 118, Part 1, as follows:

"The Ukrainian SSR is empowered to decide all questions of state administration within the jurisdiction of the Ukrainian SSR, as long as they do not belong, according to the Ukrainian SSR Constitution, to the jurisdiction of the Congress of Ukrainian SSR People's Deputies, the Ukrainian SSR Supreme Soviet and its Presidium, or the chairman of the Ukrainian SSR Supreme Soviet."

7. To word Article 120 as follows:

**"Article 120.** The Ukrainian SSR, on the basis of and in fulfillment of laws of the USSR and other decisions of the Congress of USSR People's Deputies and the USSR Supreme Soviet, laws of the Ukrainian SSR and other decisions of the Congress of Ukrainian SSR People's Deputies and Ukrainian SSR Supreme Soviet, and decrees and orders of the USSR Council of Ministers, promulgates decrees and orders and organizes and monitors their fulfillment. Decrees and orders of the Ukrainian SSR Council of Ministers are binding throughout the entire territory of the Ukrainian SSR."

8. In Article 122, Part 4, to replace the words "on the basis of and in fulfillment of laws of the USSR and other decisions of the USSR Supreme Soviet and its Presidium, and laws of the Ukrainian SSR and other decisions of the Ukrainian SSR Supreme Soviet and its Presidium," with the words "on the basis of and in fulfillment of laws of the USSR and other decisions of the Congress of USSR People's Deputies and USSR Supreme Soviet, and laws of the Ukrainian SSR and other decisions of the Congress of Ukrainian SSR People's Deputies and the Ukrainian SSR Supreme Soviet."

9. To word articles 128, 130 and 131 as follows:

**"Article 128.** The work of oblast, rayon, city and city rayon soviets of people's deputies is organized by their presidiums, which are headed by the soviet chairmen, and in city (for cities under rayon administration), settlement and rural soviets, the work is organized by the chairmen of those soviets.

"Sessions of oblast, rayon, city and city rayon soviets of people's deputies are convened by their presidiums, and sessions of city (for cities under rayon administration), settlement and rural soviets are convened by those soviets' chairmen at least four times a year.

"The range of questions resolved exclusively at sessions is established by laws on local soviets of people's deputies of the Ukrainian SSR."

**"Article 130.** Local soviets of people's deputies elect from among their deputies standing commissions for the preliminary consideration and preparation of questions within the local soviets' jurisdiction, and also for contributing to the implementation of the decisions of the soviets and higher bodies of state authority, and for exercising, within the limits of their authority, oversight

over the activities of state agencies, enterprises, institutions and organizations located within a soviet's territory.

"The appointment and election of officials to the executive committees of local soviets and people's control agencies, and of the executives of departments and administrations of executive committees, are done with reference to the conclusions of appropriate standing commissions of soviets of people's deputies.

"All state agencies, enterprises, institutions and organizations, as well as officials, located within a soviet's territory are required to fulfill the demands of the soviet's standing commissions and to present them with the necessary materials and documents.

"The recommendations of local soviets' standing commissions are subject to mandatory consideration by relevant state and public agencies, enterprises, institutions and organizations. Commissions must be informed of the results of this consideration and of the measures that have been taken within a time period set by them.

"**Article 131.** Local soviets of people's deputies carry out their activities in close connection with labor collectives and public organizations, submit the most important questions of local significance for discussion by citizens

and put them to referendums, and take steps to expand the participation of citizens in the work of the soviets and their subordinate bodies."

10. To word articles 132 and 134 as follows:

"**Article 132.** The executive and administrative bodies of local soviets of people's deputies are elected by their executive committees.

"The executive committees report at least once a year to the soviets that have elected them, as well as at meetings of labor collectives and of citizens according to places of residence."

"**Article 134.** The jurisdiction of the executive committees of local soviets of people's deputies and their operating procedures are defined on the basis of this Constitution by laws on local soviets of people's deputies of the Ukrainian SSR."

11. To word Article 171 as follows:

"**Article 171.** The amendment of the Ukrainian SSR Constitution is done by a decision of the Congress of Ukrainian SSR People's Deputies adopted by a majority of at least two-thirds of the total number of Ukrainian SSR people's deputies."

**AzSSR, ArSSR, Central Press, 'Factual' Views on NKAO Compared***18300774 Baku BAKINSKIY RABOCHIY in Russian  
30 Jul 89 p 2*

[Article by F. Asadov, candidate of historical sciences and associate of the Azerbaijan SSR Academy of Sciences Oriental Studies Institute, under the rubric "Toward the CPSU Central Committee Plenum on Interethnic Relations": "Nagornyy Karabakh: the Positions of the Sides and the Interests of the Country"]

[Excerpts] [Passage omitted] The problem of Nagornyy Karabakh has a lot of aspects by which the positions of the sides differ. Often during the examination of the causes for the conflict, the comparison of the specified contradictory views of the problem is done incorrectly, the causes and effects are confused and non-comparable categories are compared. [passage omitted]

In order to resolve the conflict in which broad layers of the Azerbaijan and Armenian peoples have turned out to be involved, it is necessary, first of all, to disclose the positions of both sides. The position of the Azerbaijan side on practically all aspects basically coincides with the constitutional positions, with the standards of Soviet law and with the official assessment of the causes and state of the conflict; it is distinguished from them only by the well-known emotional coloring. In the position of the Armenian side, there is complete divergence from the law, i.e., from the legally secured standard for the mutual relations of people at the various levels of social affairs. At the same time, it is, as it were, oriented toward a new, supposedly more improved administrative and political system, which definitely presupposes the inclusion of the NKAO [Nagorno-Karabakh Autonomous Oblast] in the make-up of the Armenian SSR. It is no accident that, in the publications of the central press, which display a significant proximity with the Armenian position, but simultaneously maintain the appearance of objectivity, it is difficult to find a clear-cut opinion on the principle question about the place and corresponding functioning of the NKAO in the adopted political and administrative system.

We will take for comparison the points of view of the Azerbaijan and Armenian sides on a number of problems associated with the NKAO, dwelling on their differences, and we will examine how they are assessed by the central press, what solutions have been adopted and how they are being implemented.

We will attempt for this purpose to bring the facts pertaining to the problem of the NKAO into some sort of more or less integral system.

**The State of the Problem****The Socioeconomic Aspect****The officially recognized factual situation:**

the unhappy socioeconomic situation of the populace is typical for many regions of the USSR and less critical than on the whole for Azerbaijan and Armenia.

**The point of view of the Azerbaijan populace:**

the consequences of the stagnation in the socioeconomic sphere have had a telling effect, but not to a greater degree, rather to a lesser degree, than in the rest of Azerbaijan's regions.

**The point of view of the Armenian populace:**

the NKAO lags sharply behind the rest of Azerbaijan's regions as a consequence of the ill-intentioned nationalistic policy of Baku.

**The tendency of the central press:**

recognition of the socioeconomic backwardness and ignoring of the relative well-being in comparison with other regions.

**The adopted solutions and the implemented measures:**

additional subsidies (around 500 million rubles). Plans for the acceleration of socioeconomic development.

**The Ethnic Cultural Aspect****The factual situation:**

quite broad ties with Armenia in the fields of culture and education and, at the same time, there are also obstacles which are natural for the rule of a bureaucratic system of administration.

**The point of view of the Azerbaijan populace:**

adequate cultural contacts with Armenia.

**The point of view of the Armenian populace:**

ignoring and oppression of the ethnic Armenian culture in the NKAO and intentional obstruction of the cultural ties with Armenia.

**The tendency of the central press:**

inadequate cultural independence of the NKAO's Armenian populace as a consequence of the incorrect policy of Azerbaijan's former leaders.

**The adopted solutions and the implemented measures:**

expansion of cultural and educational activities in the autonomous oblast (although this process has been decelerated because of the complicated political situation and the proclamation of a special law).

**The Ideological Aspect****The factual situation:**

a relapse of the bourgeois idea of the primary importance of national unity and national interests in comparison with the class and common interests of all the people and

the placing into oblivion of the principles of proletarian internationalism and the integration of the Soviet socialist nations.

**The point of view of the Azerbaijan populace:**

part of the Armenian populace has been infected by nationalistic bourgeois ideology and the reactionary idea of the reanimation of "Great Armenia."

**The point of view of the Armenian populace:**

the Karabakh Movement is proof of the development of the process of democratization and glasnost and of the improvement and subsequent realization of the Leninist ethnic policy.

**The tendency of the central press:**

the ideological inhomogeneity of the movements and the coexistence of the ideas of further improvement of the multi-ethnic Soviet society with the manifestations of nationalism.

**The adopted solutions and the implemented measures:**

recognition of the necessity of improving interethnic relations.

**The Administrative and Political Aspect**

**The factual situation:**

insubordination to the higher leading organs.

**The point of view of the Azerbaijan populace:**

totally unjustified insubordination to the higher leading organs.

**The point of view of the Armenian populace:**

insubordination to organs of authority, which is justifiable because of the imperfection of the administrative and political system.

**The tendency of the central press:**

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**The adopted solutions and the implemented measures:**

the establishment of a Special NKAO Administration Committee.

**The Legal and Juridical Aspect**

**The factual situation:**

a violation of the Constitutions of the USSR and the Azerbaijan SSR which is in no way related to the right of peoples to self-determination.

**The point of view of the Azerbaijan populace:**

a constitutional violation and illegal expansionist actions.

**The point of view of the Armenian populace:**

a legal demand based on the principle of the self-determination of the people.

**The tendency of the central press:**

divergence between the constitutional and the factual status of the NKAO.

**The adopted solutions and the implemented measures:**

a temporary change in the status of the NKAO—the introduction of a special form of administration.

**The Paths to the Solution of the Problem**

**The Socioeconomic Aspect**

**The factual situation:**

the further development of the socioeconomic sphere within the framework of the overall program for the socioeconomic development of Soviet society.

**The point of view of the Azerbaijan populace:**

preponderant attention to the socioeconomic development of the NKAO within the framework of the adopted decrees of the USSR Council of Ministers—a necessary concession for the sake of stabilization of the situation.

**The point of view of the Armenian populace:**

the imperative transfer of the NKAO to Armenia as a necessary condition for the further socioeconomic development of the oblast.

**The tendency of the central press:**

the adoption of extraordinary measures for the elimination of the socioeconomic backwardness of the NKAO.

**The Ethnic Cultural Aspect**

**The factual situation:**

the strengthening of the cultural ties with Armenia and the necessity of normalizing them with Azerbaijan.

**The point of view of the Azerbaijan populace:**

the maintenance of cultural ties with Armenia with the absolute condition of not limiting ties with Azerbaijan.

**The point of view of the Armenian populace:**

the cultural rebirth of the Armenian populace after the entry of the NKAO into the make-up of Armenia.

**The tendency of the central press:**

the expansion and improvement of cultural contacts with Armenia.

**The Ideological Aspect**

**The factual situation:**

the necessity of a principled assessment of the events from the position of the ideology of Soviet society, the

**importance of a solution regarding the retention of the NKAO in the make-up of Azerbaijan as proof of the guarantee of the republic's sovereignty and in order to avoid the establishment of a legal and juridical precedent which could entail the dangerous development of nationalistic tendencies in Soviet society.**

**The point of view of the Azerbaijan populace:**

the necessity of condemnation of the nationalistic nature of the movement and of its leaders as the champions of the ideas of Armenian nationalism.

**The point of view of the Armenian populace:**

the recognition of the democratic and socialist nature of the movement and the condemnation of the chauvinistic attitudes which have enveloped the Azerbaijan people.

**The tendency of the central press:**

the condemnation of Azerbaijan chauvinism and the extreme tendencies of the Karabakh Movement as nationalistic.

**The Legal and Juridical and the Administrative and Political Aspects**

**The factual situation:**

a significant diversity in the solutions within the limits provided for by Soviet law.

**The point of view of the Azerbaijan populace:**

the imperative retention of the NKAO in the make-up of the Azerbaijan SSR.

**The point of view of the Armenian populace:**

the imperative transfer of the NKAO from the make-up of the Azerbaijan SSR into the make-up of the Armenian SSR.

**The tendency of the central press:**

the improvement of the mutual relations between the center and the union republics and the autonomous formations.

As we see, the sole aspect of the problem which marks the divergence of the Azerbaijan position from the factual situation is cultural. Nowever, this divergence is not of a principle nature, because the true causes of the trouble in this sphere are concealed in the shortcomings of the bureaucratic system of administration which exists throughout the entire union.

An important factor for straightening out the situation is the readiness of the Azerbaijan side to eliminate the basic objective cause of the dissatisfaction of the Armenian populace: to expand and develop cultural contacts with Armenia and to eliminate subsequently the bureaucratic obstacles on this path, but, under the conditions of

the existence of favorable opportunities for the maintenance and development of the ancient centers of Azerbaijan ethnic culture and care of the monuments of the history of the Azerbaijan people on the territory of the NKAO. [passage omitted]

The Azerbaijan side sees the solution of the problem in the improvement of the country's entire socioeconomic oranism, i.e., it recognizes the universal and common nature of the problems which have arisen. [passage omitted] The Armenian side sees the sole solution in the achievement of the final goal—the transfer of the NKAO to Armenia. If the leaders of the Karabakh Movement are to be believed, this would be the highest achievement of perestroyka and an indispensable condition for its further development. But, perhaps, it is difficult to convince any sane-minded person anywhere beyond the boundaries of Transcaucasia that the success of perestroyka depends on whether or not the NKAO will be part of Armenia.

**Geographical Maps Require Clarity, Simplification**

*18001595 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 23 Aug 89  
Second Edition p 6*

[Article by D. Oreshkin: "What Maps Say"]

[Text] The world-renowned Gallup service, which analyzes public opinion, has come to some disheartening conclusions. America is the only country of ten countries surveyed where young people know less about geography than those of retirement age. Whereas 40 years ago Americans on average could identify six or seven countries on a map of Europe, they can now name only three or four. Many cannot even point out on a map which way is east and which is west....

"It costs us dearly that the 'average American' heading off on vacation holds his map upside down," said Professor J. Demko, head of the U.S. State Department's geography section at a meeting with Soviet colleagues.

A similar survey is now being conducted in our country by the Gallup Institute and the Institute of Sociology and Geography of the USSR Academy of Sciences. We will learn what sort of results the 'average Russian' provides by the autumn. But why are scholars so worked up about this?

"Many thousands of accidents occur, resulting in millions of rubles in damages, just because drivers don't understand road signs or because the signs are poorly placed," notes V. Kotlyakov, Director of the Institute of Geography and corresponding member of the USSR Academy of Sciences.

"Signs are the simplest way to explain the situation at a given location. In theory, geographical maps do this as well, but they are incomparably more complicated. Crucial decisions are made based upon them. It's no longer just individual vehicles that travel, but entire branches,

factories and cities. And as it turns out, we are sometimes travelling blindly! We spend lots of money on space research, but we can't make the most of the results. This is not due solely to the fact that they are unsatisfactorily calculated or because of our universal 'secrecy mania,' but largely owing to geographic illiteracy in our schools."

Ten or fifteen thousand years ago, long before the appearance of any sort of writing, our forbears learned to make distinctive signs of location in the form of drawings on stone or animal bones. One could say that this was the birth of the first maps. The stone age is long over. The symbology used by mankind has reached unprecedented perfection. Neither mathematics, nor writing systems, nor programming languages have been able to supplant mankind's first form of writing. A map was and remains our best means of describing our surroundings. So what is it about maps today that fails to satisfy the experts?

"For example," says A. Lyutiy, head of the cartography lab of the same institute, "the use of different symbologies frequently leads to contradictions. As a result, on one of the summary diagrams of land-use in the central RSFSR, land which needed to be irrigated was marked with symbols recommending it be drained, and vice versa. Unfortunately, this is a rather typical occurrence...."

At other times, the map simply deceives the reader. This is true with the Aral Sea, which is in reality little more than half as large as it is drawn. The rivers flowing into it are shown widening between their sources and their lower reaches, as if this were an area with a humid climate. In fact it's just the opposite: in the desert, the farther a river flows, the less water there is in it. Perhaps this is splitting hairs, but it gives someone sitting on a school bench a false view of the world.

"Iskhazhenko" is a semi-official term. It is a mass-produced cartographic product derived from distorted topographic bases. It is intended to disorient a potential opponent—except that an opponent wouldn't be using it. He has his own. But we study, and teach our children to study, the Earth through a distorted mirror.

"Ultimately, that is only half the problem," says A. Lyutiy. "Both mistakes and this slyness can be eliminated. But there is a more serious problem of scholarship. The language of maps has become excessively complex. There are so many 'words' in it—or conventional symbols—that you can't understand it without a special grammar....The words are understandable, but without a comma, the phrase is not. So it is that on a map, a combination of correct symbols can mislead the user."

According to English researchers, switching to a better system of depicting a road network would on average save drivers 3.7

of their driving time. The gain for the country as a whole would be 1.3 million man-days.

Naturally, this also applies to navigational systems used by navigators on sea, land and in space. Even a simple increase in the clarity of cartographic representations, without overhauling the system of symbols, promises great savings in view of the size of our country. A map is packed 20-50 times more densely with information than written text. One map insert in a book can replace 50 pages of verbal descriptions. But "reading" it is incomparably more difficult. This is another shortcoming of theoretical cartography.

Do you recall how the weather is given on the program "Vremya?" The country is brightly colored with gaudy little pictures—a rainshower pours down from the clouds, somewhere a sun shines....The goal is clear: to portray the distribution and dynamics of the weather in a minute of air time. All of the other details are left out.

But usually science has to resolve the opposite task. The most complete and detailed reflection of reality is required, and it is often not known in advance what can be left out. This is how the map sheet ends up loaded with superfluous information.

A solution was found long ago—atlas. But atlases are going through a difficult time right now. For example, geographers are working on NATURE AND THE WORLD'S NATURAL RESOURCES—a global encyclopedia of nature on the eve of the 21st century. It is already apparent that the atlas will contain approximately 350 maps—and this is still too few. But you can't increase its contents indefinitely!

The solution, according to those working on the problem, is to once again create a new cartographic language.

"We have really gotten to the point," says A. Lyutiy, "when the observer in space, the computer and the cartographer should deal with one another directly, without a translator. Too much depends on how quickly and how correctly data about the processes occurring on Earth is analyzed and understood. This includes security, the condition of the environment, and economic stability. In my view, creating a new 'space-computer-map' language is now of the utmost importance."

This is more apparent to a specialist. At first, "digitized" map symbols cause a map to lose its normal appearance. Nevertheless, they are clearly understood by computers. Furthermore, they offer a unique opportunity to introduce the element of time and to work with a live flow of information, separating out the most important phenomena and projecting them onto a display screen. An atlas was always a more or less complete set of individual images of the earth's surface—a set of "slides." Computers now assemble "movies."

Mankind is imperceptibly entering a new era of information. Satellites and computer networks turn former notions of secrecy to dust and present fundamentally new tasks for handling the growing stream of geographic data. This may be the first time that science has experienced such an acute dichotomy. On the one hand, machine languages and data bases represent infinite

complication. On the other hand, their main accomplishments should soon touch everyone. For cartography, this means a new generation of clear, moderately-priced and accurate maps, understandable with normal academic skills. Without them, we doom ourselves to being eternal provincials, unable to read a subway guide or find the sign we need in a hectic city.

## Mass Grave of Leningrad Victims of Stalinist Repressions Found

18300756 Moscow KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA in Russian 30 Jul 89 p 1

[Article by V. Kislov: "I Have Returned, My City..."]

[Text] Leningrad—In October of last year, a man who wished to remain anonymous telephoned the newspaper LENINGRADSKAYA PRAVDA. "It is frightening to this day," he remarked, and explained: "I was arrested in 1934, along with comrades, and 20 years of prison camps do not increase one's courage. However, I was lucky even so—I survived. But I never saw my friends again. I just heard that they had been shot as enemies of the people. Where are their graves? Where are our (Kuropats) and Leningraders'?"

The newspaper appealed to the city's residents with the request to help answer the question, which has troubled many Leningraders for several decades. The journalists for the popular "On-Duty Reporter" column, Yelizaveta Bogoslovskaya, Sergey Chesnokov, and Galina Sapunova, literally have not gotten off the telephone since that time. They established contact with representatives of party and soviet agencies, the procuracy, the KGB Administration and the police, and the "Memorial" Society's Leningrad Chapter. They made trips to places indicated by Leningraders several times. Specialists from the All-Union Scientific Research Institute for the Earth's Crust, who helped take soil samples, and then analyzed these by methods enabling them to determine the sites of even subsequently destroyed interments, took part in the search for the unmarked graves.

One address attracted particular attention; it was repeated more often than others, and was encountered in almost every letter to the editorial office. It was Levashovo Wilderness, located just beyond the city limits, which had gotten its name back in antiquity.

Here is what Ye.Ye. Dolginskaya told the journalists: "I lived in Levashovo before the war, in the house closest to the forest. My father, who loved to pick mushrooms, noticed that an excavation had appeared in the Wilderness and, furthermore, it had been enclosed with an enormous, tight, wooden fence. The barking of dogs emanated from behind the fence. Several persons saw it, whenever a 'Black Maria' entered the fenced area."

Last Tuesday, a section of the former Levashovo Wilderness, surrounded to this day by an unbroken wooden fence, gave up its half-century-old secret.

"It has been established that burials of repression victims were carried out in the Levashovo Station vicinity from 1937 even to the early 1950's. No documents of any sort about other such places have been found to date. The sentences were executed at the condemned persons' preliminary confinement places."

A.A. Kurkov, chief of the KGB Administration for Leningrad Oblast, made this statement at a meeting of

the Leningrad City Executive Committee's commission for finding the repression victims' burial places.

As a result of analyzing archival materials about land tracts set aside for the People's Commissariat for Internal Affairs [NKVD], only one document bearing upon the quest's objective was discovered—a copy of a Leningrad Soviet Forest Administration document, dated 28 February 1938, about "assigning the part of Pertevskiy Tree Farm's Pargolovo Forestland grounds requested by the NKVD Commandant's Office for a special purpose." (Pargolovo—this is the station before Levashovo.)

At the same time, a former KGB Administration associate, who had dealings with the burial ground guard in the late 1950's, related, from the words of his predecessor, that the indicated place had begun to be used for burials as early as the summer of 1937.

For all of these long decades, the tract behind the 3-meter-high wooden fence has been under KGB Administration guard. It was explained to the journalists that the guard's existence was dictated by the necessity to prevent any sort of construction or laying of roads at the place. However, the main reason, as was stressed in the answers to questions, was that the "special facility's" story was kept secret because of the absence of "instructions from above."

Many of those who are buried on the "Pargolovo Forestland" grounds have already been rehabilitated. Over 36,000 persons were rehabilitated back in the period from 1953 to 1964 by a specially created group of Leningrad KGB associates. Then the process was suspended. It is now necessary to complete the rehabilitation work as soon as possible.

How many people in all were buried on this 11-hectare spot of land? The answer given to this question was: As we have managed to establish by certificates of executed sentences—46,771 persons. Seemingly, six persons shot in the "Leningrad Affair"—Kuznetsov, Voznesenskiy, Popkov, Lazutin, Rodionov, and Kapustin—became the last of those buried.

However, one of the last burials dates from December of 1954, when the fabricators of the "Leningrad Affair"—former Minister Abakumov of the USSR Ministry of State Security [MGB] and three of his subordinates, MGB executives Leonov, Komarov, and Likhachev—got their "just deserts" for crimes against the people.

It is not just innocent victims that are buried here. Persons shot for banditry, robberies, murders, and other serious capital offenses, and, during the war years—for belonging to an enemy intelligence service, desertion, and pillage—are buried at Levashovo. There are 6,286 of these here. Ponder the sinister ratio: of almost 47,000 persons shot, only a few more than 6,000 were true criminals!

For long years, trees, which came up here after the tragic events, served as the only monument over the graves. At present those pine and birch trees are 35, 40, and 45 years old. But now a memorial marker—a half-meter stone in a sandy clearing—has appeared at a forest road intersection. The first flowers in memory of the slain were placed at it. Those who had personally experienced the Stalinist terror's consequences—V.I. Pyatnitskiy, son of Lenin's repressed coworker Osip Pyatnitskiy, and V.T. Muravskiy, whose father was posthumously rehabilitated in 1956—bowed their heads.

"One may say that an important stage of the work has been completed," observed V.T. Muravskiy. "We are especially grateful to the Leningrad City Executive Committee, which has assisted us in many undertakings, and now has begun to collaborate with us in implementing the idea of creating a charity fund to aid victims of the Stalinist repressions. Out of the fund's resources, it is planned to build boarding houses, hospitals, and a polyclinic for Leningraders who survived the terrible tragedy."

The Leningrad City Executive Committee has adopted a resolution concerning recognition of those buried at Levashovo with a memorial cemetery.

Last year, KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA wrote about one of those buried in the Wilderness in the article "The Victor." It was A. Kuznetsov, secretary of the All-Union Communist Party of the Bolsheviks' [VKP(b)] Central Committee. Judging by reader mail, the article made many readers ponder the black page in our history once again. The life of each of the victims resting here—this is also a lesson for our contemporaries. However, we shall

not be able to tell you about all of the twisted fates! Even if we were to do a story about one of them in each of the newspaper's editions, it would take...130 years! And this just in order to fully reveal the outline of the small, wooded spot on the outskirts of Leningrad....

### **Brezhnev War Deeds, Monument Questioned**

18300776

[Editorial Report] Moscow SOTSIALISTICHESKAYA INDUSTRIYA in Russian on 23 August carries a 500 word article on page 4 by V. Karamzin titled "And People Lower Their Eyes..." which comments on a photograph found during research for his book, "Stalin Gives an Interview." The photograph, reportedly published for the first time but not included with the article, depicts a monument to Brezhnev in the village of Stavishche in Zhitomir Oblast. The photograph's inscription reads, "Here on the night from 11 to 12 December 1943, 18th Army section leader L.I. Brezhnev led the machine gun fire, repelling the enemy attack."

"Brezhnev was a pretender for a special role in the history of the Great Patriotic War. Inside the dome of the Ukrainian museum's main monument to the history of the Great Patriotic War in Kiev, the last names of all of the Heroes of the Soviet Union are stamped. Above those are twice-named heroes, and then threetime heroes. And above all of the names of those who have fallen or are still living is the name Brezhnev—a four-time Hero of the Soviet Union and Hero of Socialist Labor. The People lower their eyes. Brezhnev, visiting the museum, left satisfied... Today, such injustice is removed."

## Suppression of Uniate Church Debated

### Metropolitan Filaret on Nationalistic Threat

18120117 Moscow MOSCOW NEWS in English  
No 31, 6-18 Aug 89 p 15

[Report by Zinovy Kovtun: "Was the Uniate Church Closed?"]

[Text] Following an MN publication about a recent hunger strike and demonstrations in Moscow by a group of Greek Catholics from the Ukraine, our editor-in-chief received a letter from Metropolitan Filaret of Kiev and Galich (the Metropolitan passed it on to our office via the Ukrainian department of the Novosti Press Agency). We publish it in full with comments by Sergei Filatov, a research associate at the Institute of the USA and Canada.

To Yegor Yakovlev, Editor-in-Chief, MOSCOW NEWS

Issue No 24 (June 11) of the newspaper which you edit featured an item with a photograph entitled "Prayer on Gorky Street" about the demands of the Greek Catholics from the Ukraine, who insist that their Church be legalized. Inasmuch as this publication may mislead part of the readership and depicts Greek Catholics as "victims of Stalinist repressions" and of the arbitrary rule of local authorities, I would like to point out that the Greek Catholic Church (or that part of the Greek Church which acknowledges the supremacy of the Pope) in the Ukraine was closed over 40 years ago. In March 1946 at the Church's Synod of Lvov, bishops, priests and lay representatives announced the annulment of the Uniate Church imposed on believers in 1596 at the Synod of Brest. The decision of the Lvov Synod was supported by the overwhelming majority of Greek Catholics, and nearly all the parishes in that region reunited with the Russian Orthodox Church, founded nearly a millennium before by eastern Slavs of Kievan Rus.

What triggered this act? Certainly not Stalin's repressions, which we all condemn, but the fact that the Uniate Church, which had set itself up artificially on captured territory in the Ukraine and Byelorussia, had become outdated. Throughout its history believers saw this unnatural union as a source of national, social and religious oppression. The Greek Catholic Church hierarchy completely discredited itself in the eyes of rank-and-file believers and clergymen during World War II when it collaborated with nazis occupying our territory and with Bandera's nationalist gangs.

What then is the problem, what does this handful of Uniate priests and believers, who did not recognize the decision of the Lvov Synod, want? Instigated by Uniate and nationalist centres from abroad, they are demanding not only "legal status" for their organization, as the item puts it, but the alienation of thousands of parishes and millions of believers from the Russian Orthodox Church. These Christians were baptized by the Orthodox Church. The priests of these parishes were ordained by Orthodox

bishops. And now an insignificant group of Uniates wants to join this inalienable part of the Orthodox Church to the Catholic Church. Moreover, they are already thinking of opening a Uniate parish in Kiev—the capital of the Ukraine. As we see it, their actions are characterized not by a peaceful struggle for religious liberty, but one of religious aggression.

They have become especially active recently. One example is the so-called prayers on Moscow streets, which cannot but evoke a feeling of protest among believers. It is a sacrifice to turn the sacred cause of the human soul's communion with God into an instrument of political struggle.

Why am I saying this? Because a handful of people from a church they themselves closed have been trying to use the democratization processes underway in our country and religious liberty to revitalize the Uniate Church. Their main objective is to set up a "national church" in contrast to the Orthodox one. Nationalistic elements have been trying to use the Uniate Church to estrange Ukrainians from Russians, their half-brothers. Leaders of the Ukrainian Catholic Church in the West, having joined hands with Ukrainian nationalists, do not conceal their main objective: to secure the Ukraine's secession from the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics. They are aided and abetted by local nationalists. At the beginning of this year they organized in Lvov a divine service which they timed to coincide with the 70th anniversary of the setting up of the government of a single, independent and religious Ukraine, which was known for its reactionary quintessence. This and other gatherings were held to propagandize the ideas of nationalism and cultivate hostility and hatred for the believers of other creeds, which is against the Constitution of the Ukrainian SSR. There have been increasingly frequent cases of advocates of the Uniate Church preventing believers from attending Orthodox churches. Not long ago their activists stopped a divine service at the St. Yura Cathedral in Lvov. You don't need to be clairvoyant to understand that the restoration of the former Uniate Church will lead to religious and political struggle, bringing disunity. The most cogent proof of this is the history of the Ukraine itself.

And the last thing I would like to say. The surviving Greek Catholics are not subjected to any repressive measures. They can profess their faith, consider the Pope their pastor and pray in Catholic churches on Ukrainian territory, including its western regions. No one is preventing them from attending Orthodox churches either, where divine services are given in the Ukrainian language as well, and from performing eastern rites.

Metropolitan Filaret of Kiev and Galich, Exarch of the Ukraine

**Uniate Church Defended**

18120117 Moscow MOSCOW NEWS in English  
No 31, 6-18 Aug 89 p 15

[Reply by Sergei Filatov: "Was the Uniate Church Closed?"]

[Text] Recently, public opinion has increasingly come to focus on the problem of the Ukrainian Catholic Church (Greek Orthodox Catholics who acknowledged the supremacy of the Pope). A demand for the legalization of this Church was made at the Congress of USSR People's Deputies by Academician Andrei Sakharov, a similar demand was voiced in the newspaper SOVETSKAYA KULTURA by Corresponding Member Sergei Averintsev. What is the problem?

In the 16th century the Vatican put forward the idea of uniting Orthodoxy with Catholicism (while keeping intact much Orthodox ritual) in the areas of the Ukraine and Byelorussia belonging to Poland. The Uniate Church was proclaimed in Brest in 1596 and for some time people were forced to join it. But gradually it struck root and became traditional for some Ukrainians.

In 1946, the Uniate clergy held their Synod in Lvov, which still arouses criticism.

For many years, instances of repressive measures being used against the Church and believers were not recognized in the USSR, and people were told that the drop in the number of functioning churches was a result of the dwindling interest in religion. Today the truth about victimizations and persecution of Orthodox believers, Moslems and Baptists has been recognized. But repressions against Uniates still remain a "blank spot."

It is customary to believe that the Synod of Lvov itself passed a decision in 1946 to abolish the Uniate Church of Brest. In actual fact, the rout of the Uniate Church was carried out in accordance with a well-polished tradition: in the 1920s and 1930s attempts were made in much the same way to replace Tikhon's followers with "reformists." The Lvov Synod was set up not by the episcopate, but by an "initiative group." Despite the fact that many Uniate priests and bishops were already in prison, the "initiators" were unable to get the support of a large part of the clergy. There are no grounds for questioning the honesty of Father Gavriil Kostelnik, head of the initiative group (just as there are no grounds for doubting the personal honesty of Metropolitan Vvedensky, head of renovators), yet subsequent events have demonstrated that that was the personal choice of Kostelnik and his followers, and not the whole of the Uniate Church. Many believers did not accept unification with the Russian Orthodox Church, preferring arrests, prison camps and exile.

The attempt to wipe out the Uniate Church resulted in a fratricidal struggle which lasted for many years in the Western Ukraine. These are the victims of Stalin and his

yesmen. Despite all the persecutions, it was never possible to abolish the Uniate Church. Western experts in religion believe that today Uniates have five bishops, hundreds of priests, two monastic orders, and put the number of Uniates at 2.5-4 million (3.5 million in 1943).

Under the conditions prevailing in a state committed to the rule of law there are no grounds for persecuting or discriminating against the followers of the Uniate Church. References to the collaboration of the Church's leaders with nazis have an odd ring—44 years have passed since the war, and new generations have grown up. Attempts to continue a repressive policy against Uniates threaten to aggravate social tension, interethnic conflicts and to complicate the USSR's relations with other countries. For many years it has been hoped that Uniates will return to Orthodoxy. It was widely believed that the Uniate Church owes its existence solely to the support of foreign governments. Life has shown that this was a delusion. Yet even certain members of the Orthodox hierarchy find it hard to give it up, it appears.

Representatives from the Lvov public have now raised the question of returning the St. Yura Cathedral once the principal Ukrainian Catholic Church, the seat of its metropolitans, to the Uniates. I believe that if the Cathedral remains in the hands of the Russian Orthodox Church, it will serve as a reminder of a humiliating, insulting "gift." I think that the St. Yura Cathedral must be given to its real owners, and that the Russian Orthodox Church should claim the return of its ancient shrines in the Ukraine—the St. Sofia Cathedral and other old churches of Kiev, the Chernigov Region, etc. If the St. Yura Cathedral is returned to the Uniates, this will restore justice and will stand as evidence of the triumph of courage and spiritual strength over arbitrary rule.

Let us try to imagine what people will think about the present-day situation some 100 or 200 years from now. The Uniate Church will sooner or later be given back its rights. And then, just as the Catholic Church today has to justify itself when reminded about Galileo's case, so the Orthodox Church will find it hard to explain why it so persistently supported Stalin's repressive measures against the followers of the Uniate Church.

**Orthodox Parish Formed in Magadan**

18001572 Moscow SOTSIALISTICHESKAYA  
INDUSTRIYA in Russian 29 Aug 89 p 4

[Article by V. Androsenko, SOTSIALISTICHESKAYA  
INDUSTRIYA correspondent: "Church-Memorial"]

[Text] A Russian Orthodox parish has been organized in Magadan. The first religious ceremonies conducted in the history of the city were a requiem mass for innocent victims and a christening. This is a graphic example of the change in attitude of the state toward religion.

One of the most important tasks of the new parish is the erection of a church. According to Gavriyl, Bishop of

Khabarovsk and the Far East, the church will be named "St. Mary the Protectress" signifying a refuge and defense for both believers and nonbelievers. The church will also serve as a memorial to the innocent victims of the Kolyma camps.

The Magadan gorispolkom has set aside a place for the church to be built. An architects' competition for best design for the church-memorial will be held under the aegis of the Severovostokstroy association.

**Debate on Need for Minister of Culture Continues**

18001444a Moscow LITERATURNAYA GAZETA in Russian 26 Jul 89 p 8

[Opinion survey of USSR People's Deputies: "What Kind of Minister of Culture Do We Need, and Do We Need One At All?"]

[Text] The USSR Supreme Soviet has approved the composition of the government. But for the present there is no minister of culture. For the present? In the course of discussion some said that an all-union ministry of culture is not needed at all. This opinion was not held by the majority of speakers, but the candidacy of V.G. Zakharov was rejected despite letters in his support which were then read from the high tribunal. There was announced the creation of a Department of Culture and Public Education of the USSR Council of Ministers under the direct authority of the head of its administration. All of this prompted the correspondents of LITERATURNAYA GAZETA to turn to several USSR People's Deputies and masters of culture with the question, "What kind of Minister of Culture do we need, and do we need one at all?"

**Irina Andreyeva, USSR People's Deputy**

What kind of Ministry of Culture was I advocating from the tribunal of the Supreme Soviet? Not at all the kind which has existed up until now.

Almost from the beginning, and certainly for many years, its functions have entailed censorship. It filtered the theaters' repertoire and indicated what sort of music was to be written in the studies. The ministry played the role of a unique counterbalance to all those pretentious novelties, biases, and all the "isms" which routinely spread through the offending offices.

In fairness, there is an opinion in creative circles that the last minister, V.G. Zakharov, interfered with work as little as possible (and in our predicament even that is a blessing). However, the situation in our country has now changed.

I firmly take the position that art and culture are different territories. Art is very often directed at a distant future, while culture is that sphere which permeates everything, where there always exists not only a suggestion, but also a demand. Libraries, historical monuments and architecture, archives...

A Ministry of Culture in such a country as ours must, in my opinion, fulfill two main functions. And it must not confuse them. The first is patronage of the arts. Patronage on behalf of the state, and on behalf of the people, who cannot always understand at the moment the artist who, as we say, has looked into the future. The music of Sergey Prokofiev, like the music of Al'fred Shnitke today, requires a certain situation in order to captivate minds and emotions. Their art must not be compared with, let us say, a Don Cossack ensemble (which is not to belittle Cossack artists or Shnitke). If a

popular ensemble is able to support itself on a cost accounting basis, is it fair to require the same of our legendary theaters, our celebrated museums, or simply of an uncommon artist or musician? By no means. It is up to the ministry to support them.

The ministry's other important sphere of interest is the coordination of activities exclusively for the creation, development, prosperity, and interaction of all centers of culture. Here I attach special importance to the government's potential to aid the autonomous okrugs, oblasts, krays, and republics. The artistic works of even the most backward—according to the popular notion—people can be so elevated by virtue of the depth of their meaning and significance that they become universal and cross national boundaries without losing contact with their national origins. Should not we seek it all out, accumulate it, and treasure it?

There are centers of inter-ethnic culture, our country's national property. It was no coincidence that from the high tribunal I asked, "What now, shall we hand over Sar'yanato?" Not even Nalbandyan should be taken from the Tret'yakovka! It does not matter whether or not he pleases someone, this is our history. It is our common property. The USSR Ministry of Culture is summoned to protect it and augment it.

Should there be a concerned individual at the head of such a ministry? Of course. Should that individual come from the realm of creative activities? I do not know. That depends on the quality of his personality. Yes, there was D.B. Kabalevskiy, a remarkable composer and public figure, as they say, by the grace of God. Such brilliant personalities periodically appear on the public horizon, but I would not insist solely on them to fill the post of minister. I believe that a good historian, a publicist with a wide competency could be entirely appropriate. Today, in any case, a minister does not have the right to administer by injunction only—that is, the state allots the money, and he supports these or those trends in art according to his sympathies. It must be a man around whom there exists a broad social circle—of advisers, experts, and shrewd critics with a gift equivalent to the talent of an artist. Then the Ministry of Culture's usual buffer groups will not be needed.

And I venture to state concretely that I expect for this post a person with that creative scope and enterprise possessed by the director of the Museum of Fine Arts imeni Pushkin, I.A. Antonova. I expect, in any case, a person with an orientation towards the humanities and of high culture and broad views. And he will find credit and public recognition specifically as a result of these attributes.

**Rustam Ibragimbekov, USSR People's Deputy**

Right now our society is very much like a man who is watchful, resentful, and has lost faith in everything: When cheated by a lover, such a man will stop believing in love altogether; when betrayed by a friend—in friendship; when persecuted by misfortune—in success.

In the same way all of us, for years dependent on administrative and bureaucratic offices which under the flag of state interests defended principally their own, doubted altogether the necessity of state influence on culture and art.

We all remember the 5th Congress of Cinematographers, when the legitimate wrath of the film artists challenged the leadership of Goskino [State Committee for Cinematographers] and called into question the necessity of the existence of the film bureau in its previous form—like all the other ministries, Goskino defined who would work at art and who would not, who would receive state money and who would be denied for years, it persecuted those who thought differently, and in the end it successfully concluded a grand scientific experiment by producing a new type of absolutely malleable scriptwriter and director. Like art, the cinema only survived thanks to the courage and stoicism of individuals. Like the rest of culture, by the way.

Time passed and, as the result of the tremendous joint efforts of filmmakers and scholars, a new social-state system for administering the film industry was created, one which combines opportunities for maximum scope of creative and organizational initiative for the artist and judicious state influence. Goskino will change from a bureau that is restrictive by nature into one that encourages, develops, and supports. And a system of effective return communication and social control will provide the opportunity to suppress tendencies to return to the old ways.

But then the state, in a natural impulse to prune its staff, decided to combine Goskino and the Ministry of Culture. And a paradoxical situation arose—the filmmakers threw themselves into battle to save the bureau that for years infringed on their artistic interests and dignity. We defended Goskino successfully.

Now a question has risen concerning the advisability of the Ministry of Culture's existence. I am absolutely convinced that only a decisive reinterpretation, a fundamental restructuring of the functions and goals of the ministry will make it indispensable.

In an atmosphere of maximum organizational freedom, creative initiative, and cultural enterprise the ministry, both in the republics and in Moscow (as a type of coordinating organ in which all the republics will be represented equally), will play the role of a state patron of the arts, dispensing from the state budget the necessary funds for the development of culture.

To prevent a return to traditions of administrative unaccountability there must be a reliable mechanism of social influence built into the administrative structure of the new ministry.

In such a ministry we need not fear even a minister who is not very literate and does not favor culture—and we have often had such men. His potential will be limited by the democratic customs which will inevitably establish

themselves in the country so long as we do not turn from the path we have chosen at present.

#### Viktor Rozov

I was amazed by the, one might say, neglect attending the discussion of the candidacy for the minister of culture in the sessions of the Supreme Soviet. Indeed, it seems to me that the problem can be stated even more broadly. This is a habitual disdain of culture, particularly of artistic culture, in the country.

I will speak about the rejected candidate for the post of minister of culture, V.G. Zakharov. It seems to me that this is a man who has already accomplished much for us. Under him we never felt a heavy, domineering hand, and there were no willful efforts to hinder the development of any creative processes in drama and the theater. I do not know of a single prohibited performance. A great number of drama schools have been established.

Perhaps the first strong and positive impression V.G. Zakharov made on me was many years ago when the Union of Theater Workers was organized. Was such a union to be or not to be—the question was discussed bitterly. The recently designated minister of culture, so far as I could judge from his face, was himself not yet sufficiently sure whether the union should be created. I even had a suspicion that he had been appointed the task of voting down the suggestion. However, in the course of the discussion, after the fiery speeches of Oleg Yefremov, Tat'yana Doronina, and other theater workers, Zakharov realized that the union must be. And I remember very well how, decisively, preempting the plan, as they say, he took the chair and expressed support for our idea. He is not a captive of regulations. At those few sessions which I attended in halls of the Ministry of Culture, I noted his competent and absolutely benevolent attitude to the public's concerns. Personally I do not want him to be removed from the office—even by the will of the deputies, many of whom perhaps understand very little in our subtle field. I believe on the contrary that he could accomplish much that is useful.

Once more I repeat that our stormy times have moved questions of culture in the direct sense of the word somewhere into the remote background. Perhaps this is natural in view of the defects in almost all the spheres of our life. But nonetheless, its role—culture's—remains, as before, extremely important.

#### Mikael Tariverdiyev

The Soviet Union needs a ministry of culture and a minister of culture.

But not the usual failed chemist, or the economist, or the party worker who has slipped up, but a strong representative of culture. In France Andre Malraux was the minister, and in Greece—Melina Merkuri. There are few persons of such stature, but they exist in our country too. Perhaps one of them will agree to lay aside his creative projects and help our community? He will not occupy

himself with the petty guardianship of the artists of the various republics, but will propose his idea to rescue our national culture.

### **American-Soviet Film Initiative Offers Prizes for Best Film**

*18001444b Moscow SOVETSKAYA KULTURA in Russian 27 Jul 89 p 4*

[Article by I. Kokarev, vice president of ASK, and T. Nazarova, secretary of the working group: "Challenge: A Film for the Whole World! International Award for the Best Film Script"]

[Text] The social organization named ASK (American-Soviet Film Initiative), about which SOVETSKAYA KULTURA has already written more than once, has accomplished much that is useful over the year of its existence. Take, for example, the festival of Soviet documentary films of the era of perestroika. The festival is unprecedented in scope and public response in the United States: It has toured triumphantly through many cities from Washington to Los Angeles, and in the course of 1 and ½ months the American press has written about it enthusiastically, noting especially that the festival "Glasnost" (the name it has toured under) was organized through the efforts of popular diplomacy—without the participation of state and government bodies.

At the just-concluded Moscow International Film Festival this same organization also carried out an independent action: It presented a special program of American films and conducted substantial discussions in PROK and in the club imeni Zuyev, where the ASK cultural center was opened, hopefully not just for the period of the festival.

Now ASK is embarking on a new initiative: Together with U.S. and Soviet screenwriters guilds and with the support of enthusiasts of the idea, ASK intends to provide incentive to Soviet screenwriters to create joint Soviet-American films, genre works, on themes common to all mankind and intended for a worldwide audience.

The American filmmakers Dina Merrill and Theodore Hartley initiated the project. They suggested an annual prize of 10,000 dollars to the victor of an All-Union competition for a film script for joint Soviet-American production, along with a 500 dollar award to encourage each of the five winners of an interim contest of the script proposals.

The suggestion was adopted by ASK and discussed in the American and Soviet screenwriters guilds, and it took the form of a not entirely common All-Union contest with an international jury. The international jury will be made up of such world-renowned filmmakers as the Frenchman Louis Malle, the American Robert Redford,

the Italian Lina Wertmuller, Nikita Mikhalkov, Rustam Ibragimbekov, the presidents of the Soviet and American screenwriters guilds Edward Akopov and Kirko, and of course Dina Merrill and Theodore Hartley. A working group for the competition will have the task of making the initial selection of the proposals. It will consist of experienced Soviet screenwriters, members of the Soviet screenwriters guild. ASK will take upon itself organizational responsibility for conducting the competition.

The competition will be held in two stages: In the first stage the working group will select the 25 best proposals and translate them into the foreign languages required for the work of the international jury. In the second stage five winners selected by the jury will receive the opportunity to spend 2 and ½ months transforming their proposals into polished scripts, which the working group will then translate into the appropriate languages for delivery to the international jury. The international jury will make the final decision and declare the winner at a ceremonial occasion in Moscow.

Proposals will be accepted anonymously under a pseudonym until 1 September 1989. The proposals must not exceed seven typewritten pages in length. They must be sent to the following address: Moscow, 119121, Smolenskiy Boulevard, 17, ASK—"Prize" in two envelopes. The first envelope will contain the proposal itself under the pseudonym, and the second will act as a supplement with information about the author inside and the same pseudonym on the envelope.

We appeal to all who are interested to prove their creative skills by undertaking an international film production. Of course we expect responses first and foremost from professional screenwriters, if only because the contest regulations will be received by all the country's film studios and all the branches of the Union of Cinematographers and the screenwriters guild. But at the same time we sincerely hope to broaden the circle of talented aspirants and to give every gifted person the opportunity to contribute his own skills in developing a modern conception of a film for a world audience.

The proposed competition is making its first step. It is difficult to imagine how many script proposals will be received at the designated address in the course of this month. It is even more difficult to imagine their potential for innovation, their level of professionalism, and their chances of meeting the requirements for the highest popular appeal. There is no formula for a successful film for the whole world. But we must create one, we must work over it purposefully and stubbornly. The sociologists of ASK will take up the task of analyzing all the stages of the competition, and ASK itself will do everything, as the initiative progresses, to introduce wise amendments in both the provisions and the practice of this untypical but very timely initiative.

## Soviet Crime Rate 'Higher Than in Most Countries of West'

18120118 Moscow NEW TIMES in English  
No 35, 29 Aug-4 Sep 89 pp 34-36

[Article by Alexei Izyumov: "The Sad Record"]

[Text] The crime statistics have at last been made public. It turns out that the crime rate in the Soviet Union is not lower but much higher than in most countries of the West.

Let us take serious crimes—premeditated murders. Last year, 16,710 such murders were registered in the Soviet Union. Calculated by the method usually employed in world statistics, the figure will be roughly six murders per 100,000 of population a year. In most countries of the West (except the United States), including the Federal Republic of Germany, Japan, Britain and France, the respective figure is 1.1-1.6. In other words, the Soviet citizen has a four-or five-time greater chance of dying a violent death than the average citizen in Japan, Britain or France. And this in a situation where the possession of firearms—an instrument of murder widespread in the West—is strictly prohibited in our country.

On the whole, more people are now killed in the United States than in the Soviet Union. However, in the past few years we have practically caught up with the United States in the number of murders, and in 1985 some 23,000 murders were committed in the Soviet Union against 17,500 in the United States. Moreover, there are serious grounds to believe that the actual figure is higher because a large number of missing people should be added. It will also be recalled that over 100 million units of firearms are kept by Americans at home. It is terrible to imagine what would happen if the Soviet people had the same amount of firearms.

The Soviet Union also leads in the number of rapes, robberies, thefts and frauds. We do not yet know the total number of prisoners. According to estimates, the Soviet Union holds an absolute world record in this respect too.

The publication of data on the character of crimes (who becomes a victim, when and under what circumstances, as well as the motives of criminals) could be useful in analyzing the causes of crime. But these data have not been revealed yet. It is known, however, that as distinct from the West, where crimes for mercenary motives prevail, crimes in the Soviet Union are mostly committed in daily life and for no obvious motives. For instance, husband, being in low spirits, kills his wife; a man inflicts a bodily injury on his neighbour during a quarrel; a group of teenagers, losing self-control, mercilessly beat their age-fellow to death.

One need not be an expert to say that the situation in which the majority of people live in small or communal flats, have to stand in queues for goods in short supply,

and travel home in overcrowded buses, trams or trolley-buses is not conducive to love for one's neighbour. Daily clashes with bothersome neighbours or unwelcome relatives aggravated by low cultural standards and hard drinking often result in murder. The conditions leading to such crimes are shown well in the much-talked of film "Little Vera."

Of course, daily-life crimes occur in the West too. However, most of the families live in their own houses there, with each member of a family having his or her own room. In the United States, for instance, there are 50 sq. m. of actual living space per head of population.

The high rate of crime is also explained by the absence of conditions under which people, notably the youth, could give vent to their energies. The results of a poll held recently by Moscow sociologists among teenage delinquents are very indicative: most of the crimes had been committed by them without special intent, for no particular reason.

The problems and boredom of daily life are conducive to a high rate of crime. In the cultural sphere, one can mention such contributing factors as lack of respect for the individual inherited from the Stalin period, and mistreatment of people in the offices and shops. The double burden, material and spiritual, leads to man's alienation from other people and society. The value of one's own life and the lives of others is depreciated. This can be seen from a large number of suicides. We are ahead of the majority of other countries in this respect too. According to statistics, 81,417 people committed suicide in the Soviet Union in 1984. The figure amounts to 30 people a year per 100,000 of population. By 1987 the number of suicides had dropped to 54,105, or 19 per 100,000 of population. At the same time, the respective figure in the United States has never risen above 13 in the 1980s. The number of suicides per 100,000 of population is 8-10 in Britain, 7-8 in Italy (equalling the Soviet Union's figure in the late 1920s), and 3-4 in Greece.

Crime is a disease. It can be treated only by making the whole of society healthy. To eliminate the deep roots of crime it is necessary first of all to provide a decent living for the individual and return personal freedom to him. Of course, this does not rule out special measures such as raising the efficiency of the Interior Ministry bodies, a reform of the legal procedure and criminal law, humane treatment of prisoners and, lastly, a national programme to fight crime, now in the drafting stage.

Among the measures that can reduce the crime rate already now and get it under control is undoubtedly the growth of publicity in this sphere, including the publication of crime reports in the local media, as this is done in many countries. We need such data not because of idle curiosity. On learning that the number of rape cases in your neighbourhood has increased, you will surely try to persuade your wife or daughter not to walk in the streets alone late in the evening, and on hearing that the number

of robberies has increased too, you will possibly take precautionary measures. In any case, only if you have the necessary information can you react in some way to lessen the chance of becoming a victim of criminals.

Another measure capable of bringing quick results is a substantial increase of salaries and technical outfit of our militiamen. In the majority of capitalist and in many developing countries the policeman is a respected person. His job is highly paid and valued. Unfortunately, that is not so in our country. A two- or threefold rise in the salaries of militiamen with a reduction of the total staff would increase the inflow of capable and competent people to militia and lower the incidence of abuse of power and bribetaking. The same can be said about the technical outfit of the militia. In the United States, patrol cars are fitted with computers while our militiamen do not have enough petrol at times to chase the criminal. Such an economy is too costly for our society.

Where to find money? If the situation is explained to the people, if they are told about the scope of crime, they will agree to pay even from their own pockets, through local taxes, for instance. There are other ways of finding the money for this purpose, such as the elimination of numerous militia posts in our offices and departments and the cutting of superfluous divisions in the Interior Ministry itself.

Even in those countries where the crime rate is lower than in the Soviet Union this problem is always in the focus of public attention. It is a subject of government programmes and parliamentary debates. In our country, we are making only initial steps in this field. It is surprising that practically none of the candidates for election to the Supreme Soviet had included anti-crime measures in his programme. I am afraid that the vast majority of deputies do not even imagine the level and character of crime in their constituencies. For instance, do the deputies from Moscow know that 6 or 7 murders and 25 to 30 suicides are committed in the city every week already now? The protection of human life and dignity is evidently no less important than environment protection, a problem lively discussed today. An extraordinary programme for fighting crime has been adopted, and extraordinary measures are needed to put it into effect.

#### **Intensification of Estonian Anti-Crime Struggle Addressed**

*18001549 Tallinn SOVETSKAYA ESTONIYA in Russian 29 Jul 89 pp 1,3*

[Report by M. Tiba, Estonian SSR minister of internal affairs, deputy: "Intensifying the Struggle Against Crime in Our Republic"]

[Text] Respected comrade chairman, respected deputies! The spring of 1985 has led to dynamic progress in our entire life, including in processes which influence crime and the attitude toward this complex, hard to control

social phenomenon. We know from history that revolutionary transformational processes advance different processes, far from always only positive. The economic recession caused by the period of stagnation is quite obviously turning into an economic crisis. Symptoms of a moral crisis have appeared and, possibly, it is occurring at the same time as the economic crisis. Under such conditions, an increase in crime and law violations is a generally logical phenomenon. So it is. Since the second half of 1988, a sharp increase in crime began throughout the Soviet Union, which not a single region, Union republic, or rayon has been able to avoid. Unfortunately, Estonia is no exception. Crime here has even increased at an leading rate.

Let me illustrate the above with some figures: for the 6 months of this year, crime in the republic increased by 4,700 crimes, or by 88.6 percent, and 277, or 53.5 percent, more serious crimes were committed. The number of premeditated murders increased by 14, or 51.9 percent, and that of attempted murders—by 7, or 100 percent. The number of thefts of state and public property increased by 761, or 136.6 percent. Theft of citizens' private property increased by 2,363, or 133.5 percent. The increase in the number of apartment burglaries is significant: by 443, or 68.5 percent. The number of thefts of automobile parts and items left in cars has increased considerably: by almost 1,000 cases, or 241 percent. The number of burglaries, open thefts, hooliganism, and several other crimes has increased. It should be noted that the number of deaths due to traffic incidents has increased by 42, or 41 percent. The number injured in accidents has increased by 149 people, or 23.5 percent. If we compare these figures to the corresponding Union indicators, the picture is as follows: compared to the first half of last year, crime throughout the Union has increased by 32 percent, including 39.9 percent more serious crimes, 26.8 percent more premeditated murders, 70 percent more thefts of state property, 87 and 73 percent more burglaries and open thefts, respectively, as well as 68 percent more thefts of citizens' private property.

It should be noted that Estonia, especially the city of Tallinn, has been inundated from without by gamblers and "mafiosi," against whom we can employ nothing except administrative legislation at this time. As a result of prolonged theoretical discussion among the law enforcement agencies, to this day we have been unable to pass a law that would enable us to hold them criminally responsible. Optimism is inspired by President A. Ryutzel's statement today that an ukase will be passed by the next presidium meeting which, we hope, will help to establish order. Unfortunately, this sad statistic is insufficiently complete. I am sure that many so-called insignificant violations of the law, with regard to which existing legislation permits a refusal to institute criminal proceedings, still remain unregistered. The criteria for insignificance, however, are purely subjective and are a loose concept in different regions of the country and even in different rayons of the republic, stretching from

several rubles to several hundred rubles, in connection with which the statistics do not reflect the real picture, and really nobody has even tried to somewhat seriously analyze them.

For decades, the causes of crime have been ignored and so-called study was limited to looking for scapegoats in the criminal environment and among the employees of law enforcement agencies. In connection with this, the struggle against crime was reduced essentially only to a struggle against criminals. In planning for the future, we stand, as it were, at a crossroads: to continue in the same spirit, or to start drafting a target program, in parallel with measures for the prevention of violations of the law, which would be implemented in the course of 2 years by the joint labor of the law enforcement agencies, Tartu University, and the Estonian Academy of Sciences. However, since the implementation of such a program requires more than a year, it is necessary to substantially, I emphasize this word—substantially, increase the efforts of law enforcement agencies to curb crime under conditions of crime growth. We should also include the following possibility. The Ministry of Internal Affairs [MVD] was forced to admit that it is virtually impossible to do this with the present resources. After all, one can hardly suggest seriously that some institution or enterprise would suddenly be able to operate under the same conditions, but with a double workload and high results. Unfortunately, this is expected of us. Since the militia's resources long ago ceased to meet the ever increasing workloads and the USSR MVD lacks the material resources to improve them, the republic government discussed and approved a program for assisting the militia at its 3 April 1989 meeting.

We have managed to move many problems from a standstill. We have been allocated additional gasoline, enough to eliminate the very strict limit on operative, duty, and fire transportation. An additional 20 light automobiles were allocated, which somewhat improved our mobility. The problem, unfortunately, still exists. To give you some idea of the militia transportation at our disposal, let me give the average mileage of our vehicles. Our "Volgas" have traveled an average of 317,000 kilometers, the "Zhigulis"—125,000 kilometers, and UAZ vehicles—160,000 kilometers, i.e., they are already, so to speak, nearing the finish.

We were allocated an additional wage fund, which made it possible to raise the monthly earnings for those employees receiving 150 rubles per month. Unfortunately, this is only a partial solution to the problem, since a mass outflow of employees started at the beginning of this year. In the first half of this year, 270 employees left us. Most of them were highly skilled professionals, Estonians and, as a rule, communists. We now have more than 500 unfilled jobs. To put it graphically, consider the average size of a rayon division. It so happens that we have five such divisions unstaffed at this time. Yet, this is with doubled workloads. The employees' reasons for leaving were studied: those who are leaving most often cite the decreased prestige and

very low social recognition of the militia service. The reasons also include the practical absence of a personal life, protracted stressful conditions, the lack of prospects for solving everyday personal problems and, of course, the very low salary. Since the average salary significantly lags behind the republic average, it is natural that the segment of the population whose spiritual and physical level is also significantly lower than average is, after much persuasion, directed toward militia work and, unfortunately, we must proceed from this. The average wage in the ministry system is 214 rubles per month, but half of the employees earn about 150 rubles. Serious concern is already being generated by the lack of culture, low professionalism and overall education, as well as poor knowledge of the Estonian language on the part of some militia employees. In cooperation with the republic government, this year we will receive several personal computers, copiers, and imported photographic and crime-detection equipment, for which we have extreme need. Besides direct material aid, the republic government has decided to step up the construction and reconstruction of a number of militia projects over the next 2 years. In order to raise the professional level of cadres, we have submitted a proposal to the Union ministry to reorganize the Tallinn Special Militia School, which is under Union subordination, into an ESSR MVD Training Center, where it would be possible to create a branch of our own departmental VUZ and, moreover, a average-level permanent and correspondence educational institution for 200 militia employees and courses of about 6 months for the beginning instruction of militiamen with a standard training base. It seems to us, this would permit us to completely solve the problem of instructing our cadres.

In order to improve language study, language courses of varied levels of intensity were organized in the ministry system this year, encompassing an average of more than 1,000 employees. Furthermore, in agreement with the USSR Ministry of Defense, we received the opportunity to send 30 conscripts of Estonian nationality annually for 5 years to study at the special militia school: they will later be sent to Tallinn militia agencies in order to staff the militia with national cadres.

During the fall conscription, 350 young Estonian men will also be sent to the military unit of the patrol and guard service located in Tallin, which now numbers 700 servicemen, of whom 600 are rank-and-file. We think that they should be conscripted on a voluntary basis, so that conscripts who want to tie their futures to the internal affairs agencies would serve in this military unit.

The structures of the internal affairs divisions in Rakvereskiy, Kingiseppski and Kharyyuskiy rayons have been entirely changed, for purposes of improving the structure. The possibilities for maneuvering forces among separate work districts was substantially complicated by the growth in the workload on absolutely all districts—in some by a factor of 12, in others even by a factor of 20. I would emphasize that, besides all the other known, planned workloads, yet another complex, very

labor-intensive and highly politically important task was assigned to us this year: rehabilitating those repressed in 1941 and 1949. At the present time, certificates have been issued to 15,000 rehabilitated people. Of course, this colossal job was placed on the most educated segment of the investigative employees, who have a high sense of responsibility. The load on services working to register private calls abroad has increased considerably, and we were forced to reduce it at the expense of other areas of work.

In our opinion, there is yet another significant problem. It is a question of the fact that the existing legislation hinders our rapidly developing life. As a Union republic ministry, the MVD functions according to the so-called Union model. Just what is the Union model and how much can a Union model take into account the specific nature of a Union republic, especially the smallest Union republic? In terms of concept, the Union model should take into account the specific nature of Estonia, the Russian Federation, Kirgizia, the Kuril Islands, Murmansk Oblast, etc. Let me give you an example of how well this succeeds. Consider the alleged Union administrative practice for traffic incidents, which went into effect in our republic as well. Let me call attention only to one point. According to this law, driving a vehicle while intoxicated carries a fine of 200 rubles or the suspension of the right to drive for 36 months.

However, after all, in order to punish the driver of an automobile, one must first arrest him. Yet, there is a fine of 20 to 50 rubles for failure to obey the signals of a militia employee. Who would stop after this, especially on seeing that the militia associate has virtually no possibility of pursuit whatsoever (after all, most of our militia employees work without means of transportation)? The legislator sees no paradox here, but the drivers do, and the number of cases of failure to obey the signals of militia employees increased substantially this year. If one takes into account that increasingly more and more often we have to pursue extraordinarily dangerous, armed criminals, this situation can lead and has already led to very serious consequences. Add to this the fact that 1,800 people involved in accidents fled the scene of the event this year, it is obvious what the republic's traffic situation is like right now and whether or not we will manage to improve it with the help of this law. From numerous such examples, the MVD has concluded that criminal-process and administrative legislation is in need of radical correction, in doing which, evidently, we should proceed from the 16 November 1988 law that gives priority to Union republic legislation before Union legislation. In our opinion, the legislation existing in the republic ought to serve the republic fully and should ensure law and order, proceeding from the republic's particular features and pressing problems. The republic MVD intends to make specific proposals on this matter in the near future.

### Latvian MVD Official on Deterioration of Militia Authority

18001488 Riga SOVETSKAYA LATVIYA in Russian  
15 Jul 89 p 4

[Interview with Latvian SSR MVD Political Department Chief A. A. Saleniyeks by SOVETSKAYA LATVIYA correspondent B. Bryukhanov: "The Honor of the Uniform"]

[Text] Journalists usually use the expression "to defend the honor of the uniform" in a ironical sense to show that someone is awkwardly trying to keep from washing dirty linen in public. But there are times when one has to defend the honor of the uniform, that of a militia man, for example, against irresponsible, biased attacks.

Crime, to include organized crime, is now increasing in this country and it has become more difficult to maintain social order. Under these conditions it is important that we not allow ill-intended attacks against law-enforcement agencies and that we keep their authority among the population from being impaired. Impulsive spiteful and malicious attacks against the militia only benefit people who perceive democratization and glasnost as movements that allow everything.

Our correspondent talks with Latvian SSR MVD Political Department Chief Colonel of Internal Services A. A. Saleniyeks about reasons for the deterioration of militia authority and what must be done to strengthen this authority.

[Correspondent] Aleksandr Aleksandrovich, we will first try to look at reasons for the situation at hand. It seems that the attitude toward safeguarding order was different several years ago. What happened? Thanks to glasnost we all began to know more about negative phenomena in the workings of the militia; has this had an effect on their authority?

[A. A. Saleniyeks] We cannot make it that simple. There are many reasons and I will conditionally divide these reasons into two groups, although they are to some degree interrelated. Some of the reasons are totally independent of our department and others came about through our own omissions, serious mistakes in our work and our lagging behind the so-to-speak "world standards."

I will note that there have been previous periods when militia authority deteriorated for a time. What we had to do was primarily get rid of workers who were not conscientious, those who misused their service positions and those who were simply loafers. It has always been difficult to increase the authority again and it is even more difficult to do this now, under the current conditions of glasnost. Yet we are for glasnost, for it helps us notice negative phenomena in a timely manner and forces our workers to tighten their belts and have a more careful attitude toward their duties.

We ourselves are now open about many things which we were previously silent about. However I will clearly state that our openness is not always used in the interests of the matters at hand. The mass media often permits clear distortions and exaggerations. Social attention is focused on individual "cooked up" facts that are savored and supplemented with fabrications. This causes the population to distrust all representatives of the militia profession. The prestige of district inspectors and officials of patrol-and-post services, GAI [State Automobile Inspection] inspectors, and investigators has been fairly well undermined, although there are many workers among them who are honest, love their work and are responsive and qualified.

If we look at militia activities through a magnifying glass, we can certainly pick out dark blemishes, but the overall picture would be distorted. And we have to note the positive aspects.

The low legal standards among a significant part of the population is having its effect. When a citizen has his statement denied by the militia, he immediately accuses our workers of being callous and hard-hearted and of suffering from even worse sins. Every family, especially one as large as ours, has its monsters. You will find rude fellows, indifferent employees and those who will take bribes. But these are the exceptions and not the rule. Those making statements have to consider that the militia must follow the law; whether these laws are good or bad, while they are in effect they must be carried out.

I ultimately understand why people who have a poor understanding of the law have a hostile attitude toward the militia. But I must honestly say that it is offensive to see this attitude among those who have sufficient knowledge in the legal area and especially among those who formulate social opinion, those who work in the mass media. Internal affairs agencies are an instrument of state power. In this respect attacks against the militia take on a political nature.

[Correspondent] But there are still many omissions, defects and even abuses in militia forces. We have to uncover these abscesses.

[A. A. Saleniyeks] I repeat that we have nothing against serious critical articles in the press, radio or television. Of course, they do not make us happy, but they are of benefit. However the editors of a number of republic newspapers and magazines and the management of the Labvakar television program have recently not troubled themselves with well-grounded, well-reasoned critical pieces. It appears that it has become fashionable for them to throw dirt on the militia uniform and revile militia workers.

Judge for yourself. I selected several examples in preparation for our conversation.

On the 30th of June the newspaper Padomyu Yaunatne published an article by Riga GAI Senior Engineer G.

Bralis entitled "Palka o Dvukh Kontsakh" [A Two-Edged Sword]. This article discussed problems with transport traffic around the Svoboda Monument. The following short postscript was underneath the author's signature: "Editorial comment: the Riga gorispolkom chairman is still Alfred Rubiks, but the diligent enforcer of unwritten laws is Riga GAI Chief Anatoliy Gerasimov."

I have no problem with the fact that the editor again wants to stress his hostility toward A. Rubiks, but she has to know about the sudden death of A. Gerasimov that took place ten days before the article was published. This was reported twice in the newspaper RIGAS BALSS.

Issue No 12 of DADZIS magazine contained a caricature. Here it is—have a look. A militia man is approaching a girl lying on a beach under a sign that says "Swimming Forbidden". He says "Who gave you permission to picket?" Pay special attention to how tauntingly the militia man is depicted in the drawing. He is fat, slovenly dressed, dripping with saliva and has the face of a chronic alcoholic.

Now look at this picture published in issue No 5 of the magazine AVOTS in that part of the publication printed in Latvian. This photo was published over an article by A. Bergmanis entitled "Meditations About Everything That Is Ours," although the photo is in absolutely no way related to that article. The photograph shows a young militia man who has climbed on the roof of a building. His hat is askew, his militia jacket is unbuttoned and his arms are almost up to his elbows in his trouser pockets.

Another clear taunt! The name of the militia man is not given and there is no signature under the photograph. But we found out that this fellow serves in non-departmental security. This service has the responsibility of periodically checking the roof of the site being protected. He had himself photographed there as a joke. But this amateur photograph was somehow sent to the editor and was obviously liked very well.

And finally here is another photograph. This one is from the 10 June edition of LITERATURA UN MAKSLA newspaper. We know that militia men are called "refuse" in the criminal jargon. The newspaper felt that it could illustrate a pamphlet by P. Bankovskis with several photographs. One of them shows a group of militia men standing in a semicircle around... a trash container. Very smart, don't you think?

Criticism? No—this represents the persistent desire to show militia men in an unattractive setting, to insult them, ridicule them and arouse hostility toward them. Who needs this and gains from this? Of course, not those who actually stand for perestroyka and for increasing social order under the present difficult conditions. These are not accidental blunders or oversights. This represents a clear line that is being carried out by some members of the mass media.

We count on clear thinking on the part of the people and on the support of the working collectives. We often visit enterprises and talk about our work without hiding our shortcomings and difficulties. I will tell you frankly that people are on guard and are cold when they meet with us. But after discussions lasting from sixty to ninety minutes, their attitude changes and questions take on a different character. Workers offer their help, for example, in repairing our vehicles and other types of equipment and express their readiness to transfer assets to cover our needs. We thank them, but refuse, for our situation is special and does not allow us to be dependent on enterprise managers.

We are now strengthening the press group that maintains ties with the mass media. We are getting good reviews on our newspaper NA BOYEVOM POSTU; it is being read by people outside Internal Affairs agencies. We are trying to get television time in order to regularly televise a short ten-minute program on the republic television system.

We are increasing our contacts with those journalists who are fruitfully cooperating with us and who understand the importance of objectively showing militia work. In addition to the critical articles that appear on the pages of newspapers and magazines we would like to see more essays, sketches and reports about our militia workdays. Every subunit has people who deserve a positive word.

[Correspondent] It is difficult to write about the militia in a positive sense when crime is increasing, the criminal element is becoming insolent and is acting more and more aggressively and assaults, break-ins and automobile thefts are becoming more frequent.

[A. A. Saleniyeks] I agree. Until we achieve an appreciable change in these areas we cannot talk about a high level of militia authority. We need significant perestroika in the activities of Internal Affairs agencies.

A few days ago I visited an open party meeting at the Riga UVD [Administration of Internal Affairs] gorispolkom. A rather difficult, but precise agenda had been developed; it was entitled "Negative Trends in the Development of the Moral and Political Climate among Personnel and Party Organization Tasks in Overcoming these Trends." There was a thorough and very frank discussion about these sore points.

Naturally the social and political process now taking place in the republic has not missed us. Some of our employees sympathize with the NFL [People's Front of Latvia] and others with Interfront, although they do not officially take part in these movements. Party organizations and political workers have a great responsibility. They have to strengthen explanatory and educational work and politically support the accomplishment of every employee's service obligation. But there is little of this. I was happy about a recent UVD meeting because its participants did not limit themselves to self-criticism and appeals for assistance in working better, but held a

pointed discussion about difficulties in selecting personnel, the insufficient legal protection available to militia personnel, technical out-datedness and, finally, domestic material conditions that do not conform to the weight of service.

We have often discussed these problems in the Ministry as well.

Take the personnel problem. At times you see a worker who "does not work out" and you have to replace him. But with whom? I have not noticed any competitive staff selection process. We really need personnel who represent the republic's basic population, people who speak the Latvian language and are familiar with the national traditions and customs. But in recent times Latvians have not really been attracted to service in the militia force.

We do not have a normal work day and the accomplishment of service obligations is associated with the risk of getting wounded or even killed. This service must be given good material compensation. And it is more than the amount of monetary compensation. Many employees need improved living conditions and all of them need home telephones. And we must have better looking, but more importantly, more comfortable uniform clothing.

Our technical level of equipment lags seriously behind police in the developed capitalist countries. We were envious when we found out from a PRAVDA article that, for example, vehicles for U.S. police are special ordered and police have the latest and most reliable communications equipment and computer technology at their disposal. We get serial production vehicles, and not the best models at that, and there are not enough of them. We also have to practice fuel economy. And meanwhile organized criminals have at their disposal first class vehicles and other equipment that we cannot even dream about. This is a serious attack against militia authority.

American policemen who visited Moscow during the celebrated Petrovka 38 got acquainted with our instructions covering the use of weapons and stated that if all the points of those instructions were carried out, the criminal would be able to kill the militia man four times over. All the methods used by American police certainly do not apply to us, but our militia personnel are actually not decisive in using their weapons and others means of influence when exceptional situations arise. There would be noise in the newspapers and explanations to the procurator.

A citizen of the U.S. and many other countries of the world does not think of insulting the police in word and especially not by deed. He knows that he would immediately be severely punished. But what about here? Cutthroats who behave like hooligans do everything to insult the militia men who maintain order at meetings and street processions; they spit on the militia, hit them

with hats and tug at their ties. And they very often get away with it. How can there be respect for the militia under these conditions?

We must have a clear legal status that protects the honor and dignity of the militia worker and gives him the right to act decisively while getting things in order.

It is impossible to strengthen the authority of the militia and therefore strengthen social order without resolving all of these problems. But not all of these problems are within the purview of Internal Affairs agencies. Many of them depend on the Supreme Soviet and the government of the country.

We must hope that the appropriate decisions will be made. We are creating a legal state and that is unthinkable without increasing the role of the militia who are maintaining legal order.

#### **MSSR Resolution on Workers' Cooperation With Militia**

*18001484 Kishinev SOVETSKAYA MOLDAVIYA in Russian 14 Jul 89 pp 1, 2*

[Unattributed report: "In the Moldavian SSR Council of Ministers"]

[Text] The Moldavian SSR Council of Ministers issued a decree which approves and adopts the proposals of work collectives of the republic's enterprises and organizations concerning the creation, after the example of other regions of the country, and the maintenance, through the use of their own funds, of workers' detachments to assist the militia. They are called upon to participate in the maintenance of public order on the streets and in other public places. The decree establishes a model statute for these units and a standard agreement to be concluded by the department of internal affairs of the appropriate ispolkom of the soviet of people's deputies with the enterprises and organizations.

The rayon and city soviet ispolkoms are instructed to establish estimates for the departments of internal affairs of the cost of maintaining the workers' detachments, and the Moldavian SSR Ministry of Internal Affairs is instructed to organize training for their members and establish effective control over the use of these units in the maintenance of public order.

The Model Statute for the Workers' Detachments To Assist the Militia states that under the conditions of the subsequent development of socialist society and of political, economic and social reorganization, greater demands will be made of law-enforcement organs and public units to guarantee the legal protection of the legitimate rights and interests of the state and all its citizens. The workers' desire to enjoy fully their constitutional rights, to develop and strengthen the institutions of self-government, and to secure the legal defense of their interests has found expression in the creation by the

work collectives of workers' detachments to assist the militia, which will take an active part in the maintenance of public order.

The workers' detachments to assist the militia (ROSM) are created by decision of the work collectives of enterprises and organizations according to a production-territorial principle and are approved by the ispolkoms of the city and rayon soviets, which are entrusted with the management of their activities. The Statute emphasizes that state organs, public organizations, and public officials are to render all possible assistance and aid to members of the ROSM. Opposition to the legitimate demands of the worker-patrol members or interference with their life, health, or dignity in the fulfillment of their duties will result in legal liability in accordance with the laws of the USSR and the Moldavian SSR.

The principal tasks of the ROSM are to preserve public order and the rights and legitimate interests of the workers, to take an active part in the prevention, anticipation, and suppression of crimes and offenses, and to take part in work to educate the Soviet people in the spirit of respect for the laws and standards of socialist conduct.

The ROSM's are being made up of advanced workers and office workers who have expressed a desire to take an active part in the maintenance of law and order and in the struggle against crime and who are suited to the task by virtue of their qualifications, training, and state of health. Admittance to the ROSM takes place at a general meeting of the members of the work collective along strictly voluntary lines on the basis of recommendations from social organizations at the place of work. Each member of a detachment undertakes a working commitment to fulfill his duties conscientiously and honestly.

The size of the ROSM is determined by the ispolkoms in agreement with the soviets of the work collectives on the basis of the operational situation existing on the territory under jurisdiction and of local conditions. The commanders of the ROSM's are subordinate to the ispolkoms of the local soviets and the councils of the work collectives [STK] that have created them. The departments of internal affairs carry out operational management of the activities of the workers' detachments.

In order to carry out their functions, members of the ROSM's are fully exempted from their primary work activity for a period of not less than six months. They retain their pay and privileges, which are given to representatives of the appropriate work collective, and upon expiration of the established term of work they return to production.

The members of the workers' detachments are granted the right to require the observation of established public order and the cessation of offenses; in the absence of workers of the militia, to draw up a statement on persons violating the public order and consequently to send it on to the head of the organs of internal affairs or to the

commander of the detachment; and to require a law-breaker to present identifying documents. They may deliver to the militia those citizens who have committed administrative offenses or to medical sobering-up stations those persons who are in a condition of strong intoxication, and they may enter residential housing and public places to pursue persons concealing themselves who are suspected of the commission of crimes, as well as to put a stop to crimes and offenses threatening the public order or the security of citizens.

Upon concluding their official duties members of the ROSM receive the right to free passage on urban passenger transport (excluding taxis), and in urgent cases they may use passenger transportation to deliver people to medical institutions. They are also allowed free use of the telephones of enterprises, organizations, and institutions, and they are allowed to detain and hand over to organs of internal affairs drivers who have violated traffic rules or who are operating a vehicle in a state of alcoholic intoxication.

In the event of temporary incapacitation resulting from the performance of duties to maintain public order, a member of a ROSM will be paid an allowance irrespective of his length of service amounting to 100 percent of his wage, and in the event of a permanent or protracted loss of the capacity for work for the same reason a disability pension will be designated in the amount established for workers and office workers as a consequence of work-related injury and professional illness. The family of a member of a workers' detachment who has perished in the performance of his duties will receive a pension in the amount established for the families for workers and office workers who have died from a work-related injury or professional illness. In the indicated instances the members of an ROSM or their families have the right to demand compensation for damages incurred.

Members of an ROSM who take an active part in the maintenance of public order may be awarded a diploma, a monetary award, or a valuable gift; they can be noted on a Board of Honor, and they can be thanked officially. Provision has been made for a number of other privileges and incentives.

Those representatives of the workers' detachments who carry out their duties carelessly may be subjected to penalties stipulated by law, such as deprivation of the privileges defined in the Statute or expulsion from the ROSM.

#### **New Laws Needed to Combat Computer Piracy**

*18001403 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 20 Jul 89  
Morning Edition p 4*

[Report by N. Sytezhnev: "Computer Virus"]

[Text] The unauthorized reproduction [of computer software] is leading to the emergence of a "computer virus." The resale and reproduction of numerous unnamed

programs has become one of the most lucrative forms of business on the "black market." However, it is virtually impossible to bring the speculators to justice—we don't have the necessary laws. Meanwhile, information chaos is growing....

These problems were examined by leading lawyers and programming and computerization experts at an international forum held last month in Pereslavl-Zalesskiy.

Computer piracy can only be combatted by passing legislation on intellectual property rights. This was the primary focus of the forum, which culminated in a declaration of "Principles for the Development of a Programming Industry Based on the Legal Protection of Intellectual Property Rights." The declaration urges that the use of programs without the consent of its creators and owners be deemed illegal and morally unjustified. The declaration's authors maintain that the computer community's observance of commonly recognized moral and ethical standards should become the key factor in the battle against computer piracy.

#### **Incipient Zionist Movement Considered**

*18001505 Moscow MOSKOVSKAYA PRAVDA in  
Russian 23 Jul 89 p 3*

[Article by M. Saidov: "Those Who Speculate on Problems in Interethnic Relations Act as a Detonator"]

[Text] In our complicated situation the "interethnic question" has very rapidly entered the first five problems that disturb society. The rusty spring of a Stalinist delayed-action mine has broken, and the firing-pin has hit the cap... Explosions have detonated in various rayons and republics in our country. In the recent past, there was nothing easier than writing about our inviolable internationalism. Today, there is no subject fussier and sharper than that of ethnic relations. Any careless word or sharp, ambiguous phrase can spark a feeling of national insult, the consequences of which are impossible to predict.

Facts are becoming cluttered with emotions. Emotions give rise to "facts." Intolerance toward a different point of view or toward someone else's opinion is beginning to manifest ever more sharply. The revival of the national self-awareness of the nations is being used as fertile soil by persons pursuing self-seeking, often even openly provocative goals.

The ethnic problem is probably especially complex for Moscow, as well as for other large centers where people of different nationalities live.

This city of many million contains representatives of dozens of nationalities. Many problems common to the country are displayed especially clearly and graphically in the capital. Not only because the representatives of one or another nation or nationality are striving precisely in Moscow to create a core, from which a reaction of unification, revival of traditions and a new upsurge in

culture will proceed later. Not only because people have long been in the habit of going to the capital "for the truth," including for the solution of problems concerning present and future peoples and regions. Alas, everyday Moscow life gives examples of the activeness of those who use objective problems in order to charge the political atmosphere, who act not "in the name of," but "against," who do not construct, but speculate.

Must facts that everyone knows be enumerated? There is hardly a need. It is far more pleasant to speak of that which finds ways to positive solutions. The years of restructuring have become a time in Moscow for forming associations based on the revival and development of national cultures. National cultural centers are announcing themselves ever more loudly. The question of creating schools in the capital where children would be able to study the languages of the peoples of the USSR, their history, culture, and folklore has moved from a standstill. But...

Nonetheless, it is impossible to ignore the distress signals. Particularly in cases when they obviously attest: people, not at all distinguished by moral and political decency, want to use the fruits of restructuring, the beneficial changes. Here is one such example. The editors received a package. It contained a letter and a "samizdat" publication. Let us begin with the letter. Its author, who asked that his name not be used in the paper, expresses serious alarm concerning the activity of pro-Israel "zealots" of Jewish culture. Of whom is it a question?

"I rejoice in the enthusiasm of those people who are working in Jewish cultural formations today," the letter says. "They are uniting, as a rule, around the noble ideas of reconstructing Jewish culture in the USSR. Unfortunately... it is painful to the point of despair that, having available an enormous detachment of Jews in the creative intelligentsia and masters of culture and art, we find none among them who would take up the noble mission of developing and reviving the national culture of their people. Therefore, it is not surprising that its fate turns out to be first in the hands of provokers who do not tie their future to Russia, and then in the hands of bureaucrats, who see something anti-Soviet and inimical in all Jews..."

It goes on further to speak of how, in cooperation with consultants "from over there," preparation is occurring in Moscow for the creation of a Zionist party, and how a militarized youth organization, "Beytar," has already been created under the cover of this same ethnic revival. Calling such acts provocation, the letter's author repeatedly expresses worry over the future of noble work, over those who may end up being a toy in the hands of political speculators.

Alas, we did not manage to contact Lev Gorodetskiy, one of the leaders of the "union of teachers of Hebrew in the USSR," mentioned in the letter: his telephone, given in the "union's" information bulletin, remains silent. One

could not help but think for a while that maybe this was some kind of mistake and that they wanted to slander a person who, on his own desire, had been long ago "repatriated to his historical people." However, through other telephone numbers also given in the bulletin, we managed to find out that he is teaching Hebrew, and not for free, to children near Moscow.

Let us try to get a grasp of the materials sent to us from issues of this same bulletin. With surprise, we discovered that the "Beytar" section, a union of Jewish youth imeni Yosef Trumpeldor with many year's military traditions, really was created. The most important directions of its activity, the bulletin frankly reports, are the study of Hebrew and physical training for the young generation, preparing to leave for Israel. Its activists also do not shun a course of army training. A question readily suggests itself: what for? Maybe this is the training of replacements for the battle against the peaceful populace in the Palestinian territories occupied by the Israelis? Or maybe it is for purposes of self-defense? But, from whom...?

Well, what about the "union of teachers" itself? An article by Lev Gorodetskiy himself directly states that it is "a Zionist organization whose purpose is to contribute to providing, to those who desire, a full-valued training for the aliah (return—Author) to Israel." To what does the "leader" call his fellow citizens? "As far as possible, we must not enter into any kind of relations with a semi-official organ, nor be integrated into official structures." Incidentally, the school for teachers of Hebrew promises to issue an "Israeli diploma for teaching Hebrew in the Diaspora" after the exam.

The more familiar one becomes with the revelations of the leaders of IGGUD, as the "union" is called, the more obvious is its orientation. The bulletin speaks very contemptuously of "legal Jewish cultural societies." What kind of prospects do they draw? "The activity of IGGUD is as though on two floors. The first is IGGUD itself—an organization consisting of teachers, instructors, managers, etc... It is best if this organization is not registered... this adds a degree of freedom from melukhi (the authorities—Author). The second floor is a system of clubs, registered through the cooperative system on lease premises, or unregistered, in large private apartments, which supplies IGGUD with people and resources." The final goal is the "definitive formation of IGGUD as a Zionist organization."

It seems that most of those who read the bulletin have the same feeling that I have: this organization has no relation whatsoever to the tasks of reviving ethnic culture, to the immemorial interests of Jews, or to solving problems in interethnic relations. What kind of reactions can IGGUD's semi-legal actions, clearly provocative in nature, generate in society? They hardly contribute to strengthening friendship among peoples...

Again, we were convinced: it is possible to parasitize even in the holiest thing, and even the best work can be

turned into an object of speculation. As recent publications show, far from just "teachers of Hebrew" resort to such methods. Some want to convert schools for the study of Islam and other religious studies, as well as folklore and language clubs, into nationalistic semi-underground organizations. Conversely, others hunger for public scandals in the hope of attracting the attention of foreign "protectors."

They inflict the greatest harm on their own people. Today, those who accept neither extremism, nor "silent anti-Sovietism" are talking and writing about this with indignation. Unquestionably, it is not a question of "tightening the screws." However, does society have the right to calmly watch a hearth, whose flames may burn up the traditions of interethnic unity and friendship among peoples, existing not at all on paper, as "radical nationalists" believe, but in the hearts of millions of people? We need social activeness aimed at creating healthy, cultural, educational-upbringing ethnic centers, free of speculation. Support is needed for those who are having difficulty breaking through bureaucratic barriers today.

The question of projects for creating parties and militarized organizations on an ethnic basis stands by itself. Here, it seems, a requirement for strict observance of constitutional standards and concern for the observance of laws is already in the interests of all society, since history is rich with sad examples of what underestimating such actions can lead to.

If we are capable of grasping the lessons of the past, then among the first is that we must learn the difference between "national" and "nationalistic" as clearly and profoundly as possible. The Bickford fuse to the detonator runs somewhere along here...

### Proposal for Zionist Organization Published

18001504 Moscow MOSKOVSKAYA PRAVDA in Russian 3 Aug 89 p 3

[Unsigned article: "And in Fact a Detonator"]

[Text] Having published on 23 July under the title "Those Who Speculate on Problems in Interethnic Relations Act As a Detonator" remarks about the "activists" of the Zionist persuasion who were making capital from the wave of nationalist moods, we were ready to consider the theme closed. However readers K. Voskoboinikov, M. Lomeyko, and Yu. Khavin and several others doubted whether the intentions of the members of IGGUD, the Union of Teachers of Hebrew, were so serious. The question can also be put thus: has not such activity become a gesture of despair on the part of those who have been refused the right to go to Israel? Well, we will attempt to figure it out, reminding our readers for their information that Zionism has been proclaimed by the UN as a form of racism and racial discrimination. And in order to remove doubt about the seriousness of the intentions of L. Gorodetskiy and his like-thinking friends, we will print without any changes the article "On the Resurrection of the Zionist Organization." It was included in the eleventh issue of "The Informational

Bulletin of the Union of Teachers of Hebrew in the USSR." The author is the same L. Gorodetskiy ... And so we cite him verbatim:

"Seventy years ago the All-Russian Zionist Organization was destroyed and ceased to exist. Now the necessity for its rebirth is keenly felt. In the beginning of August in Moscow a constituent congress which will develop regulations and a program and which will devise a structure for this organization will take place. Here I would like in this form, to express a few ideas and arguments on this subject.

1. The discussion concerns the creation of a **political** structure which will give representation for and defend Zionist oriented groups as well as individuals at all levels.

2. This organization should be an address within the USSR to which people can turn for suitable help and information. It should smooth the channels of emigration (for instance—currently, the system of invitations for those going to Israel) as well as the system of multiplan preparation for emigration. This is what, in essence, various Zionist groups are doing but their activities are poorly coordinated and their resources are clearly not sufficient for the effective satisfaction of the demands of emigration.

3. A very important function of the Zionist Organization must be—while maintaining a principled non-participation in the restructuring of life in the USSR—the struggle for the survival here of the Jews as a people. There is no paradox here. The fact is that the diaspora culture, the diaspora civilization which is an absolutely necessary condition for survival does not exist here. Jewish civilization in the USSR was destroyed, that fertile layer which could reproduce the culture of the people was liquidated and completely taken away. The resurrection of this layer, if at all possible, will require not years but generations. It appears that we do not have this kind of time. Therefore I am deeply convinced that the only thing which can save the Jews who remain here from assimilation is a powerful orientation towards Israel, towards Israeli-Hebrew culture, and towards the ideology of religious Zionism. The conductor of this "Zionization", this "Israelization" of the local Jewish population must be, unconditionally, a developed Zionist organization.

4. I want to repeat that the time remaining for normal work, perhaps, is very little. The simmering interethnic conflicts, degrading economy, the separatism of the provinces and the unforeseen reaction to it by the center, all these are signs of growing destabilization, which as always and everywhere are extremely dangerous for Jews. None of us wants that in this country there should appear Jewish refugees but . . . the pre-pogrom situation in Moldavia already demands the development there of self-defense groups. We remember that this was always one of the functions of the Zionist organizations, of Beytar, etc.

I am certain that the situation dictates the necessity of the creation (resurrection) of a strong centralized Zionist

organization with branches in all cities with a Jewish population."

**For justice's sake we will say that there is a postscript to the article:**

"This article of L. Gorodetskiy in issue eleven expresses his personal opinion for which IGGUD takes no responsibility" to which testify the 12 signatures underneath the postscript at the bottom of the article.

As for the possible reasons for the "despairing step" of L. Gorodetskiy, we learned in the Moscow office of the Directorate of Visas and Registration of Foreigners that in February of this year the question of his emigration was decided positively, however Gorodetskiy does not wish to receive a visa to Israel. Thus this is certainly not the reason forcing L. Gorodetskiy to come forth in the role of "detonator".

What is the reason then?

**'Facts, Fiction' of Fergana Events Explored**

18300770 Tashkent KOMSOMOLETS UZBEKISTANA  
in Russian 14 Jul 89 p 3

[Report by UzTAG special correspondent: "The Fergana Drama: Facts and Fiction"]

[Text] Fergana-Tashkent—June has passed: frightening, tragic, sorrowful. It absorbed as many tears and blood as any previous decade. Whether we want it or not, June of 1989 will go down in the history of Uzbekistan (and not only Uzbekistan) as a black month that was marked by the death of innocent people and by the burnt ruins of fires. As time passage, the pain will be deadened, emotions will subside, and life will return to its normal ways. But will the anxiety pass? Will answers be found to the questions that are disturbing many people: how does one interpret the Fergana events? What was it—an awkward tragic accidental event, as certain people attempt to present it? Or was it a completely natural omen that rests upon an unknown, or perhaps even a not yet recognizable, philosophy? Is it not possible that the unprecedented instance of resettling a part of a nation at the end of the democratic twentieth century will become a precedent in the spirit of the barbaric Middle Ages?

At the present time it is impossible to give a completely unambiguous, much less hasty, answer to these questions. This will require careful analysis, and possibly the reconsideration and rejection of many concepts that, as recently as yesterday, were considered to be unshakable dogmas. Nevertheless, while memory preserves many of the details of the tragedy, and while the witnesses are speaking the truth, rather than treating it on the basis of some self-seeking scenario, it is vitally important to return once again to the events in Fergana Oblast. The truth and only the truth is capable of untying the tight knot that was created from rumors and fabrications. Only the truth can become the key to a true treatment of the tragedy.

The official version that served as the impetus for the beginning of the tragedy seems to be as follows. (It should be noted that the public was informed of "The Truth About Kuvasay," and specifically "the truth," after the fires were already glowing in Kokanda and Yaypan, when rumors had firmly assumed the role of the chief and indisputable source of information.)

"The history in Kuvasay began in the last part of May, when a small argument concerning an everyday matter occurred between young people of the Uzbek and Turkish-Meskhet nationalities. On 23 May the conflict situation was repeated. Insults were directed at persons of Uzbek nationality who were visiting restaurants where the waiters and most of the other visitors were Turkish Meskhets. In response to this, young persons of the indigenous nationality began to gather in groups, in order to get revenge for the insults. Then they set out toward the area where the Turkish Meskhets lived in large number. At 1930 hours, more than 200 persons gathered on Ulitsa Budennogo from both directions.

Both sides, despite the presence of militia workers, were in a fighting mood, and inflammatory words were issued by both sides. Then rocks began to fly. As a result of the fight, six persons were injured and were sent to the hospital."

Then there is a description of the events that occurred the next day. In a word, it was just an everyday argument that had developed into a bloody tragedy.

The tragic events are given a different treatment by N. Leskov, chief of the UzSSR KGB Administration for Fergana Oblast. This is his version, which was published on the pages of PRAVDA: "I do not have any justification for saying that we had encountered a kind of mythological octopus with its single center, which for a long time had carefully prepared to overthrow the Soviet authority in the oblast, or even in the republic. If it had been that way, everything would have been much simpler. In my opinion, the roots are deeper and more complicated. As many as 10,000 persons participated in the disorder. Had all of them come out in response to an order from the Mafia? Asserting that would be at least frivolous and premature... In order to understand the chain of interrelated events, it is necessary to return to the city of Kuvasay. In August 1988 a Turkish Meskhet with the nickname "Boss," who had been given multiple sentences as a thief, died in an automobile accident, together with his accomplices. For a long time Boss, with the connivance of the local militia, had terrorized the city's population and had been the "owner" of entertainment institutions. Criminal elements of Uzbek nationality decided to take advantage of Boss' death, feeling that it was now their turn to run the city. They were given weight and strength by the public opinion that was directed against Boss' impunity.

Incidentally, General Leskov completely rejects any blame against the KGB that had been unable to prevent the shameful slaughter. He gives the following as a weighty argument: "Our work does not encompass all of society. We have not done this for a long time. We do not engage in political investigation." And yet, at the very same bazaar in Fergana, several days before the excesses, the dates and areas where the unleashed crowd would be meeting were named precisely. Naturally, the Turkish Meskhets also knew about this. But the representatives of the party, soviet, and law-enforcement agencies tried to assuage them, saying "Stay at home, don't get drawn into the conflicts." Thus, all the proper emphases were made: the instigators were the Turkish Meskhets, and the victims were the indigenous population. And if that was so, then it was necessary to neutralize and convince of their incorrectness only one side. What was this? Lack of knowledge of the situation? Lack of desire to analyze it, or the conviction that this was actually so?

There are other versions as well. Let us give the floor to those against whom genocide was directed.

A. Agachadze: "Ever since I was a child I was taught that one person is another person's friend, comrade, and

brother. How can I believe in that now? With my own eyes I saw the infuriated mob directing its hatred toward my nation. I do not know how many days and nights I have been unable to sleep. I constantly see before my eyes the same nightmarish scenes when my loved ones were being murdered. Previously we had been reproached for eating bread that had been produced by the sweat of the local population, and for the fact that the Turkish Meskhets had seized the commanding positions in trade. This is all a pack of lies. It is criminal to confuse national pride with arrogance, or industriousness with greed. Why were we the ones to be chosen as victims? Simply because, as a rule, our families were more prosperous than the indigenous population. But that comfortable life had been created brick by brick, by everyone doing his share of the work—everyone from the smallest to the biggest."

B. Idrisov: "I was a young boy when, in response to Stalin's order, we were forcibly resettled in Uzbekistan. Maybe those were different times, or maybe the local residents were able to understand the tragedy that had occurred for the Turkish Meskhets, but we were met cordially. We had to do a lot of work to be able to get on our feet and feel at home. It was several years later that we began to feel a negative attitude toward ourselves. We began to hear conversations to the effect that we were eating food that was the share of the local inhabitants. Therefore they were forced to seek happiness in other parts of the country."

Those are a few of the versions that led to the tragedy. There are other ones. But they are so unprovable that they could arise only in an atmosphere of general fear.

At the height of the events I was present at a meeting between Sh. Yuldashev, first secretary of the party's Fergana Oblast Committee, and young people. The calm and confident tone of the oblast party leader only stirred up those who had gathered. They smoked in the auditorium, whistled their dissatisfaction, and half of them even walked out. It is not by accident that I remember this. The local agencies of authority were unable to find any valid arguments for exerting any pressure on the young people. Any sober idea evoked the immediate reaction, "They (the Turkish Meskhets) killed our children and raped our women. There is no place for them in Uzbekistan. Uzbekistan is for Uzbeks."

Pay attention to that last slogan. It completely debunks the myth that the Turkish Meskhets are to blame, that they are exerting an influence on the local agencies of authority, and have seized the prestigious places in trade and the services sphere. I asked young people of the local nationality dozens and hundreds of times, "Where and when were children killed and women raped?" The answers were general and they all mentioned photographs. I myself saw a photograph of a child who had allegedly been shot to death by Turkish Meskhets. There was a bullet hole on his chest. Those fake photographs had been made in a really professional way. You cannot get quality like that at a rayon photographic studio!

Speaking at a meeting of the oblast's party and economic aktiv with the agenda "Nationalistic Manifestations and the Tasks of the Party, Soviet, and Administrative Agencies in Stabilizing the Situation in the Oblast," Sh. Yuldashev said, "Today we must provide a carefully thought-out political analysis of the tragic events that have occurred, and must assume the complete measure of responsibility. We must evaluate the extent to which our decisions were the correct ones, the extent to which they evolved from the real circumstances, and we must evaluate what has been done to prevent the dangerous development of events."

Those are correct words. But... no political evaluation followed. Mention was made of economic problems, the weak ideological work, the passivity of the KGB, and the lack of initiative on the part of the press. Reprimands were issued right and left at the obkom buro, with some people getting a strict reprimand with that fact entered in their party record book, and other getting off more easily, with a simple reprimand. For the time being, it was limited to that.

But at the present time the emphasis is being placed on the disastrous financial status of the inhabitants of Fergana Oblast. You cannot argue about this. But the truth cannot be of a halfway nature. Why, at all levels, is little being said about the fact that it is precisely Fergana Oblast that occupies first place in the republic with regard to the number of privately owned vehicles? Approximately every other family owns an expensive compact car. Why is it that no one wants to think about the fact that the prices of fruit and vegetables at the Fergana, Kokanda, and Tashlak bazaars have currently fallen sharply? Because, with the introduction of the curfew, the shipping of output outside the confines of the oblast is banned. And yet, previously, truck trains used to drive directly to the markets in the central rayons of Russia, to the Urals, and to Siberia, and that used to provide superprofits to enterprising persons.

And now about the tragic events themselves. It is accidental that they occurred in early June? "In my opinion, there is absolutely nothing accidental about this," Ye. Nechayev, deputy chief of the USSR MVD Internal Troops Political Administration, feels. "The events developed with unusual rapidity precisely during the hottest days of the Union of People's Deputies, where the competency of the actions of the army in Tbilisi was being actively discussed. The organizers of the Fergana excesses put their clear-cut political hopes on that. They were well aware that the 'Tbilisi syndrome' would make it impossible to make a split-second decision about sending in the MVD internal troops. The lost time and the unarmed troops allowed the extremists—and that is what we shall call them—to do a lot of harm. For me, one thing is obvious: the organizers of the tragic events are top-level professionals."

One of the first subdivisions to arrive at the "hot spot"—the settlement of Komsomolskiy in Margilan—

was the subdivision in which political worker Ye. Zemlyanskiy serves. He takes the floor.

"We flew into Fergana and set off on the march to the place of the events. One hundred thirty persons with armed with rubber truncheons and shields. We attempted to block off the area with dense Turkish Meskhets population, to which a crowd of a thousand people was rushing. We were hit by bottles filled with flammable liquids [Molotov cocktails] and rocks. The attackers had pikes with a diameter corresponding exactly to the viewing slits in the shields. It would be naive to consider that to be accidental. The attackers were excellently informed about our armament. That was why their vanguard had been equipped with pikes. At first we were able somehow to restrain the crowd. After we repelled an onslaught, the representatives of the extremists came out to negotiate. They gave an ultimatum: 'If you don't let us get to the Turks, you will all be crushed.' Naturally, we refused. We attempted to push the crowd back. Then a very curious thing happened—rocks began to fly from the crowd into the attackers' first ranks that had been stopped. We could no longer put up any opposition. Before our eyes, buildings were burning and people were dying. We did not have a single person who was not wounded or injured. Strange as this may sound, each of us was capable only of defending himself... Our subdivision had been in Sumgait, Armenia, and Tbilisi. But all of that, taken together, cannot compare with Fergana."

At briefings with representatives of the law-enforcement agencies the opinion was frequently expressed that the soldiers had fired into a peaceful demonstration. Something else that continues to be greatly inflated is the assertion that, with the aid of bullets and rubber truncheons, the troops—and, consequently, the center—attempt to stifle the increased self-awareness of the Uzbek nation that has risen up to gain its economic freedom. Is that really so? Because if it had not been for the troops, if measures—albeit delayed, but strict ones—had not been taken, the events in Fergana Oblast could have escalated from a tragedy into the most terrible bloody slaughter in which thousands of persons would have been killed. This is the opinion of another competent individual, Colonel-General Yu. Shatalin, chief of USSR MVD internal forces:

"I never thought that I, a person who had served in Afghanistan, would have to neutralize an enemy in my own country. The crowds of thousands were well organized. At first they successfully used the 'flying detachment' tactics. At the specified hour, on motor transportation that had been seized, they were moving toward the specified point. They were storming administrative buildings and using any methods in the attempt to break our cordons that had blocked off the areas of dense population by the Turkish Meskhets. The attackers had at their disposal weapons, including automatic ones, radio equipment, and considerable amounts of money that they issued lavishly to participants in the excesses.

At times the situation required split-second intervention. Therefore we frequently used the airborne assault. In order to make a judgment about this allegedly faceless crowd, I would like to give one example. Everywhere—in Tashlak, Kokanda, and Yaypan—they attempted to seize the buildings housing the city and rayon internal troops departments, because those were the only places where weapons were stored. There is something else that is very striking—the brutality with which the extremists carried out drumhead justice with their victims. I do not think that confused people who have given in to the crowd psychosis are capable of doing this. This attests to prolonged and thorough psychological processing."

Here are a few facts. In Kokanda, after an unsuccessful attempt to break through the cordon set up by the internal troops, an attempt was made to ram them. Two trucks with trailers came rushing at high speed out of the crowd in which there were children and into which, consequently, there could be no thought of directing fire. The extremists' plan was simple: to crush the soldiers.

Private Vladimir Neznamov, who was standing in the cordon in Yaypan, had his shield pierced in three places by a semi-automatic burst. Miraculously, the bullets did not strike the soldier.

Despite the danger, troublemakers attempted by any means to capture an armored personnel carrier that had been stopped. There were instances when the armored personnel carriers were hit by "Molotov cocktails" thrown by young men sitting in the trees.

The troublemakers came to the demonstration—or to the excesses, or whatever you want to call them—with slogans for perestroyka and also slogans like these: "Let's strangle the Turks, let's strangle Lenin's degenerate offspring, the Russians! Long live the banner of Islam, the Muslim religion, and Ayatollah Khomeini!" The officers of the special-purpose internal troops where V. Yemyagin serves as the political worker keep within their memory this slogan as physical evidence. Incidentally, no matter how much they deny this, there were also green banners. (At the present time it is very important to ascertain whether they were used to cover those for whom religion was only a screen.) What was this? Conviction, an attractive entourage that gives special significance to the disorders, or an accidental fish chowder?

Every true believer knows that in our country the believers are Suni, and in Iran they are Shiites. The religious tendencies are different and are largely contradictory. So there cannot be any discussion here of any religious concept. The organizing of the disorders required a symbol—one that was well-known, clear, but... little understood. That was apparently the origin of the illogical slogan. And, then, religion bans bloodshed.

While giving everyone verbal assurances that they adhered to the Muslim religion, the crowd actually did not even want to listen to any clergymen.

"We drove through the district, attempting to persuade people to stop the excesses," N. Khakimov, "mutavali" of the Margilan Khonak mosque, said. "We called upon parents to stop their sons. We begged wives to think carefully about their husbands' fate. Many did not listen to us. They were thirsty for blood..."

A person can get accustomed to many things: burdens, deprivations. But he always believes in his future happiness. But what do the Turkish Meskhets believe in now? Where and when will they acquire that happiness?

In Fergana Oblast I saw many things: burnt corpses, houses that had been burned down, human tears. But never in my life will I forget a ten-year-old boy who had made his way with difficulty to the soldiers in the internal troops in the settlement of Gorkiy.

His parents had managed to throw him over the fence when the enraged crowd was dashing into the courtyard of his home. The last words that his parents shouted to him were, "Run and save yourself!" For three days he hid in the field, feeding himself on what he could find on the ground. Ragged and emaciated, he was greedily eating a soldier's ration. No, he was not crying. He simply was no longer able to cry. He told about the tragedy calmly, without omitting any details. And then things became even more terrible. I do not know whether his mother and father are alive, but that young boy has learned for a lifetime what misfortune is like. The most important thing that he must understand is that the pain was inflicted on him not by the Uzbek nation, among whom he had grown up and been educated. He had been chased out of his home and had had his childhood taken away from him not by Uzbeks, but by criminal scum "who had deprived themselves of the right to belong to that nation, or to bear its historic and respected name." Those are N. I. Ryzhkov's words. And that is what is believed by millions of Uzbeks, Russians, Tatars, Koreans...

Here is another impartial story. The person speaking is Private 1st Class Viktor Shvind.

"In the area of Tashlak the crowd set fire to our bus, in which our personal articles and shaving needs were located. People living in the district saw that. After several difficult days, after the tension had lessened, we were approached by Uzbeks: women, old men, children. They shared what they could. Some brought hot bread, others brought razor blades, soap, or towels. They invited us to share their pilaf. The persons who had participated in the excesses and pogroms were not members of this hospitable nation, but individual degenerates."

Nevertheless, as bitter as it is to admit this, crowds of thousands of people cannot in any way fit into the definition of "handfuls of extremists." So, who then were those people? What were their true feelings?

"Basically they were men no older than 30. There were also adolescents," Lieutenant-General V. Pankin, chief

of the Main Investigative Administration of USSR MVD Criminal Investigation, says. "The crowd that committed the excesses should not be called a faceless gray mass. The participants in the vandalism included former workers in internal affairs who had compromised themselves. Of course they know our work methods, and this creates additional difficulties in the course of the investigation. The active participants include a rather large number of intellectuals—teachers, doctors. We have at our disposal operational data to the effect that, in exchange for participating in the extremist actions, young people were given money: 50, 100, or more rubles each. It is also necessary to think carefully about other facts. For example, as they set out to engage in arson, looting, and murders, the extremists were using narcotics and alcohol, which are quite expensive... In my opinion, the Turkish Meskhets simply became the pretext for the organizers of the excesses. It will be necessary for the investigative agencies to make their final conclusions, but one thing is clear even now: the troublemakers had big plans. And, unfortunately, they succeeded in doing a lot. One cannot fail to say that a role was also played here by the population's passivity—its failure to interfere. I might note that certain workers in the law-enforcement, party, and soviet agencies also showed their bad side. All this added conviction to the extremists."

A few people have not taken seriously the Kuvasay incident, a few simply did not want to see in it an ominous portent of the tragedy, a few put their hopes on the "Kuvasay horse"... Be that as it may, a considerable number of young people proved to be ready to loot and to carry out drumhead justice. And not only with the Turkish Meskhets.

On the eve of the events a curious test was conducted at Fergana Polytechnical Institute among the students of indigenous nationality. Very simple questions were asked: "What is the capital of Lithuanian SSR: Kaunas, Tallinn, or Vilnius?" "What ocean washes the shores of Nicaragua?" The striking result was that only 30 percent of those young persons could give the correct answers to the simplest questions about geography. You have to agree that those questions were at the fifth-grade level! The fact of the matter is that many of the students did not have even this elementary knowledge. Their thoughts were occupied with other things. So the "instructors of national self-awareness" had done a good job. Did the people at the institution of higher learning, the Komsomol obkom, or the party's gorkom know about this? Of course! But...

Whether or not we want this, the simplest logical analysis attests to the fact that the Fergana events were a real demonstration of the anti-perestroika forces. It is obvious that the participants in the events could not count on a political victory. Nevertheless they achieved a lot. Some of the long-suffering Turkish Meskhet nation were resettled from the territory of Fergana Oblast. Are there any guarantees that something like this will not be repeated? We need laws to guarantee the security of every citizen. But we do not have them. Therefore there

has been a sharp increase in the migration of the Russian-speaking population from the cities in the oblast. The waiting list for railroad containers has been scheduled for many months ahead. The party's Fergana Oblast Committee has not found anything better than to indicate to the oblast newspaper that it should stop printing announcements about exchanging the housing of persons who wish to leave the confines of Uzbekistan. The reasoning is in the spirit of stagnation: "Stop inciting the psychosis!"

A statement that found a large response throughout the country was the statement made by CPSU Central Committee General Secretary, USSR Supreme Soviet Chairman M. S. Gorbachev over Central Television, which was devoted to interethnic relations. That statement contained the words: "The equality of nations and peoples is inseparably linked with the equality of persons irrespective of their nationality. This is the highest principle of the humanism of human civilization." A thorough, well-principled evaluation of the events in Fergana Oblast was provided by the CPSU Central Committee Politburo. Everyone must know and understand that the state will defend the rights of a citizen, irrespective of his nationality, with all the means that it has at its disposal.

On the edge of Fergana, on a street that was burned to ashes, a street where Turkish Meskhets used to live, a pole where storks used to roost was miraculously preserved. Will the birds, which according to tradition bring good luck, return here? That depends upon people, upon their intellect, their sense of responsibility, and their faithfulness to the traditions of friendship.

#### **Pulatov on Causes of Interethnic Tension in Uzbekistan**

*18300769a Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 11 Aug 89  
Second Edition p 4*

[Interview with Timur Pulatov by Yevgeniy Gilmanov: "Our Guest Writer Timur Pulatov. On the Eternal and the Everyday"]

[Excerpts] Timur Pulatov is a well-known Uzbek writer, the author of stories and novels such as "Kaip's Second Trip," "Possessions," "Watch Towers," "The Habitue," "Tarazi the Turtle," and "Passions of a Bukhara Home," which have been translated in many republics of the USSR and abroad. The urgency of the moral problems, the combination of purely national concerns and those common to all mankind, and the vivid color of this prose master's works have attracted a wide readership. ■passages omitted■

[Gilmanov] In your opinion, which of the problems of interethnic relations need the most urgent attention—social-economic, cultural?

[Pulatov] No priority can be assigned. It seems to me that all the problems have long since become such a tangle that it is impossible to separate them. I'm certain

that we will begin to untangle the social-economic problems and then focus on cultural and moral ones.... But what of those stemming from the violation of the rights and freedoms of whole peoples during the Stalin era?

Since childhood I have been obsessed by a burning thought: Why did Uzbekistan, my unique and cherished motherland, become the place of imprisonment and oppression of the special exiles [spetspereselentsy]? And this happened in the years when we Uzbeks were filled with sincere feelings of brotherhood and compassion for the Russians, Ukrainians, and Belorussians whose lands bore the brunt of the war. By reaching out to unfortunate Slavic women and children, we ourselves were made morally cleaner and felt that we were a healthy, worthy people. And we would have lived for decades and centuries in that friendship....

But Stalin turned our land into a vast special camp for exiled peoples. And it was as if he drove us Uzbeks as well into the camps, where morality became perverted, and oppressed and injured our spirit. Having shown graphically that certain concepts count for nothing in a totalitarian state—concepts like Motherland, mother tongue, native culture, history, mercy, compassion, and peoples' friendship—that tyrant tried to inculcate cruelty, cynicism, and spiritual emptiness in us as well. Can it be these flaws and defects in our soul and conscience, left over from the Stalin and Brezhnev eras, have manifested themselves in the Fergana tragedy?

[Gilmanov] But there were other causes of the events in Fergana too....

[Pulatov] We still face the task of getting at the root causes. Among other things this will require astuteness, wisdom, and calm. But where are we to get this calm, when the newspapers—both in our republic and in the Center, especially in the first days of the events—"foisted" all kinds of contradictions, superficialities, and even untruths off on the readers. Almost all the editions, for example, wrote about children being brutally murdered, even naming a particular kindergarten in Fergana.... Then, apparently, they saw they had gone too far and they backed off. Central and local television showed that kindergarten, and its director said not one of the children had even been frightened.

Why all this fanning of passions and terrors? As if the killing of about a hundred adults were not horrifying enough.... As for narcotics addicts and corrupt elements taking part in the mass assaults on the Turks, I fear they are being made into the main "scapegoats." Just like the trans-oceanic imperialists, who were for many years blamed for all our domestic failures.

Naturally, conservative and corrupt forces are indeed very interested in destabilizing our life, reverting to the old ways. But these forces are exploiting unhealthy social-economic and moral conditions in society. If it were not for the mass employment among the native population in Fergana, the domination of the cotton monoculture, the dangerous ecological situation in what

was once Uzbekistan's breadbasket, and many social injustices—if the local authorities were more competent and listened to the people, the evil forces would never have been able to lead young people into pogroms.

Let me paraphrase an Uzbek saying: "When you have peace and plenty in your home, never ask what your neighbor's like; he is as goodhearted as you...." People are tired of unkept promises, slogans, and empty words. They want honest, intelligent, humane leaders to organize harmonious efforts everywhere—labor that is free. Creative labor can resolve many current problems in interethnic relations.

Here's an example of working in the old way. After ten days of the terrible events, a group of writers was invited to the Uzbek Communist Party Central Committee and were asked to speak via the media, to appeal to the reason and sensibilities of Fergana's people. The writers consented; they made their appeal. Some went on radio and TV, others spoke out in the newspapers. What was the reaction? "Same old hackneyed lectures about peoples' friendship again!" is what I heard from people. "Not a word about what to do, how to go on...." For a writer, of course, his words are what he does. But many local party and soviet leaders, in talking to the people, couldn't come up with a single substantive suggestion. They had to resort to extreme measures: the introduction of curfew and internal troops. And I have to think, regretfully, that in evacuating the Turks out of Uzbekistan—even for the sake of their safety—we have carried out the demands of the mob leaders and set a precedent. What we need most urgently now is new words and new actions.

[Gilmanov] What do you mean by "new words"? What specific contribution can the creative intelligentsia make to the resolution of interethnic problems?

[Pulatov] Unfortunately, the creative intelligentsia—like many party and soviet officials locally and in the Center—have proved incapable of working in troubled, extreme situations. It's no wonder, considering that both were shaped by a society in which interethnic problems went unsolved for decades. Because of that, we never did learn to debate, to use persuasion. We never learned the courage to stand up in front of the raging mob and shout the word that would stop the evil in its tracks! But there have been such spokesmen! During the 1920s, in Bukhara, a mob of fanatics wanted to burn down the house of an astronomy teacher who had disparaged medieval superstition. In a narrow alley, their way was blocked by writer Sadriddin Ayni. The mob, shamed, turned back.... And what a magical way with words Ilya Chavchavadze had in such situations! And what a courageous man Yeghishe Charents was: a glance from him was enough to make cowards creep back into their hole. The Turkmen poet Makhtumkuli more than once prevented bloody interethnic slaughter. And Berdak, the Karakalpak, could calm people's passions with one wise word.

How about us, we the living, today? What do we know about each other, the spirit of each people, their nobility and aspirations toward mankind's ideals? We do not really know the literature and culture of other peoples, even though we frequently exchange visits specifically for the purpose of attending all kinds of ten-day festivals of literature and the arts. "Events" of this sort are terribly over-organized. We are losing the lively sense of sharing the joys and sorrows of others; we are jaded from all the fussing and are concerned with imaginary values such as prizes and awards, forgetting that the highest award is a kindly embrace from a Russian or Kirgiz friend.

Instead of vital participation, instead of deep and sober understanding of the causes of interethnic friction, members of the intelligentsia frequently invent new myths, theories, historical designs that serve only to tangle matters further. I have wanted to say for a long time, "My Armenian and Azerbaijani brothers, at long last stop, enough of this myth-creation about the 'Karabakh problem,' the creation of myths more evil and hurtful than those of the Greeks!" Is it not the sacred duty of the intelligentsia to humanize myths, as Thomas Mann said? Yes, to humanize them as fast as they are invented. It is best, however, not to invent them at all but to depict the real picture of existence, for the concepts of brotherhood that are sacred to all of us have been placed on the map.

Events in a number of our republics have shown, unfortunately, that there are some intellectuals who go along with the crowd and get carried away, drawn by it to the point of madness. Others, however, who style themselves "independent thinkers," sometimes fall into "the embrace" of the crowd without noticing, and become the mouthpiece of dark, elemental forces, giving form to their slogans. It looks as if we are losing the age-old quality of the intellectual—the ability to rise above the particular and look deeper than the surface. Expounding pluralism, we frequently, with our narrowly national viewpoint, deny the living variety, we deny that which makes up the multicolored pattern of civilization and culture.

[Gilmanov] What are the wellsprings of genuine internationalism, in your opinion?

[Pulatov] I believe that every people is genetically endowed with the healthy foundations of internationalism. Every people creates its own unique culture, which has links with other cultures. A people's sense of internationalism may become dulled and diminish to national egotism, but it may also become more keen. This happens when a people develops freely and naturally, without experiencing distortions in its social, economic, and spiritual life. Distortions, in effect, dilute the sense of internationalism. A people that feels uncomfortable may, like a sick person, withdraw into itself. It may feel offended, and this feeling is one component of nationalism. Internationalism always has the sense of free will, of voluntary progress of the spirit toward pluralism. I'm certain that by restructuring our shared

home—the USSR—as a federation of sovereign republics having equal rights, we will attain to a new and higher stage of internationalism.

### **Paper Slams Fergana Crisis 'Disinformation' By Uzbek Police Official**

18300769b Tashkent PRAVDA VOSTOKA in Russian  
20 Jul 89 p 4

[Unsigned article: "The Best Defense. On Certain Publications in the Central Press"]

[Text] Everyone knows what an offensive is. This best defense has been demonstrated from the beginning by Uzbek SSR Deputy Minister of Internal Affairs E. A. Didorenko. He has demonstrated the kind of admirable energy that he has failed to show in the fight against crime.

Back on 23 February Eduard Alekseyevich gave an interview to the Tashkent Oblast newspaper, "Those Who Are Exacerbating Ethnic Relations Are Taking the Road to a Dead-End." It evoked an explosive reaction in Tashkent.

On 25 February, PRAVDA VOSTOKA printed its own thoughts about the piece, "Can We Tell the Road From the Dead-End?" [for a translation of this article see pages 78-80 of JPRS series SOVIET UNION: POLITICAL AFFAIRS, JPRS-UPA-89-027, dated 8 May 89.] Our editorial welcomed E. A. Didorenko's and TASHKENTSKAYA PRAVDA's desire to shed light on many problems of interethnic relations and the fight against crime, and stated that our colleagues' publication included much that merited attention and much that could be agreed with.

However, certain things in it seemed unacceptable either in terms of the tone of the debate, the substance of the unproved conclusions, or the level of edification of its ultimate truths.

We all had a pretty good idea about the "shady network" of the opponents of perestroika, and resistance to perestroika on the part of certain "exes" was quite well known even before E. A. Didorenko's interview. We merely asked, "Inasmuch as the republic MVD [Ministry of Internal Affairs] apparatus has official evidence against specific 'opponents,' how come they continue to do their dark deeds?" Shouldn't all that task-force power, concentrated in the hands of the general being interviewed, put an end to these vermin? And we inquired:

"What is the republic's MVD doing to impose order? Does it know a way out of the dead-end?"

Our editorial did not put up a "them and us" opposition, an opposition between those sent to the republic to render aid in imposing order and those who were born and raised here, who never soiled themselves in corruption and are doing an honest job.

We were puzzled by the republic's chief operative's report, in his interview, of interregional gatherings of "habitual criminals [vory v zakone]." We perceived as juridically incorrect his assertion that "the informals are camouflaged criminals."

New questions were raised in the editorial: "Who's doing anything to stop it? Or is the MVD's chief concerned now to worry the people with such statistics and observe the gatherings of 'habitual criminals' from the sidelines? And if the operatives' main task nevertheless is to root out the crime from our life, there is another statistic we'd like to know: are there now fewer 'habitual criminals' at large, or 'camouflaged' informals (who in fact are not informals but primitive criminals)?"

Finally, the last thing that this organ of the Uzbek Communist Party Central Committee, the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet, and the Council of Ministers objected to. We are moving toward a state of law. Is it permissible for the oblast newspaper, through the mouth of a general, to paste hurtful labels on specifically named persons? Labels like speculator and nationalist, or head of a "witch hunt" in the republic's academic science? The editorial did not demand anything supernatural in regard to that point of the interview. We merely stated, If E. A. Didorenko has the relevant materials on these people, he ought to turn them over to the court. Nothing else is called for, as the saying goes. Because any "something else" would come from the arsenal of the past, when people were pilloried in the press as enemies of the people, after which "the cudgel of the law" was applied.

This, then, is the essence of the recent debate. We can only add that on 15 March 1989 TASHKENTSKAYA PRAVDA itself offered a forum to those who had been castigated in E. A. Didorenko's interview.

To be sure, the oblast newspaper then dumped a bucket of mud on PRAVDA VOSTOKA under the pretext of what it, for some reason, considers "pluralism"—but this, again, is a matter of the tone of the debate. We have no wish to comment on it. Our newspaper's position in this now long-standing debate has been endorsed by the public at large and by members of the Uzbek Communist Party Central Committee Buro, in particular during a meeting with the republic's journalists.

While discussing the matter of TASHKENTSKAYA PRAVDA's editorial efforts to elucidate the oblast's social-political problems, the Tashkent Obkom Buro noted that "the tone of certain articles suffers from serious flaws, in particular the interview with E. A. Didorenko, the first deputy minister of internal affairs of the Uzbek SSR, titled 'The Road to a Dead-End,' and certain responses to it. The stridency and the categorical assertions in the newspaper articles make them unacceptable and diminish their effectiveness."

This was published in TASHKENTSKAYA PRAVDA on 18 April 1989. One would think that the person who gave the interview would get the point.

And, in fact, there was a lull in the polemic, which apparently signaled that the people involved in the whole story had taken the decisions of the party committees in the right way.

But precisely because this is not so, we need to turn once more to the past.

The bloody Fergana tragedy took place. Efforts to draw conclusions are still going on. It is already known, however, that the MVD organs proved totally helpless in the situation.

Yet the first deputy minister of internal affairs, in our opinion, took it into his head to exploit Uzbekistan's tragedy to justify his own helplessness to prevent the events of Fergana, and to appear before the uninitiated as a "prophet and seer" of the vandalism in Tashlak, Margilan, and Kokand, his prediction of which was not heeded even after the interview in TASHKENTSKAYA PRAVDA.

The foisting off of "information" like this on the special correspondents of the Central newspapers began some time ago, when E. A. Didorenko went to Fergana. He gave self-vindicating interviews to IZVESTIYA, KRASNAYA ZVEZDA, and All-Union Radio.

We expected that the general himself would stop disinforming the special correspondents of the Central media. But then yesterday SOBESEDNIK, the supplement to KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA, appeared in the Soyuzpechat newsstands. It featured special correspondent Konstantin Mikhaylov in notes titled "Proving Ground [Poligon]," where he begged indulgence for unobjectivity with the verbal curtsy, "These notes that I submit to your attention represent a subjective view to some extent." And he offered the following, verbatim:

"The name of Eduard Didorenko, Uzbekistan's deputy minister of internal affairs, is now well known to everyone in Fergana. In February of this year he was interviewed in the journal CHELOVEK I ZAKON and in TASHKENTSKAYA PRAVDA. He warned that there was an elaborate network of opponents of perestroika operating in the republic.... No, his words did not go unnoticed; people did take note. On 25 February 1989 PRAVDA VOSTOKA expressed its disquiet in an editorial, as follows: 'Whence this certainty?... Or is the MVD's main concern now to worry people?'"

It is well known that skillful "quoting" of sources can have an effect on any ideas, even directly opposite ones. And the character of the "quotation" in SOBESEDNIK is quite clear.

The words "Or is the MVD's main concern now to worry people?" in our editorial are preceded by something K. Mikhaylov deliberately left out: "E. A. Didorenko's sideline observation of ten interregional gatherings of 'habitual criminals.'" And we asked the militia general whether anyone was doing anything to stop it. And the words that SOBESEDNIK took out of context, "or is the

MVD's main concern now to worry people?" are followed by a passage that has nothing to do with any "elaborate network of opponents of perestroika." Our passage continued, "to worry people with such statistics (ten gatherings of 'habitual criminals') and observe these gatherings from the sidelines?"

Meanwhile, the republic's inhabitants are not indifferent to how we are to live. Everyone is doing the best he can to maintain order. This was the intent of PRAVDA VOSTOKA's editorial, if you read it without omissions and distortions.

Incidentally, if SOBESEDNIK's special correspondent had examined the TASHKENTSKAYA PRAVDA interview, our own editorial, and the material in CHELOVEK I ZAKON, he would have perceived clearly the line taken by PRAVDA VOSTOKA and CHELOVEK I ZAKON: Accepting E. A. Didorenko's alarming information about the crime situation in Uzbekistan, we would have unhesitatingly asked the general one thing: Isn't he the one who is supposed to fight crime, and isn't he the one who underestimated the situation?

Incidentally, our young SOBESEDNIK colleague wasn't the only one who got twisted around in the vortex of the events of Fergana. As we have said, E. A. Didorenko's "offensive" in defense of his own passivity was taken at face value by other Central publications as well. Extremely indicative in this regard is the interpretation by IZVESTIYA special correspondent V. Ardayev in the 14 June edition, titled "Fergana: Could the Disaster Have Been Prevented?" V. Ardayev writes, "During those days, which were difficult ones not only for Fergana Oblast but for all Uzbekistan, E. Didorenko was in Fergana constantly, actually directing the efforts of the republic's MVD organs to put out the fire whose prevention he himself had called for." Then the journalist, on his own, adds the halo of a clairvoyant to this image of the fire-fighter: "The theme of your interview three months ago now rings more than timely, and your other statements and predictions are nothing short of prophetic...."

Eduard Alekseyevich humbly agrees. Except that at the time of the IZVESTIYA interview he had just arrived in Fergana; a government commission was already at work there, and the republic's MVD chief, the Uzbek SSR Procurator, USSR MVD officials, numerous task forces, and USSR MVD troops were constantly on the scene and in control.

Hence, the fire was put out by people and services who were in no way under the general's jurisdiction.

This is how legends are born—and they do not come into being by themselves. These can be traced to the directorial hand of the first deputy minister himself, who, exploiting the tragedy in Fergana, has demonstrated a predilection for the familiar tactic, "The best defense is to take the offensive!"

Even if the attacker's statements don't jibe.

### Defense Official on Payments for Exercise-Related Environmental Damage

18300772 Moscow SELSKAYA ZHIZN in Russian  
12 Aug 89 p 3

[Interview with Colonel Yu. Pikulev, chief, Moscow Military District Inspectorate for the Protection of Nature, by V. Shcherban: "'Waterloo' On a Field of Oats"]

[Text] Maneuvers in the countryside are feared like a heart patient fears an infarction. From experience it is known that as soon as the "north" beats the "south" and rolls back to their bases what remains on the battlefield is torn up roads, oil polluted streams, crops trampled down by equipment, to say nothing of land torn up by tank tracks and explosions. When the dust from the departing tanks settles, the "scandal time" and haggling with the army begins. To handle this the military has set up the so-called crop damage commission. Its goal is to quickly calculate damages, pay for them down to the last kopeck, solve all problems and depart in peace.

Troops from the Moscow Military District recently fought it out. Our correspondent met with Yu. Pikulev, chief of the District's Inspectorate for the Protection of Nature.

[V. Shcherban] Yuriy Konstantinovich, people do not know enough about the activities of the crop damage commission. It has always been in the shadows, nobody wrote about it. If they did, there would have been discussions about one of the most murky aspects of military exercises, about disputes and litigation between rural dwellers and the military, about swindling and mutual deceit. Therefore, they kept silent. These facts are in sharp contrast with the image of military exercises on television: orchestras, flowers, the invariable presentation of bread and salt, kisses and dances. In other words, an idyll. In short, we knew about one side of the coin, but what about the other?

[Yu. K. Pikulev] The public really does have misunderstandings about the conduct of army exercises. Tanks break down fences and dig up gardens and dirt roads. The larger the exercise the more disputes there are. Rural soviets and kolkhoz farmers naturally complain: Either repair what has been broken or pay for it. The crop damage commission (which includes the chief of the District Inspectorate for the Protection of Nature, a financial officer, lawyer and chief of the forestry department) is also obligated to examine all complaints and to prevent scandals. Thus, we are sort of a buffer organization. However, don't think that we are only justifying ourselves. Often we are accused of things of which we are not guilty. For example, it was reported that our truck drove through a corn field. It was determined on the spot that the tracks were not from our truck. Unfortunately, however, rightly or wrongly farmers want to get more out of us. We check out everything. If somebody complains that soldiers dug up a couple of buckets of potatoes from

a garden, what do we do? We reach a compromise and settle accounts with work or gasoline.

[V. Shcherban] Inhabitants of areas where there were exercises often write indignant letters: "Probably Napoleon did not leave such a disfigured landscape as do soldiers after exercises. It looks like after the Battle of Waterloo. As a member of the crop damage commission, what do you see after exercises by the Moscow Military District?"

[Yu. K. Pikulev] I don't know about the situation in other military districts, but there were no special complaints about our's that time. The soldiers restored damaged land and repaired and washed everything broken or dirtied. As a result there was not a single complaint from the public. Overall, it should be noted that there has been a big change in the army's attitude towards ecological questions. Everything was different just 2 or 3 years ago. However, in 1987 inspectorates for the protection of nature were set up at all districts. They now monitor the observation of environmental laws by all military personnel. The commission I head has repeatedly shown its claws—we fined one unit 10,000 rubles, several officers were retired for polluting the environment. There are many such examples.

[V. Shcherban] What is your estimate of the cost of damage by Moscow Military District forces during the last exercise?

[Yu. K. Pikulev] Around 1,500 rubles. This is mainly for destruction of trees. This is a tiny amount. Sometimes payments reach hundreds of thousands.

[V. Shcherban] I personally am doubtful about such a total. Is it conceivable that so many soldiers could move around in such a huge territory and only do 1,500 rubles worth of damage to grass and trees? Moreover, there were letters from the area of this recent maneuver that disagreed with the miserly compensation. They write that fruit trees were knocked down. How much do you pay somebody for an apple tree?

[Yu. K. Pikulev] For an apple tree up to 20 years old we pay 60-70 rubles and for each year over 20 we add 2 rubles.

[V. Shcherban] Now I understand the reason for the letter writers' dissatisfaction. After all, if, in the autumn, the owner of the tree sold its apples they would bring in at least 100 rubles. You only give him 60-70. This causes the dissatisfaction. What about nonmonetary values? How are they calculated? Why not pay the owner 10 times the value of the destroyed tree, as libraries do for lost books? Then, I am convinced, trees would not be destroyed.

[Yu. K. Pikulev] This complaint is not correctly addressed. The size of payments is not set by the Ministry of Defense, but by the price departments at obispolkoms. Every oblast has its price list for damages. Everything depends upon climate conditions, vegetation

and water resources. For example, in Moscow Oblast a cubic meter of water costs 4 kopecks, while in arid regions the price ranges from 11 to 16 kopecks. The further south the exercises the more expensive they are. However, I agree with you that these fines are only symbolic. They should be convincing.

[V. Shcherban] Local inhabitants often complain to soldiers that they do not look where they step. Tell us, prior to sending young soldiers out on exercises, do you give them an understanding of the need to protect nature?

[Yu. K. Pikulev] Of course, during each training period soldiers are given 4 hours and officers 6 hours of lectures on this subject. In addition, we have a leaflet "On the Protection of Nature."

[V. Shcherban] I have seen that leaflet. It is a collection of banal phrases such as: "We should protect and beautify our land," "During field exercises you should avoid damaging the soil," "Do not allow..." "Be careful...", "Strictly observe..." and so on.

[Yu. K. Pikulev] Do you think that soldiers first learn about ecology from this leaflet? We are only reminding them.

[V. Shcherban] There are often exercises in Western European countries. However, I have not heard about any misunderstandings between the population and the army after exercises.

[Yu. K. Pikulev] That is not surprising. In the FRG, for example, there are special ecological units that have equipment to repair damages: scrapers, bulldozers, and excavators. These units do their own plowing and harrowing. Consequently, the public has practically no complaints about the army. If the military does not clean up its mess, then the local administrative organs where the exercise took place forbid the next exercise. This is also true in Denmark and the Netherlands.

[V. Shcherban] How do farm managers react to the news that exercises will take place?

[Yu. K. Pikulev] In differing ways. After all, although we damage dirt roads, we also repair them so they are in excellent shape—grading and compacting them. We also give technical help to farms. In Belorussia, for example, we hauled hundreds of tons of flax for one farm. Who would refuse such help? Others receive this news unenthusiastically. Some ask that the troops be taken further away from their land.

[V. Shcherban] I think this is understandable. Leasing and cost accounting dictate their own rules. What is to be done if, long before the official announcement, army strategists have designated tree lines as hills and rivers as water barriers? Can a selsovet change anything if it is persistent and does not want to be host to the exercise?

[Yu. K. Pikulev] First of all, such decisions are coordinated with local soviets, right up to the USSR Council of

Ministers. Secondly, exercises are not often conducted on farm land. Mainly they are in training areas. Finally, what does it mean to be "persistent and not want?" Exercises are an important state undertaking. During them we try to get all services to work together, to sharpen troops' battle readiness in conditions as realistic as possible.

So far the public has not protested maneuvers before they take place. What will happen in the future I cannot say.

[V. Shcherban] Are exercise times coordinated with rural dwellers? Is this the dictate of the military?

[Yu. K. Pikulev] Usually exercises take place prior to March or after September. Their times are adjusted. Long before they begin a reconnaissance group visits the proposed region and reaches agreement on all disputed points.

[V. Shcherban] Are these matters taken to court?

[Yu. K. Pikulev] One was, in April 1987. There was an emergency discharge of several tons of fuel oil. A large share of it was cleaned up, but some entered a river. We were given a bill for 400,000 rubles.

[V. Shcherban] Did you pay it?

[Yu. K. Pikulev] Of course not. We did not think it was justifiable. Moreover, almost all the fuel was cleaned up. Only one-thirteenth was not taken out of the water. This was affirmed by specialists in our sanitation and epidemiological detachment. The rayon SES [Sanitation and Epidemiological Detachment] then turned to Gosarbitrazh [USSR State Board of Arbitration]. It agreed with us. We did pay for the damage we caused, but only a small part of the bill presented us.

[V. Shcherban] But doesn't an army sanitation and epidemiological detachment work according to the principle "Do what you please?"

[Yu. K. Pikulev] We always use their services to handle disputes. These detachments monitor air, water and soil quality. They have the equipment for this. However, there can be no talk about juggling the results. The rayon SES [Sanitation and Epidemiological Detachment] worked together with our specialists. Water and soil samples were taken from the same places. This research was done independently. Naturally, the results coincided.

[V. Shcherban] As I understood it, crop damage commissions are a working organ of inspectorates for the protection of nature. Their authority ceases when the last conflict is settled. What about the time when no exercises are under way? Can these inspectorates monitor ecological conditions in the armed forces? Incidentally, how many people are working in the inspectorate which you lead?

[Yu. K. Pikulev] Hmm, at this time two people.

[Yu. K. Pikulev] Everything is clear. And you think that such a "formidable" force can handle the tasks entrusted to it?

[Yu. K. Pikulev] Of course you have a right to be ironical. However, one cannot deny that recently the officer corps has become remarkably "green", that is it is paying attention to ecological questions. I can give you dozens of examples where officers and soldiers have shown a careful attitude towards nature even during exercises. There are military units which have something to show any civilian organization with regard to this question. Of course, we are not able to put everything in order. This requires supplying the inspectorate with the instruments needed to monitor the air, water and soil. We also need to solve personnel questions. Special laboratories must be set up. It is time to combine civilian and military efforts. We should not ignore a single instance of damage to trees or pollution of reservoirs. These must be quickly reported to inspectorates for the protection of nature. Violators will be dealt with harshly as was done during the last exercises.

[V. Shcherban] Thank you, Yuriy Konstantinovich, for the frank discussion. One hopes that in its future exercises the army will respect farmers' labor. Also, your ranks contain many peasant youth, who, as is said, God himself taught to take care of the land on which they will work.

**Leningrad People's Front Members Discuss Goals**  
*18001528 Leningrad LENINGRADSKAYA PRAVDA in Russian 25 Jul 89 p 2*

[Interview with G.A. Bogomolov, board member of Leningrad People's Front, USSR State Prize winner, milling machine operator at Poligrafmash Plant; A.V. Boldachev, engineer at Russkiy Dizel Production Association; T.S. Dorutina, chief scientific associate, Leningrad Khimvolokno SRI, candidate of technical sciences; V.A. Ogarkova, engineering technologist from Gatchina; P.S. Filippov, department head, EKO; M.M. Chulaki, writer; and K.N. Yuzbashyan, chief scientific associate, Leningrad Department, USSR AS Institute of Eastern Studies, doctor of historical sciences, by Ye. Bogoslovskaya, T. Syrochenko, T. Chesanova, and S. Chesnokov: "A Front Without Flanks: Activists of New Social Movement Answer DEZHURYY REPORTER Questions"]

[Text] The Leningrad People's Front [LNF], a "movement for democracy, civil liberties, and radical economic reform" (so stated in its constituent congress's Manifesto), has existed for a month. Clearly, it is too early to summarize any results of the organization's activity. Yet, we invited a group of LNF activists to the editorial office to answer questions asked by the readers of DEZHURNYY REPORTER. The people of Leningrad want to define their attitude toward the new social movement and understand its goals and ability to practically assist restructuring.

**Everyone is a Politician**

[Question] How did the People's Front arise in Leningrad?

[Filippov] The need to consolidate democratic forces acting in support of radical economic and political reforms, democratization, and the implementation of civil liberties in action, not in words, has been felt for a long time. The appeal to create a People's Front was first heard last May in the "Perestroyka" discussion club, which set up a section whose purpose was to prepare for creating the People's Front in Leningrad. It soon grew into an independent organization, "For the People's Front." There were many difficulties and relations with official organizations occurred far from easily. Incidentally, real contact with the CPSU obkom has recently appeared. So, step by step, we advanced toward a constituent congress.

[Question] Does it follow that the LNF is an association of different, previously independent organizations?

[Bogomolov] No, the Leningrad People's Front cannot be viewed thus. It is noted in the Statutes and turns out in practice that only part of the members of these movements, for instance, "Memorial," support the LNF. They are also joining our ranks. The same goes for the "ecologists" and "economists." However, the creation of the LNF, unquestionably, has facilitated the conduct of joint actions.

[Question] So, who is joining the LNF?

[Yuzbashyan] Anyone who wants to. There is one age restriction: no less than 14 years old. So anyone can join, regardless of social, professional, ethnic or party membership. At the same time, we are trying to assert the interests and formulate the requirements of different social groups, for example, of invalids, ethnic communities, and residents of one rayon or another.

[Filippov] The structure of the LNF and its primary groups is changing substantially. With the conception of the movement, lone people came, as though to lamplight, to the "For the People's Front" organization or the "Perestroyka" club. They needed to feel a sense of comradeship with each other. Today, the situation has changed radically. Right now, the LNF is more like a union of groups and initiative-minded people, formed in enterprises, organizations, and the creative unions.

[Question] What can the People's Front give the individual?

[Chulaki] An opportunity to realize himself. After all, everyone knows that soon after the revolution the majority of people lost the possibility of participating in political activity and influencing the fate of the state. Yet, man has this, if you wish, almost biological need, a social instinct. He should express himself, including as a politician, albeit a very minor one. In my opinion, the LNF enables each person to express his own social temperament and aspiration for political activeness.

[Yuzbashyan] The LNF has a magnetic attraction not just because it raises specific tasks (the Fox Nose "dike," etc.) Above all, it is a broad sociopolitical movement which asserts the ideas of democracy and progress in definite organizational forms.

### Both Words and Action

[Question] However, as they say, ideas are ideas. What about practical work?

[Filippov] Twelve commissions were formed at the LNF Constituent Congress, each with its own sphere of activity. For example, the ecological commission monitors the condition of small rivers in Leningrad and the oblast and the cutting of forests on the Karelian isthmus, involves various ecological associations, and goes to Goskompriroda and the people's deputies in order to solve nature conservation problems through joint efforts.

In close contact with the "Perestroyka" and "Arendator" clubs, the LNF is offering methodological assistance in converting enterprises to lease and to the organization of production self-management.

[Dorutina] The LNF primary organizations in enterprises can really participate in this work. For example, the people of Okhta are often unable to open their windows: the influence of chemical enterprises is having an effect. The SES tests the air at certain points and... finds nothing. Apparently, these points were selected incorrectly. With the help of our own sanitation laboratory, we are trying to analyze the air in the microrayon and supplement the official data, or show that they are not consistent with reality.

[Boldachev] At the Vyborg People's Front, people burning with a desire to participate often come to us and ask: where to go, whom to boycott, against whom to struggle? Our very first task is to moderate their militant ardor and attune them to constructive work. Studying the situation in the rayon, we are compiling a program of actions. LNF members have already held subbotniks at the Hospital imeni Karl Marx and at children's institutions.

[Ogarkova] In Gatchinskiy Rayon, one-third of the appeals to the commission on social rights and social defense relate to medical service. In particular, a teacher from one of the specialized children's boarding schools turned to the People's Front with a request to investigate why normal children are being held along with mentally retarded ones. Right now, we are involving specialists—doctors and teachers—in this.

[Dorutina] The People's Front at our "Khimvolokno" Scientific Research Institute has more than 50 members. The task of the LNF group is cooperation with and activation of the STK. It was chosen, like many others, rather formally, and therefore soon turned out to be ineffective: some do not want to work in it, others do not know what to do or how to do it, and a third know how

and want to, but do not have the strength to display independence. A group was created in the LNF which coordinates movement on work in the STK. We are exchanging information with other enterprises and developing common approaches.

[Question] Does the LNF plan to publish its own newspaper?

[Filippov] It does, but for the time being cannot publish due to formal grounds. It seems, it is impossible to raise the question of a newspaper or information bulletin, since the LNF has not yet been registered by the Leningrad Soviet Executive Committee. However, they began publishing bulletins for the People's fronts in the Baltic up to half a year before their official approval. Right now, along with the Tartu People's Front, we are publishing the TARTUSKIY KURYER, half of which is devoted to Leningrad subjects. The news that the CPSU obkom has submitted a proposal to the Central Committee to give local bodies the right to decide the question of the possibility of releasing new publications is reassuring.

[Question] Is the People's Front's activity restricted to local problems or will the LNF go to a union-wide level?

[Yuzbashyan] We cannot ignore, for example, interethnic relations. We must make our own contribution to disarming interethnic tension and must approach this problem very circumspectly. We can scarcely consider events, for example, in Fergan, only through the prism of interethnic relations. There was a great deal that we did not know, so the LNF sent its own delegation there. We plan to send our own representative specialists to the Nagorno-Karabakh Autonomous Oblast and Abkhazia. They will be able to study the situation on site and, on returning, will try to draft an LNF proposal on this problem.

[Ogarkova] Whereas previously the painful problems of the city and country stood alone and, as a rule, found no support for their solution, it is now possible, raising them through the People's Front, to achieve a result more easily, attracting the attention of society, specialists, and the USSR people's deputies.

### Ahead—the Elections

[Question] Does the People's Front intend to become a party in the future?

[Filippov] We are moving toward a civilized civilian society, for which, in my opinion, a multi-party system is natural. What role will the People's Front play in this? It will unquestionably work for democracy. However, I would not even begin to claim that the LNF will turn into one of the parties. The range of opinions of those who join it is too broad. These people see the future differently.

[Boldachev] The LNF's task is to help one or another group or strata of the population express their views on

various problems and seek a compromise democratically. When habits for interaction among groups of people with different views appear, it will then be time to interpret the new situation.

[Question] Does the LNF duplicate the trade unions?

[Chulaki] The events in the Kuzbass clearly showed who the leaders of the local trade unions defend: as was revealed, mainly the authorities. Here, it seems, given the form in which such trade unions exist, they naturally generate the need for an alternative. The LNF supports the miners' demands.

[Question] How are relations taking shape among the LNF, the Democratic Union, and "Pamyat"?

[Bogomolov] The Democratic Union [DS] is not homogeneous. Some of its members are against the communists in general, while others consider it possible to cooperate with the progressive wing of the CPSU. Recently, the Kolpino group of the DS rejected opposition of the CPSU and split away from the Democratic Union. The members of this group joined the LNF. There are other similar examples.

[Chulaki] As far as "Pamyat" is concerned, as well as the new "Patriot" society, we believe that their leaders are reinforcing chauvinistic moods with their speeches. The LNF does not and will not have any relations whatsoever with such movements.

[Question] Will the LNF nominate its own candidates for the elections to local soviets?

[Bogomolov] Absolutely. We will nominate our own candidate with a specific program for solving the urgent problems of a rayon for each deputy seat.

[Boldachev] In order to do this, we are studying the activity of the current rayon and city soviets. Today, however, precisely what system these elections will be held under is very important.

[Chulaki] We think that the elections should be direct, equal, and only by territorial okrugs. It is necessary to maximally utilize the existing law, having added conditions for nominating alternative candidates to it, having indicated the points on elections from social organizations and on okrug assemblies. We are in favor of everyone being able to nominate candidates: labor collectives, social organizations, citizens' assemblies by place of residence, right up to self-nomination. However, the elections should be by territorial okrugs.

We know that the United Front of Working People [OFT] proposes holding elections in production okrugs, to make plants electoral districts for their workers. In this case, the soviet authorities in local areas would be elected by those who, as a rule, do not live there and for whom the interests of a given rayon are alien. In this connection, someone else, instead of them, will vote in enterprises in their rayon.

However, after all, a person's interests lie above all with his home and family. Here, interests are common for workers, officials, doctors, pensioners, or students. The deputies elected by the people ought to defend these interests.

The contradictions between the population and enterprises are often aggravated in a rayon. Will a deputy from a labor collective who does not live in the rayon be able to act against his own plant or shop? After all, he is far more dependent on his job.

Why is such an experiment needed? Let us recall that many candidate USSR people's deputies who received support in production collectives lost the elections. Therefore, this project was generated in the depths of the OFT in order to ensure the election of a specific sort of deputy, guaranteed the majority of votes beforehand. This contradicts democracy. They suggest returning us to a class dictatorship. In words, as I believe, to a dictatorship of workers against the newly appeared "NEP-men" and cooperative workers. In reality, it is the bureaucracy against broad strata of working people.

[Question] Many think that the LNF only supports the intelligentsia. Is this so?

[Bogomolov] Having worked at a milling machine for 35 years, I have the right to say: it is precisely the intelligentsia, its best representatives, that has always defended the interests of the working person. On the other hand, however, may my thought not seem absurd, but in many ways precisely the long scorn for the intelligentsia, beginning with miserly pay for engineering and technical work, has led to the fact that everything was left on to run on its own: increasing labor productivity, production efficiency, and time standards. Everything is made up for at the expense of the worker's physical force. We should clearly understand that only if we learn to value the intelligentsia (in this case, it is a question of technical intelligentsia), will better work places, equipment and instruments appear for us, and work itself will be easier.

[Ogarkova] It is no accident that the influx of workers into the LNF is growing. No confrontation whatsoever arises between me, an engineering technologist, and the workers. Basically, it arises not between the intelligentsia and workers, but between the administration and working people. It is important to explain to the workers how much their standard of living depends on the activity of administrators under the current economic mechanism. We must unite our efforts precisely in order to halt the squandering of the common wealth, to radically change conditions under which the country, which has tremendous natural resources, provides its people with only a beggarly existence.

**■Editorial Note■** We were unable to ask all the questions and, indeed, this is hardly possible, because life advances more new ones every day. They must be answered with action. We must hold a constructive dialogue and close

flanks with all social movements that support the intensification of restructuring and further democratization.

The more people we have, sincerely concerned about the fate of our city, supporting the revival of its glorious traditions and the preservation of its residents' habitat, the sooner long-awaited changes for the better will begin. However, in order to do this, close cooperation is needed among all forces which have the common, main goal of promoting restructuring.

### **Aims of Leningrad People's Front Discussed**

*18001577 Tallinn SOVETSKAYA ESTONIYA in Russian 4 Aug 89 p 3*

[Article by Nikolay Kornev: "The 'Fronts' of Leningrad—Goals and Tasks"]

[Text] At the request of our correspondent E. Kekelidze, member of the LNF [Leningrad People's Front] Coordinating Council Nikolay Kornev (senior research associate of the Institute for the Professional Advancement of Physicians) talks about this.

On 17 and 18 June, the founding congress of the Leningrad People's Front was held. The democratic community of Leningrad proceeded for a long time toward this event; for the first time, the concept of creating the people's front was voiced more than a year ago in April 1988. The LNF was born primarily as a response of the Leningraders to the events of last year. We should note in particular the election campaign which served as the main catalyst for the emergence of the LNF. Many Leningraders understood that only the grassroots support for the democratization movement would ensure that it is irreversible.

More than 100 LNF support groups created at enterprises, in institutes, in independent social organizations, and at places of residence (about 680 delegates) were represented at the congress. During the 2 days of work, a statute, a manifesto with the main political goals, and a resolution on the priority tasks of the LNF were adopted.

Four days before our congress, the founding conference of the socio-political organization United Front of Toilers (OFT) was held. It was preceded by an appeal of a group of workers in LENINGRADSKAYA PRAVDA who called on the Leningraders to join the movement in which workers will become the main force and the mouthpiece of the interests of all.

This front formed very fast, and for many of us its rapid emergence was unexpected to some degree.

Immediately after the congress, the correspondent of a Leningrad newspaper asked me: How are the relations between these two fronts going to develop? At the time, I had to admit that I did not even know the position of the United Front of Toilers because it emerged so rapidly. By now, there is a degree of certainty. It is hard to judge on the basis of the deeds of the OFT; little has

been done thus far. However, some conclusions can be drawn based on which persons have become the leaders of the movement and what their background has been.

For example, the suggestion to hold elections to the local soviets pursuant to provisional regulations which call for electing two-thirds of deputies at major enterprises with more than 1,000 employees, and one-third in territorial electoral okrugs was the first "creation" of the OFT. It is absolutely obvious that this formula is anti-democratic.

At present, the lawyers of the Leningrad People's Front are preparing their proposals for local elections: We seek direct, equal, and secret elections.

The LNF Coordinating Council consists of M. Salye, doctor of geological and mineralogical sciences; famous journalist S. Andreyev; writer M. Chulaki; former officer of the militia N. Arzhannikov; lawyer V. Monakhov; G. Bogomolov, worker of the Poligrafmash [Plant], and a number of other well-known people, who gained their authority among the citizens during the election campaign due to their adherence to democratic principles.

The issues facing the citizens of Estonia and Leningrad are similar on many points; the urgency of democratizing the society and the need to draw all citizens into these processes are apparent. We have to become a civic society in which everyone feels his responsibility for what is going to happen to us.

### **Innovations in LaSSR Constitutional Reform Project Discussed**

*18080060 Riga CINA in Latvian 25 May 89 pp 1,4*

[Article by J. Bojars and A. Plotnieks, doctors of juridical science: "Regarding the Latvian SSR Law 'On the Changes and Supplements to the Latvian SSR Constitution (Fundamental Law)'" ]

[Text] Today the main question of the nation's political life is still to realize the efforts towards the democratization of the USSR political system outlined at the 19th All-Union Party Congress.

In the first stage of this process there appeared the task to democratize the organization of the higher authority and election system. This problem was solved at the Union level, accepting improvements in those USSR Constitution articles that regulate the organization of supreme state power and elections, as well as accepting a new law on the election of USSR people's deputies.

Unfortunately, in the implementation of this draft law representatives of the Soviet republics did not take part, and the work ended in a hurry, which can be objectively explained with the short time span that remained until the elections of the USSR people's deputies. Therefore, our republic could become involved in this important process only when the draft was being discussed by the entire nation. In a very short time—in one month—the republic formulated its constructive position on these

laws and submitted developed and founded suggestions for the changing and supplementing of many standards.

The republic representatives determinedly defended these proposals in various Union instances and achieved an essential improvement of many standards of the submitted laws. However, in a few cases we did not succeed in defending our viewpoint.

Now the first stage of the reform of the political system is taking place on the united republics' level. At the foundation of the legal reform of the Latvian SSR Constitution are the same aims as are behind the improvement of the Union legal system. Namely, the renewal of popular government, by working out democratic legislation on higher representative organs and elections.

In the commentary on the Latvian SSR Constitution reform bill, we will basically express only innovations that differ from All-Union standards and will provide their legal foundation.

Before we start to comment on the law on Latvian SSR people's deputy elections, it is necessary to answer a few principal political-juridical questions. First of all, is the Latvian SSR competent to accept laws that stand out with a certain novelty, because the USSR Constitution's Article 74 states that "in case a Soviet republic's law does not conform to the All-Union law, then the USSR law is in effect." However, Article 76 of the USSR Constitution declares that "a Soviet republic is a sovereign Soviet socialist state," and therefore in accord with the Final Document of the Vienna conference, which must be fulfilled without exception by all participating nations in all its aspects, including also internal state affairs, as a sovereign nation any Soviet republic, which in accordance with the USSR Constitution has not delegated the Union the right to accept republic laws, has the right "in full conditions of freedom and without outside interference to determine its internal and external political status and laws and according to its views to realize its political, economic, social and cultural development."

In this regard a Soviet republic's constitution by all means need not conform to the USSR Constitution word by word; this is also affirmed by the leading USSR expert jurist group, when discussing the Latvian SSR constitutional reform draft. Moreover, in its exposition a Soviet republic's constitution cannot be completely identical to the USSR Constitution, because various areas of state authority are fixed in them, which is why the Soviet Constitution contains several powers that are not in the republic constitutions.

Furthermore, in the third portion of the USSR Constitution's Article 76 it is stated that Soviet republic constitutions should reflect the unique features of the republics; that excludes not only the mutual conformity of various republic constitutions, but also the identical nature of the republic and Soviet constitutions' wording. One must also take into account the fact that currently the legal regulations of the USSR federal relations are

oriented towards excessive centralization, which actually prohibits the utilization of the equality principle of the federation members and the sovereignty of the Soviet republic's will. USSR people's deputies from the Latvian SSR have decided to bring up a question about changing Article 74 of the USSR Constitution at the USSR Congress of People's Deputies. For now the highest legal power in all cases is the USSR Constitution, therefore we must also answer the question on the Soviet and republic's constitutional standard coordinating mechanism, as well as on the order in which changes in these constitutions must be made. The question is actually about which constitution must first be changed—the republic or the Soviet. The stagnant way of thinking is reflected in the concept that no changes in the Soviet republic constitutions are allowed before changes are made in the USSR Constitution. This approach automatically shuts out any standards on Soviet republic sovereignty, which wholly satisfies conservative circles, but which never again will be agreed to by the supporters of the democratization of the Soviet political system.

Beginning constitutional reform solely with the Soviet Constitution is connected with many essential defects: not only unsatisfying reform rates of revolutionary democratization of the Soviet political system, but also a surprising, voluntary, and unanticipated introduction of norms not discussed by the people and not approbated on the republican level onto an All-Union scale.

In our opinion, the revolutionary dialectic of restructuring, quite to the contrary, foresees the perfection of Soviet constitutionalism, starting at the republican level, approbating principles and norms at first maybe only in one or a few Soviet republics, and thereafter incorporating into the Union scale those legal mechanisms that have proved themselves the best.

Moreover, the 19th All-Union Party Congress' suggested renewal of unlimited soviet power cannot be imagined without the rout of the over-centralized bureaucratic command system also on the federal relation level, which will unescapably lead to a redistribution of plenary powers between the Soviet republics and the Union, when in the republic its supreme state power organs will realize sovereign supreme power.

Presently in many Soviet republics there dominates the concept that the power redistribution between the Union and republic organs must occur in such a fashion so that the Union organs would be left with only the regulating of those relations which the republics have jointly delegated to the Union.

The Baltic republics hold that the currently familiar formula "a strong center—strong republics" is better expressed thus: "strong republics—a strong center," because a pyramid is build from the base, not from the top. The essence of a strong center's role, in our opinion, is such that republics, supporting themselves on foundations of equality, must determine together the general

directions of our political-juridical system's development. Within these boundaries each republic must have full creative freedom when choosing socioeconomic and legal mechanisms and operatively changing them according to the necessities of the republic as well as the entire federation.

The leading Soviet rights specialists received our position with understanding. On 28 April 1989 in the Kremlin, in the USSR Supreme Soviet Presidium building, a meeting of the consultative group took place. Our republic was represented by Aivars Krumins, director of the Latvian SSR Supreme Soviet Presidium's legal section, and the authors of this commentary. In the consultative group's membership there were nine legal science doctors, among their number such familiar scientists as B. Lazarev, V. Vasil'yev, V. Pertcik, B. Strashun, M. Studenikina, and K. Sheremets.

The republic law "On Changes and Supplements to the Latvian SSR Constitution (Fundamental Law)" has been worked out for the large part, basing itself on the USSR Constitution (the wording of 1 December 1988). This approach is determined by the fact that, with a few exceptions, in the part on regulating supreme power the USSR Constitution's legal constructions rely on legal principles and mechanisms approved in the world long ago. In many cases other, more democratic ones simply do not exist.

At this moment in the republic's constitutional reform law, which the Latvian SSR Supreme Soviet Presidium has already approved, along with the norms borrowed from the USSR Constitution, there is also a row of basically new theses, many of which, according to the thoughts of Moscow experts, "must be included in the textbook." A few of our proposals have even been evaluated by leading Moscow legal specialists as ones that have earned a reception in Union legislation.

About the other, most radical standards, which differ substantially from Union standards, a mutual agreement was reached that in the USSR Congress of People's Deputies we will submit proposals on the completion of respective changes in the USSR Constitution.

During the course of the aforementioned expert discussions on a few of our innovations, the chairman, doctor of legal sciences Professor B. Lazarev, pointed out to the most conservative-minded conference participants: "Let us not limit the sovereignty of the Soviet republic. A Latvian SSR legislator has the right to decide this question independently, correspondingly regulating the unregulated questions of the Union. The republic has the right to detail the norms of the Soviet Constitution."

In a few other instances quite logical versions of the final draft's wording were suggested to us.

We motioned that it be added to Article 89 of the Latvian SSR Constitution that "soviets of Latvian people's deputies fully realize all state power in their territory."

Professor B. Lazarev evaluated this from a logical and doctrinal viewpoint as not a very successful formulation because if the rayon soviet holds full power, then the village soviet cannot have full power. The compromise formula "plenary powers" satisfied everyone. And this truly is the most successful.

In the sixth part of Article 80, to create legal guarantees for the priority of the law in a legal state, a regulation was included on the possibility of removing any official from his post before the completion of his term if he violates the Latvian SSR Constitution and Latvian SSR law.

Regarding the already mentioned, unresolved theoretical argument on the priority of Union or republic law in the project, it was decided to retain the compromise wording "violate the Constitution and laws."

Further in the USSR Constitution there are expounded only very general tasks of population control organs. We decided to detail these tasks, as a supplement giving our republic the most current questions, for example, the need to fight violations of social justice, the unfounded raising of hopes, and actions that threaten the population's health and harm the surrounding environment.

In Article 82 of the constitution as an innovation we strengthened the legal guarantees for soviets of any level to organize their activity on the basis of full cost accounting. This standard was received by our Moscow colleagues with great understanding.

On the other hand, our initial achievement of absolute priority for the power of a soviet of any level was rightly questioned. This could lead to the bureaucratization of soviet work and the need to synchronize with it any undertaking, even one allowed by law. Much more democratic is the formula that permission from local soviets must be received only by enterprises that touch the interests of the entire population of the territory in question. The published draft also contains this formulation.

Unquestionable support was earned also by the novelty in Article 83 of our project on the need to have soviet work based on scientific resolution of questions and constant supervision of executive and activity organs.

In the part of the changed Latvian SSR Constitution that refers to elections, no doubts are raised by the opinion of Article 85, in regard to which, just as USSR citizens have the right to elect and be elected as USSR people's deputies, so do Latvian SSR citizens have the right to vote and be elected in the Latvian SSR people's deputy elections. It is fully clear that citizens of other Soviet republics, who during election time are resting in sanatoriums and rest homes, which are located on our republic's territory, and who have come here to shop or on a business trip, cannot, as was formerly the case, participate in Latvian SSR elections.

Our project completely fairly makes an exception for the army, for from a social standpoint it is a separate, strictly

limited group of people, who due to specifics of military service can all probably not be equally counted as republic citizens, but obviously their corporate interests must be represented in the highest organ of state power. On the other hand, so that misunderstandings would not arise, whose cause could be the moving of subdivisions for maneuver purposes, typical of the army, also during election time, in our project the armed forces located on Latvian SSR territory form their election district separately from the territorial election precincts, in which they elect their representatives according to a fixed representative norm—12 deputies in the Latvian SSR Congress of People's Deputies.

The published projects do not envision election of Latvian SSR people's deputies from social organizations. The members of the constitutional commission and the working group arrived at this decision after long contemplation, and we acted according to these considerations.

First of all, a deputy from a social organization must receive a mandate both from the respective social organization, as well as directly from the people, because he, just as all the others, is a **"deputy of the people."** The Union legislation observed the political request of the 19th All-Union Party Congress—on representation of social organizations, but did not provide for any legal mechanism by which the people could influence the solution of this question. We worked out a few such models of election organization, where citizens directly vote for all candidates, in their number also for those nominated by social organizations. But these are technically complicated and massive constructions, and it is expensive to organize elections in this fashion.

Second, the Latvian Komsomol Central Committee invited us to give up social organization representation, and other social organizations publicly remained silent, but their representatives on the constitutional committee and working group in the general meeting also spoke up about rejecting this institution.

However we take into account the necessity to liquidate contradictions between our drafts and the USSR Constitution, and among other changes we propose to take out from the USSR Constitution's 95th Article the reference to "Soviet republics" and "republic organs of social organizations," thus leaving the solution of this question in the hands of republic legislators.

The utility of this approach did not evoke any doubts from the Moscow experts, and Professor B. Lazarev summed up the results of the discussion of this norm with these words: "We will not make any notes regarding these paragraphs."

A great meaning for the defense of democracy from the concentration of dangerous power in the hands of a certain category of representatives of executive and juridical power is held by the application of the principle of division of power, recognized by the whole world, in regard to which one and the same persons do not have the right to make and pass laws, incarnating them in life

and discharging their enactment, which really only "angels" would have the power to do. The decisive step has been taken on the road to introducing the principle of the division of power in the changes to the USSR Constitution during the course of the winter. However there are still ways for categories of individual executive and action directors of legislative organs, as well as of organs of justice, to get into the legislative body. Therefore, the introduction of the power division principle in our draft has been led to a noticeably higher level, and the deputy's mandate has been completely justly refused also for the chairman and members of the constitutional supervisory committee, the deputy ministers and state committee chairmen, the deputy managers of the resource and local soviet executive committee departments and administration, the procurator, and their deputies. Obvious support for our position could be heard in the remarks of the discussion participants: "The procurator has a lot of responsibilities, why should he have the mandate of deputy" (K. Sheremets), "I also agree in my soul" (B. Lazarev). From such an approach a wish to also effect changes in the USSR Constitution arises.

The novelty of our draft also lies in the fact that the number of subjects who have the right to nominate the people's candidates includes pupils of educational institutions and student collectives, who in the last elections actually were discriminated against in this respect. By granting the right to nominate their own candidates to these democratically-minded collectives it will be possible to increase the unsatisfactory representation of young people in the supreme organs of power.

Of great meaning for the actual guarantee of equality for all deputy candidates will also be our innovation regarding the fact that the law prohibits the financing of election campaigns from sources other than state sources. In cases when wealthy social organizations, work collectives or cooperatives can allocate great sums for the promotion of their deputy candidate, the population must be guaranteed the chance to clearly evaluate the attributes that a more talented and significant candidate that has less material support may have.

An essential question of our constitutional legislation is the problem of the many-tiered system of supreme state institutions of power. In this case the All-Union model rests on the fact that there are two legislative organs—the USSR Congress of People's Deputies and the Supreme Soviet. By itself, a third level is held by the USSR Supreme Soviet Presidium, for which there is usually not an analogue in bourgeois democracies. The advantage of this system is that the representation of the broader public is guaranteed, but at the same time there are noticeably more negative traits. This is the artificial division of the legislative body into two parts, with just an artificial division of parliamentary authority between the Congress and the Supreme Soviet, which threatens to transform the people's deputies into not very competent electors, because deputies from one republic do not know well enough the good or bad qualities of deputies

from other republics. Thus, the Congress can become an comfortable mechanism for the insertion of such candidates into the USSR Supreme Soviet in whose election the apparatus is interested. At present the main task that must be solved in order to democratize the Soviet political system is once again to renew the representative organ, that is, the prevailing of Soviet organs over executive and directing organs. For the achievement of this goal in the whole world a one-level parliament is considered more democratic than a two-level parliament. This was precisely the view of the commentary's authors during the winter, during the time of constitutional crisis, and that is exactly why in Lithuanian and Estonia it was decided to get along without a congress. The draft suggested by the Latvian SSR Supreme Soviet Presidium contains an improved Union version with a congress, a version which was defended by many representatives of simple Latvian workers. In the end result it is only a proposal for the Latvian SSR Supreme Soviet, and it can be reworked into a more compact model without a congress in only a few days' time.

As is known, sharp discussions in the Baltic republics are aroused by the question on the legal evaluation of the incorporation of these republics into the body of the Soviet Union, on the direct or indirect activity of the Soviet Constitution in the republics, as well as on the priority of Soviet or republic law. Furthermore, in the Baltic republics there actively enough appeared both supporters of a new Union treaty and opponents of this idea. In regard to this, the second part of Article 97 of the Latvian SSR constitutional reform draft proposes the granting of full authority to the Latvian SSR Congress of People's Deputies to ratify a Union treaty or the USSR Constitution. Furthermore, we suggest that Article 70 of the USSR Constitution be worded thus: "The Union of Soviet Socialist Republics is a united, multi-national state, which was founded on the basis of the socialist national loyalty principle, the free self-determination of nations and the equal, voluntary union of the Soviet socialist republics in the result, basing themselves on the Union treaty."

In the final result the norms of the Union treaty are nothing else but a division of plenary powers between the Union and the republics, and this task can be achieved just as well by a treaty as an individual division of the USSR Constitution, which regulates this division of power. But that itself is not that important. Much more important is the creation of a legal mechanism, with whose help the real, sovereign equality of all—both large and small—Soviet republics would be guaranteed. In its own turn, this anticipates setting out in both the Soviet and all the republic constitutions guarantees of republic state sovereignty, corresponding to standards of international rights. Therefore it is necessary to create a balanced mechanism whereby it would be possible to unite not only the mutual interests of the Soviet republics, but also the interests of the whole Union and individual Soviet republics. The future stability of inter-republic and interethnic relations in the Soviet Union depend on

the solution of this problem. Therefore, so that they would not assume ties corresponding to All-Union norms that have been determined contrary to a republic's wishes, the Baltic republics ask that a condition be included that the All-Union Constitution take effect on a republic's territory only after it has been ratified by that republic's legislative body. Respectively, Article 174 of the USSR Constitution should be amended with a new norm: "Laws on changes in the USSR Constitution take effect after they have been ratified by the highest representative bodies of all the Soviet republics." Let us not forget that also in the United States of America all constitutional amendments and changes take effect only after they have been ratified by a corresponding number of state legislative assemblies.

In a word, the essence of the problem is that until the Soviet republics have equal representation in the USSR Congress of People's Deputies, its voting procedure cannot protect itself from the acceptance of a decision unwelcome for a particular republic. If equal republic representation is guaranteed in the Congress of People's Deputies and the Supreme Soviet, then the need for the republic to ratify the Soviet Constitution will automatically be taken care of.

In the same vein, this also refers to the republic rights to leave the Soviet Union, acknowledged in Soviet constitutional legislation. The adoption of our draft's proposal on this question is part of the competence of the Latvian SSR Congress of People's Deputies, but Moscow experts suggest that this question be decided in a referendum. This may be, but as the Soviet political system becomes more democratic in the second phase of improvement, the possibility that any of the Soviet republics will raise the question of leaving the Soviet Union will be much smaller.

Continuing the discussion of the jurisdiction of the congress, in the proposed draft we must also turn to the painful question in our republic of the appointing and removal of the republic's procurator. Currently the legal status of the republic procurator in effect in the Latvian Soviet Socialist Republic does not fall under any measures of parliamentary democracy, because the procurator, one of a few directors of organs of justice, is actually higher than the supreme body of power in the republic, or at any rate, outside of its influence. The existing system for appointing Soviet republic procurators during the time of the cult of personality was mechanically transplanted from the Russian Soviet Federal Socialist Republic to all the Soviet republics. This antiquated system does not at all reflect the sovereignty principle of the Soviet republic. Therefore, our draft includes a transitional norm, regarding which "the Latvian SSR procurator is confirmed by the Latvian Congress of People's Deputies, but is removed from his post on the suggestion of the Latvian SSR Congress of People's Deputies." In the USSR law "On Changes in the USSR Constitution (Basic Law)," which we will submit to the USSR Congress of People's Deputies, among other things there is also included this proposal:

to express the first part of Article 166 of the Soviet Constitution in this wording. "Soviet republic procurators are appointed and removed from their posts by the Soviet republic's Congresses of People's Deputies and are confirmed by the USSR General Procurator."

The law's articles dedicated to the Latvian SSR Supreme Soviet also contain several innovations. For example, on the question, unsolved in the USSR Constitution, on the way in which proposals on candidates for Latvian SSR Supreme Soviet deputies are to be made, we propose to solve it by granting this authority to groups of deputies that can be formed just as well depending on membership on social organization, or on representation of administrative territorial units.

We suggest the granting of new, supplemental powers to the Latvian SSR Supreme Soviet. For example, it will solve questions of special economic zones and will determine their legal routine. The Supreme Soviet will guarantee the unity of legality in the Latvian SSR territory and will halt the execution of USSR state administrative organ acts on Latvian SSR territory in cases when they do not correspond to the Latvian SSR Constitution and laws. The Moscow experts announced that obviously this norm will be included in the USSR Constitution in the next stage of the reform. We plan to suggest respective amendments in the USSR Constitution already now and concretely—to include in Article 76 a norm of this content: "In the case that acts of the USSR state administrative organs contradict the laws of a Soviet republic, the Soviet republic's law will be in effect." We must note that Lithuania and Estonia anticipate relating the principle of republic law prevailing not only to All-Union administrative acts, but to legislative acts as well.

According to the draft, the Latvian SSR Supreme Soviet will have the right to open and close diplomatic representation and consular institutions of the Latvian SSR, as well as representatives of trade and other organizations, and to control the concluding of agreements on loans and credits that are received from external sources.

The innovation in USSR constitutional legislation is the fact that the Supreme Soviet will have the right to supervise the external ties of the Latvian SSR and the observance of legal ties in this respect, and to control how the Constitution and the law are observed by the armed forces located on republic territory, by state security organs, internal organs and departments, as well as defense industry enterprises and other enterprises under All-Union jurisdiction. It is unnecessary to mention how very sharply the need to realize this power was discussed in the Latvian SSR press.

Obviously the necessity to grant the Latvian SSR Supreme Soviet the right to consider questions of ethnic policy has ripened, because in this area the situation can change very quickly and it is not always possible to call the congress.

The question of who will be given the right to initiate legislation is also of importance. Along with certain state

organs and responsible persons, the draft grants these rights to the newly-founded and, in the current conditions of complicated interethnic relations, important organ—the consultative Soviet of Nationalities of the Latvian SSR Supreme Soviet. Currently the question of this Soviet's completion remains unresolved. But in regard to the fact that the question of the cultural and national autonomy of the republic's ethnic groups (not territorial units) was formulated clearly enough at the Latvian SSR Peoples' Forum, and currently the only organized efforts in this direction are the national cultural societies, then the representation elected from them can also become a basis for the future Soviet.

Among the draft norms that are especially acutely received in the republic are the creation of a mechanism to guarantee the self-determination of the Latvian nation and Latvian SSR sovereignty. For the achievement of this aim we decided to utilize the formula of the Vienna document. In this result part two of Article 104 is stated thus:

"In cases when the Latvian SSR Congress of People's Deputies or the Latvian SSR Supreme Soviet receives laws or draft resolutions that violate Latvian SSR sovereignty or limit the people's right to self-determination—in full conditions of freedom without interference from the outside to determine their internal and external political status and according to their views to realize their political, economic, social, and cultural development, the draft will be examined only in case it is voted for by everyone in the Latvian SSR Congress of People's Deputies or by the deputies present at the session of the Latvian SSR Supreme Soviet." Therefore it is fully just to solve this questions only on the basis of the consensus principle.

It is interesting to note that Professor K. Sheremets, doctor of legal sciences, suggested that this formulation be strengthened even more, to render the republic's sovereignty and the Latvian people's self-determination principle fully irrefutable, but a few other Moscow scientists at the same time went so far as to try to convince us that the participatory nations do not obligatorily have to fulfill the principles of the Vienna documents in internal state affairs. In this respect we must note that at the meeting of the USSR United Nations support association on 17 May 1989, Comrade Petrovsky, USSR deputy foreign minister, said that the Vienna document has an obligatory nature in all its facets, including on the question of internal state affairs. This approach was determined in the corresponding Politburo decision.

A few new, fully responsible questions regarding the draft will also have to be decided by the Latvian SSR Supreme Soviet Presidium, for example, it will have to determine efforts that are necessary to guarantee state security and social order. Together with the USSR Supreme Soviet Presidium it will accept resolutions on the declaration of martial law or state of emergency in the entire republic or in individual territories and on a

determination of a realized administration form by special USSR or Latvian SSR state organs in specified cases.

While working on the text of the republic's constitutional draft, the authors were caused great doubts by the norm of the second part of Article 120 of the USSR Constitution, currently in effect, according to which the supreme soviet chairman can "at any time by secret ballot" be removed by the USSR Congress of People's Deputies. Such a formulation actually allows for a coup d'etat. Therefore in our draft the initiative of raising this question is given to the constitutional supervisory committee, but the congress is assigned with solving this question by secret ballot.

As an essential guarantee of a legal, democratic order we consider the expanded immunity of the deputies, judges, and constitutional supervisory committee. We suggest that the deputy immunity contained in All-Union law be supplemented with immunity against arrests and searches. In case the immunity of the deputy, his family members, or his belongings is threatened, the state must guarantee his safety. In principle the immunity of the constitutional supervisory committee members and judges is made equal to the immunity of deputies.

The constitutional supervision committee will be of utmost importance for the defense of democracy in our nation. In addition to the powers mentioned in the USSR Constitution, we propose that it be granted the right to examine the question of the conformity of normative acts and the statutes of republic social organizations with the Constitution and the law. Here the rather interesting precedent of the West German constitutional court was taken into account. According to its decision this nation's neo-fascist party was acknowledged as anti-constitutional and was liquidated.

The draft also grants the constitutional supervision committee the right to determine the conformity of USSR state administrative organ acts with the Latvian SSR Constitution and laws and to examine material cases when higher officials have not observed the Constitution and the laws. In cases of the ascertainment of such facts the committee will raise the question of removing the indicated persons from their appointed positions, as well as calling these persons to account.

#### **Armenian, Jewish, Other Societies Flourish in Lvov**

18001211a Kiev PRAVDA UKRAINY in Russian 6 May 89 p 2

[Article by K. Chavaga, RATAU correspondent: "Our Common Home, the Country of the Soviets: Frindeship Without Slogans"]

[Text] The oblast branch of the Ukrainian Culture Fund has begun its activity with the resurrection of the best traditions of interethnic relations in Lvov. Under its aegis, amateur associations of admirers of the cultural

legacy of Ukrainian, Poles, Armenians and Jews have been created, as well as a movement of Russian-speaking friends of Ukrainian literature and art.

"Our ancient city has been multinational since olden times," says the chairman of the the Cultural Fund branch, People's Artist of the Ukrainian SSR E. Misko. "Old-timers still remember how in the residential quarters the songs of various nationalities were heard and distinctive trades were developed. For this reason, we once supported the initiatives of our fellow-countrymen striving to preserve their national traditions.

Instructive is the history of the creation of the Armenian Akhpyur (Rodnik) Society. Enthusiasts from the young people's Association of Lvov, consisting primarily of Ukrainians, were joined by a group of Armenian lads. Together they restored monuments at the Lychakovskoye Cemetery took part in charity concerts, and then decided to devote themselves entirely to the resurrection of Armenian culture on Lvov soil. Thus, in the former Armenian quarter, they have already begun to create a center for Ukrainian-Armenian relations. Here a museum, a library, a cafe for young people, and studios for artists are housed. Lessons have begun in an Armenian Sunday school, which is also attended by Ukrainians, Poles and Russians who desire to study the language and literature of the fraternal people.

Recently posters of the Society for Jewish Culture imeni Sholom-Aleykhem, which has succeeded in the creation of collectives of amateur talent activities, have become customary in the city. They have returned to contemporaries the colorful Purim spring festival, which at the request of the people of Lvov, went on for 3 days in the Romantik Youth Palace. Now the townspeople all together are collecting materials and exhibits for the museum of Jewish culture, which was ransacked by the Hitlerites, and are contributing funds for the erection of monuments to victims of the Nazi genocide. Soon they will be installed at the place of the former ghetto and near the Yanovskiy Concentration Camp.

And here is how the first steps of the activity of the Polish Cultural-Educational Society are characterized by its chairman, Leshek Mazep, a professor of the Lvov Conservatory.

"First of all, we undertook the organization of branches in rural localities, where concentrated groups of Poles live. Basing ourselves on the experience of the Society of the Ukrainian Language imeni Taras Shevchenko, we are striving to increase the study of the native language, the collection of folklore, and the creation of choral and dance ensembles. Not long ago, at the invitation of the Polish Cultural Fund we were in the People's Republic of Poland and agreed that during the current summer we will send several groups of school children there for the holidays.

### Ukrainian CP Historian Examines Nationalities, Language Issues

18001211b Kiev PRAVDA UKRAINY in Russian  
6 May 89 p 2

[Article by F. Rudich, director of the Institute of Party History at the Ukrainian CP Central Committee and the Branch of the Institute of Marxism at the CPSU Central Committee: "Interethnic Relations: Trends of Development and Paths of Normalization"]

[Text] The events connected with the aggravation of interethnic relations in Kazakhstan, Nogornyy Karabakh, the Baltic republics, Moldavia, and a number of oblasts of the Ukraine, are filled with dramatic qualities. The matter, as happened in Georgia, even reaches tragic situations. All this compels us to recognize the problem of present-day interethnic relations as extremely important, requiring the intent attention of all to whom the consolidation and unity of the Soviet peoples are dear.

For the multinational Ukrainian SSR, the relations between nations and nationalities are of special significance. And not only because its weight in the country's economy, science, and culture is so great, because it bears great responsibility for the general interests of the [Soviet] Union. But also because, by the will of history, the Ukrainian people were determined as one of the first to verify in experience the creative force of internationalist values and Leninist nationality policy, as well as the whole interminableness and blind alley nature of the numerous nationalist variants, and the paths proposed at various times by dubious protectors of its interests.

The Ukrainian people have always chosen the path of unity and friendship. That is how it was during the days of the Great October and during the years of the defense of its achievements and peaceful creative work. In the Ukraine, the fundamental methods of the socialist solution of nationality problems passed a vital test for the first time. Here the first Soviet national republic was created and the fundamental principles of its interrelationships with Soviet Russia and the other socialist republics were determined. It is difficult to overestimate its contribution to the realization of the Leninist idea of the creation and consolidation of a political, economic, military and diplomatic union of Soviet republics and the formation of the Union of Soviet Republics.

A new stage in party construction, marked by the creation of republic party organizations as a constituent part of a single Leninist party, is connected with the Ukraine.

It is precisely in the paths of the persistent struggle for optimum regard of the inter-national and the national that the solution of the age-old problem of the reunification of all the Ukrainian lands and the consolidation of the Ukrainian socialist nation became possible.

And today, in restoring in primordial purity the Leninist conception of interethnic relations, in cleansing it from

the deformations of Stalinism, the working class, the peasantry, and the intelligentsia of the Soviet Ukraine, through their political will, labor and reason, are doing everything to strengthen the consolidation and unity of the Soviet people, to strengthen the socialist order—the foundations of the free development and prosperity of the peoples of the USSR. These are, indeed, fundamental values. To defend and augment them is our international duty.

The party organization of the republic keeps the questions of interethnic relations constantly in its field of vision. Twice in recent times—in August 1987 and December 1988—the Ukrainian CP Central Committee adopted detailed resolutions on the state of affairs in this sphere. Special structural subdivisions for questions of patriotic and inter-national education have been created in the Ukrainian CP Central Committee and the party obkoms. The center of gravity in their work is gradually being focused on the development of reliable reference-points for the optimization of interethnic relations, the consistent formation of a healthy public opinion, and an intolerant attitude to any manifestations of national narrow-mindedness.

A practical step in this direction is the integral conception of the development of Ukrainian national culture to the year 2000, which is being developed by the Ukrainian CP Central Committee, with the participation of scholars and all the creative unions of the republic.

The Presidium of the Ukrainian SSR Supreme Soviet has begun the development of draft supplements to the Constitution of the republic and a Law on Language.

But nevertheless there are trends that are potentially dangerous for the healthy practice of interethnic contacts, which cannot but call forth serious concern. Historical experience—including the experience of socialist construction—indicates: An aggravation of the nationality situation takes place, as a rule, in sharp historical changes, when these or those economic expectations do not come true, when social insecurity intensifies, when other urgent questions are not solved for a long time, including that of the development of national culture. The social consciousness in this case is frequently thrown in searches.

The state of affairs in the national-spiritual life of the republic is now characterized to a significant degree by cultural and language situations, in particular in the sphere of the use of the Ukrainian language.

The intensified investigation of this problem shows that two trends in the interethnic intercourse of the inhabitants of the republic have taken shape. On the one hand, national nihilism of a significant part of the population is tenacious, as well as the loss of many progressive traditions and, in many cases, an attitude of indifference to the native language and culture. On the other hand, an exaggeration of the significance of national factors in public life is observed, as well as national pride, which

frequently develops into national egoism, and sometimes even into political extremism. The latter is especially dangerous.

Such is the reality, which should be taken into account both in theory and in practice.

We find reference points for the solution of these difficult questions in the materials of the 19th All-Union CPSU Conference and in the documents of the Ukrainian CP Central Committee on nationality problems. In so doing, the concern about the active functioning of the Ukrainian language in the various spheres of state, public, and cultural life is being moved into the foreground. And at the same time—the creation of all the necessary conditions for the harmonious and natural development of national-Russian bilingualism and the Russian language, which has become the means of interethnic discourse, without which it is simply impossible today to imagine public life in a single union state.

It should be especially emphasized that there exists not simply an objective need, but also an acute necessity to raise the prestige of the Ukrainian language and in many cases to restore it. A number of approaches to the solution of this question are being singled out. One of them—it is now being given preference—is the giving to the Ukrainian language of the status of a state language on the appropriate constitutional basis. The second is the introduction, in the republic, of two state languages: Ukrainian as the national language and Russian as the language of interethnic discourse.

And nevertheless, the complexity and the special delicate nature of this fundamentally important question compel us to search for other variants of the solution of the language problem, which are acceptable for the entire population.

In our view, the question should be rightfully put of anchoring legislatively the following essential categories: With respect to the native language—the “national language of the republic”; with respect to the Russian language—the “language of interethnic intercourse.”

In support of such an approach, one could cite the non-acceptance, by Lenin, of the concept of “obligatory state language.” Although Lenin had in mind a situation where they attempted to impose the language of the great Russians on the entire rest of the population as the state language, in principle he came out against the element of compulsion in language policy. No matter how many fine phrases about “culture” you might use, an obligatory state language is attended by compulsion and hammering in,” he wrote. Compulsion “will heighten hostility, create millions of new conflicts, and intensify irritation, mutual lack of understanding, etc.” And further: “Necessary: The absence of an obligatory state language, with the provision of schools for the population with instruction in all the local languages. . . .”

Proceeding from these methodological directives, it seems expedient to reflect in the constitutions of the

union republics the proposition that the working languages of the supreme organs of state power are the national language and the language of inter-national intercourse. In this case, the necessity of securing the term “state language in legislation no longer arises.”

But even in so doing, the native nation (in our case—the Ukrainian) must show constant concern about the equality of all the other nationalities living in the republic and to create the necessary prerequisites for the unimpeded development of their native language, national traditions, and cultural values.

It goes without saying, all of these approaches should be thoroughly discussed with the participation of scholars, specialists-philologists, teachers, and the entire population of the republic, and a procedure should be adopted which will make it possible to avoid non-democratic decisions in questions of language policy. It would also be useful to turn to foreign experience, in particular to the practice of multilingualism in Switzerland and bilingualism in Canada.

In the country, including in the Ukrainian SSR, a positive social renewal is under way at the present time, the processes of democratization are becoming intensified, and glasnost is expanding. The election campaign and the elections to USSR people's deputies have demonstrated the present explosion of civic activeness. Party and soviet organs are developing new approaches in their activity, the trade union, Komsomol and other organs, including newly-created public organizations, are becoming more active.

On the wave of democratization and glasnost, numerous informal associations are springing up. In many cases, the representatives of the artistic and scientific intelligentsia appear as their initiators. In this process, the youth, mainly the student and school youth, is being actively involved. During the past 2 years, quite a few amateur associations, clubs and groups have been created—a process which is continuing.

Many of them set themselves the goal of participating in the restructuring processes in the various spheres of the economy, social life, and the study of the “blank spots” of history, and they focus their attention on the questions of the development of Ukrainian culture and the Ukrainian language, the preservation of the monuments of history and architecture, and on ecological problems. On the whole, the operation of associations of that sort can be assessed as positive. But is impossible not to also see the fact that, under the influence of extremist elements in their activity, increasingly often crude attacks on our historical and social achievements and on the socialist order are being observed.

A pointed discussion is being conducted in the republic in connection with the publication of the draft program of the so-called “Popular Movement of the Ukraine for Perestroika”. Whatever the authors of the draft say, in practical terms they are talking about the creation of a political and organizational structure that is opposed to

the CPSU, about the aspiration "to soften" and "to wash away" the union principles of our state. It is impossible to consider the draft program of this movement as anything else than a manifesto of political demands, as a kind of platform of a struggle for power.

In so doing, there arises the association with the popular fronts in the Baltic republics, sufficiently contradictory movements, whose operations have not only not led to consolidation, but have called forth a sharp aggravation of interethnic relations in the region mentioned.

It is also impossible not to call attention to the following characteristic fact. The leaders of the Helsinki Union, the National Democratic League, and the Culturological Club have declared their support of the "movement" and their intent to join it as "collective members."

But, indeed, it is precisely in the activity of these groupings that a consistently nationalist and anti-socialist tendency is clearly observed. The membership of the leadership of the so-called Ukrainian Helsinki Union and the Ukrainian Culturological Club closely connected with it basically includes people who in the past have been convicted for anti-Soviet and other illegal activity. Under the pretext of the struggle for democratization and national revival, they are propagating open nationalism and separatism, inspire the conduct of various types of anti-social actions, and form alliances with nationalists and extremists from various other regions of the country. The political platform of the Ukrainian National-Democratic League includes the "condemnation" of the October Revolution and the Soviet political system, the "repudiation" not only of Stalinism, but also the "cult of Lenin", and the ideology of Marxism-Leninism. In spite of various "pretexts," the leaders of these, if one can call them so, unions orient themselves on the directives of well-known Western bourgeois-nationalist subversive centers and lavishly supply them with tendentious information.

The events taking place lately in the sphere of interethnic relations in a number of union republics confirm with special force the topicality of the words of M. S. Gorbachev about the fact that "in the conditions of restructuring, political extremism of the nationalist persuasion, which hinders the normal development of the democratic process and does damage to all our national affairs, is especially intolerable and dangerous."

The party committees should not leave without rebuff various sorts of nationalist or chauvinist attacks. We ought to proceed from the fact that the propagation of racial and national enmity is prohibited by law in our country. Society must be protected against extremism. In the Law on Public Organizations and Their Status, which is now in preparation, provisions must be made both for their right to legislative initiative and the direct prohibition of extremist formations capable of inflicting irreparable damage to the normal functioning of socialist society.

On the threshold of the CPSU Central Committee Plenum, which will examine the present-day conception of nationality policy, especially urgent interest is attached to a thorough analysis of the processes that are taking place in interethnic relations and the increase of the level of the propagation and realization of the Leninist conception of internationalism and the Leninist approaches to patriotic and international education.

It goes without saying, this work must be conducted on a firm theoretical basis. This proposition must be underscored since recently one increasingly frequently has the occasion to hear assertions about the necessity of an all-round examination of the Marxist-Leninist theory of nations and national relations, including the category—the Soviet people, which characterizes a qualitatively new social and international community of people. It stands to reason, in this and in any other question, new approaches are needed that are capable of freeing the theory of dogmatic fetters. But it is impossible to hit another extreme and to cast doubt on its fundamental principles.

We see the task of the social scientists in this, and at present the efforts of the scholars of the Institute of the History of the Party at the Ukrainian CP Central Committee are concentrated on this, in order to clearly mark off the Leninist approaches to the solution of nationality problems from their latest deformations, in order to cleanse the Leninist conception of socialist federalism from everything that is uncharacteristic of it and that appeared in the situation of the cult of the personality and constraint of democratic institutions. We are placing serious hopes on the sector of the history, theory and practice of interethnic relations that has been created in the institute.

A return to the principles of socialist federalism, which in many respects has been lost, appears to be the chief path to the normalization of interethnic relations. In this connection, the scholars are called upon to satisfy the public interest in the theory of Soviet federalism. How are the concepts of "the single union state" and "the federative state" correlated? What is the dialectic of the combination of "the strong center and strong republics?" What should be understood by economic sovereignty, republic khozraschet, etc.? Now these are already not merely questions of theory, but also directly practical questions, which today are knocking loudly at the door. This is also indicated by the draft of the General Principles of the Restructuring of the Leadership of the Economic and Social Sphere in the Union Republics on the basis of the expansion of their sovereign rights, self-government, and self-financing, which have been published for discussion.

We must decisively overcome the "lack of attachment" of theory and practice, which has led to the fact that the social scientists did not know the situation which had in reality taken shape in inter-national relations, and practical workers demonstrated a peculiar "deafness" to questions of theory, making do with the search for

citations suitable to the case. Unfortunately, even today this gap is overcome only with difficulty. The arrangement of clear-cut interaction between social science scholars and practical party workers seems urgently necessary. The absence of a mechanism of direct connection and feedback leads in practice to the fact that suggestions of scholars frequently remain "not called for", and the practical workers act, adapting to the situation, without a special care for theory. This is fraught with new defects.

Party organizations and communists are called upon to be the cementing force and the soul of the socialist union of peoples and active champions of internationalism. The formation of the socialist and internationalist way of life is the business of the entire party and all Soviet people. For this, we should make full use of the political experience, labor ethics, and moral potential of the working class, the peasantry and the intelligentsia, as well as their deep devotion to the friendship of peoples.

And the very last thing. From the organizational point of view, the experience of the formation of inter-sectorial research programs in the analysis of national processes on the basis of the combination of efforts of sociologists, political scientists, historians, ethnographers, demographers and linguists deserves attention.

### Working Group on Status of Ukrainian Language

#### Group Member Interviewed

18001570 Kiev PRAVDA UKRAINY in Russian 21 Jul 89 p 3

[Interview with I.A. Timchenko, work group secretary, senior scientific associate of the Institute of State and Law of the Ukrainian SSR Academy of Sciences, candidate of jurisprudence, by RATAU correspondent: "On the Status of the Ukrainian Language"]

[Text] As has already been reported, the permanent commissions of the Ukrainian SSR Supreme Soviet for questions of patriotic and international education and interethnic relations, for education and culture, and for legislative proposals have initiated a petition to make changes in the Ukrainian SSR Constitution with respect to granting the Ukrainian language the status of the state language and developing a draft of a Ukrainian SSR law on languages. To this end the permanent commissions created a work group.

Our RATAU correspondent asked the secretary of the work group, senior scientific associate of the Institute of State and Law of the Ukrainian SSR Academy of Sciences, Candidate of Jurisprudence I.A. Timchenko to discuss the group's activity and the condition of the work on the draft of the additions to the Ukrainian SSR Constitution and the preparation of the draft law.

The work group, says Ivan Artemyevich, includes deputies of the Ukrainian SSR Supreme Soviet, scientific associates of institutions of the Academy of Sciences,

VUZ scholars, writers, and workers of soviet organs and organs of education, culture, justice, and social organizations. At the organizational meeting we created work subgroups which immediately began to work on the drafts. Their initial variant was ready within a month.

It should be emphasized that the development of any draft law, and the more so one on language, is a highly complex, significant, and, I would say, delicate matter. Therefore any haste would be inappropriate here. At the regular meeting on 22 May the work group discussed comprehensively and in detail the drafts of the additions to the Ukrainian SSR Constitution and the law on languages. The remarks and suggestions made there were taken into account during further careful development of the drafts, which are now in the final stage.

This work required painstaking study and research on a broad range of issues. Each of them taken individually and in connection with the others affects the determination of the content of various provisions of the draft and the formulation of specific articles of the future law. Such an approach is a guarantee of successful embodiment in practice of social relations and legal support for effective development of the corresponding social phenomena and processes in the ethnic and interethnic spheres of our life.

First of all it should be emphasized that in its work the group started with party principles concerning interethnic relations contained in the corresponding political decisions of the 19th All-Union Party Congress. These were provisions concerning free development of national languages in our society, their active and equally valid use in all spheres of state, political, and social life; the Russian language as the language of interethnic communication among the peoples of the USSR; and the need for citizens of other nationalities to study the language of the people whose name is used for the republic on whose territory they are living. They also used as a point of departure the decrees of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Ukraine concerning questions of ethnic relations and interethnic and patriotic education of the population. As we know, in all these party documents Lenin's ideas on national issues have been given further progressive development with respect to the practice of the present day.

[RATAU] Was the experience of other union republics used in the legal regulation of language issues?

[Timchenko] Yes, without a doubt. When preparing the drafts we studied first of all the experience in solving these problems in our republic during the first years after the revolution and in legislation that is currently in effect. Members of the work group had at their disposal the corresponding legislative acts of the Transcaucasian and Baltic republics and also the published draft law on language of the Moldavian SSR [Soviet Socialist Republic.] Experience in solving such problems in foreign countries was also studied.

But probably of greatest value to us were the numerous letters from citizens sent to the work group, soviet and party organs, and the editors of newspapers and magazines. They were warm, touching, and imbued with a deep concern for the development and functioning of our native language. True, sometimes they were excessively emotional. But a lot of this can be understood. This mail included practically everything having to do with the development of the draft law: constructive suggestions and business advice. There is no doubt that the letters also contained questionable opinions. But the sincere and friendly polemic was only in favor of establishing the truth in disputed problem issues. And the leading opinion found in these letters was to give the status of the state language to the Ukrainian language and to be concerned about the free development of the languages of other nationalities living on the territory of our republic.

[RATAU] And were there letters with a different content?

[Timchenko] Not many, but there were some. As for myself, one of the reasons for this was the shortage of extensive information about the work of the group. Some people perceived the announcement about giving the Ukrainian language the status of a state language, to judge from several of the letters, as though they were supposed to forget their own national language and use only Ukrainian. There is no doubt that such an opinion is erroneous.

[RATAU] What does it mean for the Ukrainian language to have the status of the state language?

[Timchenko] I shall not speak about the final formulation of the law. This is a matter for the republic's highest organ of authority. For myself I shall say that the state language—the Ukrainian language—should be the language for work, business correspondence and documents of state, party, and social organs, enterprises, institutions, and organizations, and also the language of their interrelations. As concerns the citizens, the law should guarantee them the right to use any national language, including a free choice of a language for communication in the aforementioned organs, enterprises, institutions, and organizations.

[RATAU] What are the prospects for the languages of other nationalities in the economic, state, political, and social life of the republic?

[Timchenko] The status of the Ukrainian language as the state language should not rule out the possibility of using—along with the state language, of course—the national languages of the compact majority of the population of various localities in the work of state, party, and social organs, enterprises, institutions, and organizations located there.

[RATAU] Many people if not all are interested in the question of the use of the Russian language.

[Timchenko] As of today the Russian language does not have a clearly defined social and legal status either in the union republics or in the USSR. Therefore it would be expedient to fill in this gap in the law on languages. The unification of the republics into the USSR—the single unified multinational state—makes it necessary to select the national language of one of these republics as the language of interethnic communication of the peoples of the USSR. This is actually what the Russian language, the language of the RSFSR [Russian Soviet Federated Socialist Republic], has been, and this should be reflected in the legislation.

We should clearly distinguish the status of the language of the Russians living on the territory of the republic from the Russian language as the language of interethnic communication among the peoples of the USSR, which is actually recognized as such by each of the union republics. In the former case its status is equated to that of the languages of other nationalities living on the territory of the republic. In the latter case it is, in the first place, the language for the interrelations of republic and local state, party, and social organs, enterprises, institutions and organizations of the republic, on the one hand, and the corresponding organs, enterprises, institutions, and organizations of the USSR and other union republics, and, in the second place, it is the language of interethnic communication among citizens of the USSR.

[RATAU] What are some other of the most important issues of language that are within the purview of the work group?

[Timchenko] First of all, the language used for education. Here we should proceed from the idea that every child has the inalienable right to be reared and receive a school education in his native language. But when creating the network of preschool institutions and schools we must not fail to take into account the desire of the parents to put their child in a school with one or another language of training and instruction and also the realistic possibility of providing it. The study of the Ukrainian language should be mandatory in all the schools.

Also in the field of vision of the work group were questions of vocational and technical schools, secondary specialized and higher educational institutions, the language of information, communication, and names, and the language for the work of law enforcement agencies and international agreements.

[RATAU] What are the group's tasks in the current, final stage of its work?

[Timchenko] In a couple of days our work group will gather at the regular meeting to discuss the final drafts of the laws. Taking into account the remarks and suggestions, they will be reworked and submitted for the consideration of the permanent commissions of the Ukrainian SSR Supreme Soviet. After that the drafts will go to the Presidium of the republic Supreme Soviet

which, according to the Constitution, will make a decision about submitting the draft laws for public discussion. This will take place as it was discussed in the interview published in RADYNSKIY UKRAYNI with a member of the work group, the first secretary of the board of the Union of Writers of the Ukraine, Yuriy Mushketik, within a month or two, that is, at the end of August or the beginning of September.

### Working Session Described

18001570 Kiev PRAVDA UKRAINY in Russian 27 Jul 89 p 3

[RATAU report: "The Meeting of the Work Group on Questions of Languages"]

[Text] The regular meeting of the work group for preparing the draft of additions to the Constitution of the Ukrainian SSR having to do with giving the Ukrainian language the status of the state language and developing the draft of the law on languages in the Ukrainian SSR was held on 24 July.

Participating in the discussion of the drafts were V.I. Shinkaruk, chairman of the work group, director of the Institute of Philosophy of the Ukrainian SSR Academy of Sciences, and corresponding member of the Ukrainian SSR Academy of Sciences; V.S. Burlay, deputy chairman of the work group and director of RATAU; A.V. Myalovitskiy, editor in chief of the magazine KOMMUNIST UKRAINY; and members of the work group: V.V. Akulenko, head of the foreign languages department at Kiev State University, corresponding member of the Ukrainian SSR Academy of Sciences; A.A. Birov, chairman of the Prikordonnik Kolkhoz [collective farm] in Vinogradovskiy Rayon in Transcarpathian Oblast; V.A. Vasilenko, professor at Kiev State University; M.A. Golodnyy, deputy chief of the administration for codification and systematization of legislation of the Ukrainian SSR Ministry of Justice, candidate of jurisprudence; I.M. Dzyuba, a writer; V.V. Kopeychikov, professor at the Kiev Higher School of the USSR Ministry of Internal Affairs; P.F. Martynenko, docent at Kiev State University, candidate of jurisprudence; G.M. Mushketik, first secretary of the board of the Union of Writers of the Ukraine; V.M. Rusanovskiy, director of the Institute of Language Study imeni A.A. Potebnya of the Ukrainian SSR Academy of Science, academician of the Ukrainian SSR Academy of Sciences; V.N. Selivanov, lead scientific associate of the Institute of State and Law of the Ukrainian SSR Academy of Sciences, doctor of jurisprudence; N.A. Slavov, first deputy minister of transportation of the Ukrainian SSR, chief of the Glavrechflot production association; I.A. Timchenko, senior scientific associate of the Institute of State and Law of the Ukrainian SSR Academy of Sciences, candidate of jurisprudence; V.G. Shevchenko, chief of the main training and methods administration for general secondary education of the Ukrainian SSR Ministry of

Public Education; and Yu.M. Shramko, chief of the KGB of the Ukrainian SSR for the city of Kiev and Kiev Oblast.

Participants in the meeting comprehensively discussed the draft of the additions to the Ukrainian SSR Constitution and each of the articles of the draft of the law on languages. It was noted that when preparing them the work group was guided by Leninist teachings and party decisions regarding interethnic relations contained in the documents of the 19th All-Union CPSU Conference. Here they gave full consideration to the provisions concerning free development of national languages in our society and their active and equal use in all spheres of state, political, and social life, the Russian language as the language of interethnic communication among the peoples of the USSR, and the need to study the language of the people whose name is that of the republic by nationalities living on its territory.

It was emphasized at the meeting that when the drafts were being prepared attention was paid to the experience in finding legal solutions to language problems in our republic during the first years after the war and in legislation currently in effect as well as the corresponding laws of other republics and numerous letters sent by citizens to the work group.

A decisive factor in the group's work was the development of legislative provisions which would grant the Ukrainian language the status of the state language and make sure that it actually became the language of work, business correspondence, and documents of state, party and social organs, enterprises, institutions, and organizations of the republic. In the drafts they formulated principles whose practical implementation would guarantee the citizens the right to use any national language freely.

It was stated at the meeting that the status of the Ukrainian language as the state language should presuppose the use along with the state language of the national languages of the compact majority of the population in one locality or another in the work of state, party, and social organs, enterprises, institutions, and organizations located there.

It is envisioned in the draft law that the Ukrainian SSR provides for free use of the Russian language as the language of interethnic communication among the peoples of the USSR.

A considerable amount of attention was devoted to articles of the draft which pertain to languages in the sphere of education, science, and culture. Many aspects were taken into account during their development and discussion and a wide range of issues was carefully studied. This pertains especially to the language of education. It was stated at the meeting that each child should have an inalienable right to be reared and receive an education in the national language of his people. Attention should also be paid to the parents' desire to

send the child to a school where the rearing and education are in their language of choice. The study of the Ukrainian language should become mandatory in all schools.

They also discussed the language used for education in vocational and technical schools and secondary specialized and higher educational institutions.

The remarks and suggestions made by members of the work group will be taken into account in the final version of the drafts. Then both drafts will be considered by permanent commissions of the Ukrainian SSR Supreme Soviet—for questions of patriotic and international education; interethnic relations, education, and culture; and legislative proposals.

N.G. Khomenko, secretary of the Presidium of the Ukrainian SSR Supreme Soviet, participated in the meeting of the work group.

### **Ryzhkov's Parents, Way of Life in Ukraine Described**

*18001567 Kiev PRAVDA UKRAINY in Russian 30 Jul 89 p 2*

[Interview with I.F. Ryzhkov, father of the chairman of the Council of Ministers, by PRAVDA UKRAINY special correspondent V. Lukyanenko: "Visiting the Parents of N.I. Ryzhkov"; date and place not specified]

[Text] The noon sun was beating down on the Donetsk steppe in earnest. The green wicket opened without squeaking. I walked to the house past the flower beds of roses and clematis. The house was locked. The path led to me to the garden and the vegetable patch, diving into the ephemeral shade of a pear tree. Aleksandra Pavlovna sat on a low stool next to the dwarf cherry tree. Ivan Fedorovich emerged from the back of the garden (perhaps, this is stretching it, as the garden was not that big) carrying buckets full of ripe berries.

This was an ordinary day and customary occupations for the Ryzhkov family. The parents of Chairman of the USSR Council of Ministers live here, not far from the city of Dzerzhinsk, as they always have.

Our newly appointed prime minister is definitely a likable person. Many people approve of his reserved, well-disposed, collected manners. The customary impartial judgments whereby the situation in the country is being attributed to the personality of the prime minister are not infrequent either. This is also understandable. However, in all of that even the critics do not deny the humanity and openness of Nikolay Ivanovich.

The people were given an opportunity to follow a non-conventional process of forming the government. In addition to their previous impressions, many people noted the high culture of parliamentary procedure which

our prime minister possesses. The impression was such that this man was reared and groomed especially for a high state post.

No, it is not this way at all. Ryzhkov does not come from "elite" circles. He was brought up in a large working-class family which settled in this mining area about 100 years ago.

I happened to have a conversation with the head of this family, Ivan Fedorovich Ryzhkov. His bearing is enviable (despite his age of 82 years). His simple and natural behavior does not as much as hint at any exclusiveness of his present situation. Perhaps, the immutable dignity of a person who has lived his life honestly and has nothing to rebuke himself for is the reason.

We entered the house, a cool oasis amid the heat of July. We started our conversation with the house.

Ivan Fedorovich explained: "The walls are made of wood here; this is, perhaps, why it is cool. In winter, it is a cold house, though. They advised me to lay bricks around it... Devil may take it"—and he waved off the proposal which he did not think was needed.

[Correspondent] How old is your house?

[Ryzhkov] I built it in 1937. Before that, Aleksandra Pavlovna and I lived in a hut for 7 years. Building it was an adventure! They were thinning out the forest strip along the railroad, and they were selling the wood very cheaply. So, I went there and selected timber which was more or less fit. I also purchased some things at a lumber yard, and built the house. We spread clay on the outside, and that was it.

[Correspondent] Where was your family home? I asked knowing that this settlement next to Dzerzhinsk has been called Ryzhkov Hamlet since long ago.

[Ryzhkov] At first, the father and his family lived not far from here, in Zaytsevo, and then they moved here, to the virgin land, when there were only six houses or so in the settlement. At first, they worked as shepherds for the entire summer, and then they went to the mines. There were six brothers and a sister in our family (she died recently). My mother told me that, all told, 14 children were born...

So, all the brothers became miners. I do not mean to boast, but we worked well. Look, Mikhail had the Order of the Red Banner of Labor, Fedor had the Order of Lenin. Vladimir also had orders. Yuriy, to be sure, only had a medal [original illegible] now they will drive the veterans around the rayon in the buses free of charge...

Ivan Fedorovich went on and on about his family drawing from the uncomplicated family chronicle the kind energy which was easy for the people to understand. Everything in this story was recognizable and close to the heart of a person familiar with the Donbass—about Ivan Fedorovich working first as a mine props installer and then as a coal-hewer, about the working life at the same

imeni Voroshilov mine where they have a fond memory of the Ryzhkovs to this day, about "going for the record" twice in the time of Stakhanov, about graduating from the courses of mining foremen, becoming a coal quality inspector, head of the Technical Control Department, about receiving his first "special award"—an opportunity to buy a Moskvich of the previous, old model.

I could not resist it and asked him:

[Correspondent] Ivan Fedorovich, did the newspapermen approach you when you worked? Did they write about your work?

[Ryzhkov] No... They have become interested now.

[Correspondent] Could you ever expect changes that abrupt in your life?

[Ryzhkov] What changes? Personally, we have not had any. We live our way.

[Correspondent] Still, Nikolay Ivanovich has had a swift career. How do you view it? How has it affected you?

[Ryzhkov] I have already told one story about his advancement; listen to this. Kolya was still working in Sverdlovsk, and he was getting a promotion virtually every year. A rumor spread around the Urals Machinery Plant that Ryzhkov's father was in the ministry, and was pulling his son up "by the reins." We had a laugh: I wish you could visit this "ministry"—500 meters below the surface...

In general, it is hard to say whether we thought about what was going to come of our son. Of course, Nikolay has always been talented, extremely so. He brought certificates of merit from school every year. To tell you the truth, I did not have the time to prompt something to him. He went up on his own... To tell you the truth, we were calmer when Nikolay did not hold high positions.

[Correspondent] Do you see him infrequently?

[Ryzhkov] Yes. Previously, he used to come here. It is not possible at present, there is very much work. Now we visit him for a week almost every year. I see how difficult it is for him to work. From 7.30 to 22.00, he is at work, and then we have a supper together. On top of that, he goes to his office and works until midnight. I tell him: That's it, Kolya, let's rest. He laughs, because this cannot be postponed.

He calls us now. He is worried about how we are doing here.

[Correspondent] At present, the chairman of the Council of Ministers does not have it easy. There even are outward signs of that. All of us saw that when they began to broadcast the procedure of confirmation of ministers...

[Ryzhkov] I follow this too. During the day, there is no time to watch, but at 21.00 hours we always watch TV. Of course, we feel for Nikolay Ivanovich. It is interesting

what happens. Everyone has his own opinion. How are they to come to an agreement? Still, this must be right. This is what I think: Every matter, every decision has to be well "chewed," that is, thought through and tried. I do not like people who start an endeavor hastily, without thinking.

[Correspondent] Have you ever tried giving advice to your son on governing the state?

Having raised his eyebrow just a little, and smiling gently, Ryzhkov answered:

[Ryzhkov] No, how can I? And what for? Everybody should mind his own business.

[Correspondent] However, people definitely come to you with requests to appeal to your son?

[Ryzhkov] This happens in abundance! They come week after week. Initially, I even wanted to do something, to pass it on, but then I understood that this is not good. It is not right for me to interfere. People do come, and I cannot drive them away. But I cannot promise to help. I cannot do it that way.

[Correspondent] Perhaps, you also happen to hear criticism of Nikolay Ivanovich?

[Ryzhkov] What is criticism... I went to the market (I sometimes go to sell something from the garden). Someone recognized me, they came up, and began to praise Nikolay Ivanovich. One man—his back was turned to me—muttered softly: "Go on, praise him, but soap is not available..."

You see, there are all kinds of people, you cannot make them all happy. Who knows in our country what burden the leaders carry? Kolya told me that in Armenia he slept 2 hours a day after the earthquake. And the nerves...

[Correspondent] There is much dissatisfaction in the country. Everyone wants to live better. After all, you, Ivan Fedorovich, are in a special situation. You are what they call common people, and you live like everyone does. Your son, for his part, leads the state. "Combining" in yourself these two levels of society, do you think that we are going to live better?

[Ryzhkov] I do not want to make a prediction. Indeed, I am a common man. I will tell you as I understand it. I know that perestroika was conceived for the benefit of people. I know that our leaders sincerely want an improvement, and I believe it is going to be so. After all, I compare how we used to live and how we live now: This is like night and day. When I got married I did not have a suit of my own, I put on my brother's. A bicycle was considered to be a luxury item... I believe it. What worries me is that the people do not quite want to work. You see, the respect for work is disappearing. And they judge everything sort of... lightly.

We were at the end of our conversation, and I did not ask the question prepared: Why have you not moved closer

to your son? I had already understood that the question was not necessary. The Ryzhkovs are good and open people, and their principles of life are not vain. How can they leave this land to which they have given their lives? How could they give up their habits the main of which (I am in no fear of making a mistake here) is to work while you still have the strength?

I will admit that in the house of the Ryzhkovs I sought (without an ulterior motive) at least some hint at the high position of the son, or, so to say, "local grovelling." It was not there. There are 120 rubles of retirement benefits for miners. There is an abundant garden and vegetable patch on which they work themselves. There is the respect of neighbors and those who knew the Ryzhkovs from work. There is the concern of the son...

I have no right to judge what the the personal relations in the family are. I will still venture to state what I have detected in the course of the conversation—the understanding which firmed up later.

There is a tremendous distance between shiny limousines, representative chambers, official visits abroad, and everyday dizzying problems of the head of government of a great power, and the tidy simple house in the mining area, everyday care of the earth beds, trees, and

flowers by Ivan Fedorovich and Aleksandra Pavlovna. However, I think that the distance is only superficial.

If someone doubts whether the chairman of the Council of Ministers knows the real life of the people then he should not doubt; the chairman does know it. Here is a detail, though: N.I. Ryzhkov could play his trump card, much in the style of rallies, during the debate at the congress: Supposedly, my parents live as everyone does, so I understand and know the pain of the people. He did not do so. Apparently, his integrity and feeling of responsibility prevented him from this. Not everything is that simple in our life. You cannot build a showcase idyll "from top to bottom."

If the prime minister has given up "personal window-dressing" this alone commands respect, as well as the genuine dignity of Ivan Fedorovich.

...Unfortunately, I can expect ahead of time that some people will suspect me of servile tender emotions. Not at all, I just rendered here what I had heard and seen at the place of the parents of our prime minister. Maybe, this will become a detail of his human side. When it comes to judging the head of our government, we will do so on the basis of his deeds.